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Abstract 
This dissertation is an inquiry into the nature and significance of artistic knowledge, as a 
subset of the larger category of tacit knowledge. Art, both in its production and reception, 
encompasses many diverse forms of knowledge, so by artistic knowledge I am referring to 
the intangible components of art that do not conform to traditional notions of codified, 
propositional or explicit knowledge. 
Such forms of qualitative and subjective knowledge are undervalued within our current 
Western context, which is dominated by a rational, objective and scientific mode of thought. 
This is primarily due to the impossibility of quantifying such intangible knowledge, or 
measuring its results. 
As someone with a background in both science and art I can see great value in both forms of 
knowledge and feel it is critical to find ways of combining different ways of knowing 
otherwise an awareness of the bigger picture and an interconnected view of the world is lost. 
The integrated articles included in this dissertation explore the application and potentials of 
artistic knowledge and arts-based research within science (Chapter 2: “The Idea of Colour”), 
design (Chapter 3: “Design of the Absurd”), and art history (Chapter 4: “An Uncertain 
Experience”). Additionally, my own projects, The One Pixel Camera, Locations, and A 
Series of Boring Videos: Watched, Watching, Watch are discussed (Chapter 3: “Design of the 
Absurd, Chapter 5: “A Brief Statement on Locations" and Chapter 6: “How to Watch Video” 
respectively) as artworks that present single or very limited modes of knowledge transfer. On 
one level, these limitations might work to frustrate the viewer, but on another, they open up 
the potential for new forms of appreciation and new ways of knowing.  
 
Keywords 
Artistic Knowledge, Tacit Knowledge, Arts Based Research, Photography, Video Art, 
Intersections of Art and Science, Colour, Politics of Design, Documentation of Performance 
Art, The One Pixel Camera, Locations, A Series of Boring Videos. 
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Methods Statement 
This dissertation applies a multifaceted approach in order to contend with the ineffable nature 
of tacit knowledge. The goal, ironically, is to make the tacit explicit. As an exceedingly 
complicated task, due to the personal and internal qualities of tacit knowledge, it cannot be 
generalized to a universal account, nor accomplished through the presentation of quantifiable 
data. Consequently, multiple perspectives and approaches have been used in order to 
converge on a new understanding of the significance of tacit knowledge, and to explore ways 
in which it can be combined with explicit forms of knowledge where both function on an 
even playing field. 
I acknowledge that this dissertation does not provide a full analysis of the complicated 
nuances of tacit and explicit knowledge. For the purposes of better illustrating the specific 
issues presented in this dissertation I felt it necessary to approach the problem as a binary, in 
a dualistic and polemic manner. 
To accomplish this goal I incorporate three main strategies: I draw from theorists in a variety 
of fields that discuss the merits of tacit knowledge; I present a series of artworks that produce 
simple or very limited modes of knowledge transfer in order to lead the viewer towards a 
greater appreciation of tacit knowledge; and I include case studies that demonstrate situations 
where tacit knowledge can augment explicit knowing and enhance overall cognition.  
The case studies include examples from the early days of modern science when tacit ways of 
knowing were still appreciated; it illustrates how the designed objects around us and the tools 
we use affect us and control our actions on a subsidiary and tacit level; it looks at the work of 
artists who make use of tacit methods in order to produce a more profound awareness on the 
part of the viewer; it discusses samples from my own art practice and explains how I 
endeavor to transfer tacit knowledge through my artwork; and it includes a discussion of my 
experience documenting performance art events and how these mediated documents can 
work to tacitly convey an experience of the originating event. When assembled as a whole, 
these case studies encompass the role of tacit knowledge in the primary activities of art 
production and reception. In so doing, they present a specific analysis of the significance of 
artistic knowledge as it exists within the realm of tacit knowledge. 
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Preface 
For a visual artist functioning within an academic context, the question of “artistic 
knowledge” is always an issue: what is it that artists, actually know and how can they share 
this knowledge with others? In fact, the very existence of a studio-based PhD program is a 
matter of contention, and there are many who would argue that ineffable artistic knowledge 
has no place in the academy. Others claim that applying an academic research approach to art 
production is detrimental to the very essence of art.1  
The difficulty primarily stems from the impossibility of quantifying artistic knowledge and 
measuring its “results”.2 Artistic knowledge cannot be transferred through explicit, linguistic 
means, but instead is uniquely produced within the individual through their own personal 
engagement and embodied experience.  
Artistic knowledge is aligned with philosopher Michael Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge 
(personal knowledge that cannot be articulated through verbal means), which exists in 
contrast to what he refers to as explicit knowledge (formal, codified, linguistic knowledge).3 
It should also be noted, that tacit knowledge is by no means exclusive to art. It is the 
knowledge we use to navigate the world on a daily basis, it drives the realms of craft and 
design, and even plays a role in the sciences (especially in the early stages of hypothesis 
generation). However, due to its qualitative and subjective nature, it is given little credit and 
generally ignored as a valid or credible form of knowledge. I see this as problematic because 
much of what it is to be human is based in tacit understanding and most innovation, at its 
root, stems from some form of tacit or gut-based intuition.4 
                                                 
1  See James Elkins’ book Artists with PhDs: On the new Doctoral Degree in Studio Art for an extended 
 discussion on this issue. 
2  Art, both in its production and reception, encompasses many diverse forms of knowledge, so by artistic 
 knowledge I am referring to those components of art that do not conform to traditional notions of 
 codified,  propositional, or explicit knowledge. 
3  Further exploration of these concepts can be found in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
4  An expanded discussion of these issues is also found in Chapter 1. 
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As someone with a background in both science and art, I can see great value in the 
knowledge and epistemological systems of both areas: science primarily aligned with explicit 
forms of knowing, and art with tacit. Historically, these areas were not so divided and it was 
common to encounter artist/scientists and mathematician/philosophers, but such hybrids are 
now quite rare. I feel it is critical to find ways of combining such fields and to resist the drive 
towards specialization and purification. Without an amalgamation of knowledge, an 
awareness of the bigger picture and an interconnected view of the world is lost. More than 
ever before, an integrated and comprehensive understanding of the world is needed—and it is 
this viewpoint that informs and drives my research and artistic production.  
I would propose that art provides us with ways to increase the appreciation of tacit 
understanding and encourages us to accept composite ways of knowing that involve both 
tacit and explicit approaches. On one level, art is an effective means of transferring tacit 
knowledge: through a process of showing rather than telling, and by constructing specific 
experiences for the viewer. On another level, if done properly, art can make us aware of our 
own perception and the ways in which we construct our personal understandings of the 
world—thus demonstrating the significance and importance of tacit knowing in relation to 
these processes. How such knowledge can be applied in science, design, art history and to my 
own artwork will serve as the core of the discussion for the following series of integrated 
articles, which comprise my dissertation.    
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction: Theoretical Background  
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the overall scope of my research, presenting a 
theoretical background on different forms of knowledge and their significance, as well as 
defining my primary research questions: 
1) What exactly are tacit forms of knowing? 
2) Why are tacit ways of knowing important, and why should we care? 
3) What can be done to increase awareness, acceptance and appreciation of this type 
of knowledge within contemporary culture? 
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Chapter 2 – The Idea of Colour: Newton’s Skeleton, Goethe’s Gentle Empiricism and 
Olafur Eliasson’s Room for One Colour 
Chapter 2 looks at the specific case of colour perception, where neither an explicit scientific 
approach (Newton), nor an experiential tacit approach (Goethe), will result in a full 
understanding of the phenomena. Instead, a composite approach is required. This chapter will 
explore the advantages and limitations of both approaches, as well as considering comingled 
alternatives, such as Alva Noë’s model of Active Perception. Additionally, experiential 
artworks, such as Olafur Eliasson’s Room for One Colour, will be examined as a means for 
the viewer to gain a greater tacit understanding of phenomena such as colour, while at the 
same time developing a deeper understanding about the nature of our own perception.   
 
Chapter 3 – Design of the Absurd: The One Pixel Camera 
Chapter 3 considers tacit knowledge within the realm of design, how the manufactured 
objects and infrastructure around us contain hidden politics and prescribe specific behaviors 
through features of their design. Through the process of design, certain actions are made to 
be intuitively obvious, while the possibility of other actions is entirely eliminated. To explore 
the tacit politics of design, this chapter will draw from the writings of Bruno Latour, 
Langdon Winner and Vilém Flusser. Additionally, my own artwork, The One Pixel Camera 
Project, will be discussed as an absurdist “performance” of technology that works to make 
the hidden politics of design more tangible to the viewer, on an intuitive level, through the 
production of an apparatus with an incredibly restrictive design.    
 
Chapter 4 – An Uncertain Experience: the Production and Viewing of Photographic 
Documentation from Performance Art Events 
The tradition of performance art is premised on the "authentic" tacit experience of being 
present in the live audience. However, due to the limitations of time and space, such an ideal 
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experience is rarely possible, so photographic documentation serves as its best proxy—
especially for art-historical purposes. Drawing from theorists such as Peggy Phelan, Amelia 
Jones and Philip Auslander, as well as my own personal experience photographing 
performance art, this chapter explores the dynamic between the experience of being there live 
and the “experience” of viewing the photographic document. Additionally, the role played by 
the photographer is considered in terms of how photographic decisions subjectively shape the 
eventual visual document and how both the photographer's body and the mere presence of 
the camera alter the dynamic of the originating performance event. 
This chapter argues that the eventual performance document is not an "objective" document 
produced by a fly-on-the-wall entity. Rather than lamenting it as a weakness, I propose that 
the viewer might view the mediation of the photographer in a positive light: as a transfer of 
tacit knowledge that presents an experience of the photographer’s experience. Through such 
an approach, the experience of the photograph becomes a richer and more embodied 
experience in itself.   
 
Chapter 5 – A Brief Statement on Locations 
This chapter presents a brief description of my Locations project. Locations consists of a 
series of images depicting banal, yet enigmatic landscapes; there is a logic and a rationale 
behind the images, and the selection of locales, but this will remain intentionally unstated. 
Locations is meant to function in contrast to the One Pixel Camera Project : where the One 
Pixel Camera Project is reliant on the use of explicit captions, Locations does away with 
captioning altogether leaving only the uncoded content of the images to explain and provide 
meaning in the work. 
 
Chapter 6 – How to Watch Video: The Benefits of Becoming Bored 
Chapter 5 looks at my project, A Series of Boring Videos, which consists of three videos: 
Watched (2011), Watching (2012) and Watch (2014). Each video pertains to a specific idiom 
of boredom: “a watched pot never boils”, “watching paint dry” and “to watch grass grow”, 
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respectively. Beyond a simple tongue-in-cheek literalization of these adages, the videos are 
meant to encourage the viewer to engage in a close and considered look at what, in actual 
fact, are very complex physical, chemical, biological and psychological phenomena. 
This type of close viewing yields an intuitive and tacit understanding of the phenomena 
depicted, and ideally a greater awareness of the process of perception itself. The chapter 
explores the potential of “boredom,” as a way of pushing past literal and explicit 
understanding, and exhibition strategies that may encourage viewers to engage with the work 
in an extended and profound way. 
 
Chapter 7 – Documentation of The Things You Know but Cannot Explain (McIntosh 
Gallery, June 12 - July 12, 2014) 
A visual chapter depicting the exhibition of artwork produced as part of my research: The 
One Pixel Camera, Locations, and A Series of Boring Videos: Watched, Watching, Watch. 
The exhibition explores the ways in which we construct our understanding of the world, 
through combinations of tacit and explicit forms of knowledge. Each of the works in this 
exhibition present single, or very limited, modes of knowledge transfer. On one level, these 
limitations might work to frustrate the viewer; on another, they open up the potential for new 
forms of appreciation and new ways of knowing. 
 
Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
Chapter 8 offers an overview of the various chapters and a discussion of how they 
specifically relate to the research questions posed in the introduction. It includes a further 
analysis of the ways art and arts-based research can inspire further acceptance of tacit ways 
of knowing and work towards a more integrated and comprehensive understanding of the 
world. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction: Theoretical Background 
The dominant mode of thought for our current age, in the western world, is one based in 
rationality; objectivity; universality; deductive logic; explicit, denotative language; 
abstraction; a reduction of things to their constituent parts; and an emphasis on utility. It 
primarily emerged during the time of the Enlightenment, following Descartes’ distrust of the 
senses and separation of the body from the mind, although it can also be found to have roots 
in the Platonic emphasis on reason and ideas (Forms) over experience of the material world. 
This mode of thought has developed and increased in dominance over the years, reaching a 
pinnacle in modernism, continuing on through post-modernity and persisting in the present 
moment. In many ways, this trajectory of thought has served us well and brought about many 
scientific and technological advancements, as well as greatly increasing our material standard 
of living; however, it has not come without a price. Philosopher and psychiatrist Iain 
McGilchrist characterizes our modern era as having “an excess of consciousness and an over-
explicitness in relation to what needs to remain intuitive and implicit; depersonalisation and 
alienation from the body and empathic feeling; disruption of context; fragmentation of 
experience; and the loss of ‘betweenness’ ” (397).      
We live in an age based on a logical, mechanical model of the world, where much of what it 
is to be human is lost, rejected or downplayed in significance. As described by philosopher 
Michel Serres: “We have lost, without recourse, the memory of a heard, seen, perceived 
world, experienced by a body devoid of language.” (339) We pass over our subjectivity and 
our intuition, focusing on the parts with little concern for the whole. Feelings, senses and 
tacit understandings are viewed as untrustworthy; the qualitative mode of understanding is 
replaced by the quantitative, in which everything must be measured and categorized in order 
to determine its utility and value. We are no longer situated in context, not even within our 
own bodies, and have come to view the world from above: from nowhere. For Serres, a new 
theory of knowledge is required, one that “brings together the exact and the human sciences” 
for “It is only on this condition that we shall escape our collective death” (Serres 51). 
2 
 
 
The philosopher Michael Polanyi uses the term “explicit knowledge” to describe this 
rational, logical mode of thought. However, Polanyi does not value explicit knowledge above 
all else. He instead sees it as a pole on a continuum of knowing, along axes of activity and 
awareness, with “tacit knowledge”—personal intuitive knowledge that cannot be articulated 
through verbal means—as the opposite pole. For the purpose of simplicity, I will often make 
use of his terms “explicit” and “tacit”1 as shorthand to describe the two ways of knowing 
described above. I am aware that the discussion of tacit and explicit is more complex and 
nuanced than addressed in this dissertation; however, I felt it necessary to approach this 
discussion as a binary in order better illustrate the issues presented. 
In terms of my own research, I am interested in the ignored and undervalued tacit ways of 
knowing, which are often associated with the arts. This is not to say that they should serve as 
a replacement for logical, analytical thought, but rather that they should work in combination 
to form a greater, more complete and holistic understanding of the world and ourselves 
within it. Specifically I am interested in looking at the following questions:    
1. What exactly are tacit forms of knowing? 
2. Why are tacit ways of knowing important, and why should we care? 
3. What can be done to increase awareness, acceptance and appreciation of this type of 
knowledge within contemporary culture? 
When I started this research, I was specifically interested in the intersection, interactions, and 
differences between art, science and technology and in interrogating how these fields have 
shaped our perception and understanding of the world. Over time and through my research 
process, I came to see that it was not just that these fields that changed our perception and 
understanding of the world, but also that our modes of perception and understanding 
significantly shaped and constructed these fields. With this in mind, my interest shifted from 
primarily looking at art and science to exploring the ways of knowing described above: how 
they interact with one another, how they can be combined, as well as how they are 
emphasized, promoted and constructed within the specific epistemologies of art and science.   
                                                 
1  These terms are unpacked in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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1.1 Question 1: What exactly are these tacit forms of 
 knowing? 
Many theorists have written about the tensions between distinct types of knowledge and 
epistemologies, and about what happens when a single type of knowing comes to dominate a 
current worldview. For instance, Heidegger sees our modern age as one premised on a 
process of “enframing.” Enframing describes an explicit way of viewing and thinking about 
the world from a reductive and rational perspective such that it is seen only for its utility, as 
resource or as “standing reserve.” For Heidegger, this is a new way of picturing the world, 
brought about by the advent of the Industrial Revolution and specifically modern technology. 
Elsewhere, he describes a difference between “objects” and “things,” not as different types of 
physical entities, but as different ways of perceiving and experiencing items in the world. An 
“object” is the mere objective, explicit understanding of an item, whereas a “thing” is 
something that contains meaning and is understood on a more tacit and subjective level. 
According to Heidegger, “Science’s knowledge, which is compelling within its own sphere, 
the sphere of objects, already had annihilated things as things long before the atom bomb 
exploded” (“Thing” 168). However, it is not just science that strips meaning away from 
“things” — any overly explicit explanation will do the same. A simple example of this is the 
way explaining a joke ruins its impact. 
Often, explicit ways of knowing are associated with the notion of objectivity. As Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison describe in their book Objectivity, this concept is not something 
that has always been around but rather a new epistemology that emerged in the mid-
nineteenth century:   
 Perhaps the most disorienting feature of the history of scientific objectivity was 
 not, as we had originally assumed, the bare assertion that objectivity had a history, 
 but rather the specifics of just when and how that history began. The shock was  that 
 the emergence of objectivity in the mid-nineteenth century did not coincide with any 
 of the conventional accounts (which vary from discipline to discipline and among 
 national traditions) of the origins of modernity: not with the scientific revolution, in 
 the seventeenth century, the political revolutions of the late  eighteenth century, or the 
 industrial and technological revolutions of the turn of the twentieth century. (3) 
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According to their research, objectivity does not have a specific cause, but instead emerged 
alongside the modern concept of subjectivity, which also has a history of its own:    
 ... objectivity and subjectivity emerged in tandem, and the explanation is the
 demarcation line between them. Like the similarly complimentary pair 
 male/female, the details of what characteristics fall on one or another side of the 
 boundary are less important than the extraordinarily elastic and resilient structure  of 
 the structure itself. (5)    
For Daston and Galison, it is the identification and separation itself that created the distinct 
ways of knowing, which over time further divided to the point where objective, explicit ways 
of knowing became the only way to produce proper scientific knowledge. 
Originally, even in science (or natural philosophy as it was once called), there was no 
distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. Science was based in extended and careful 
sensory observations and intuitive interpretations of what was contextually seen, smelt, 
tasted, felt or heard. From these interpretations, an ideal, archetypical and holistic 
understanding of natural phenomena could be achieved by the “sage-like” (371) figure of the 
natural scientist. In order to transfer this intuitive, tacit knowledge, the scientist would work 
in close collaboration with artists and illustrators. Through a process of “four-eyed sight” 
(Daston and Galison 88), they would work in tandem to produce drawings for scientific 
atlases depicting archetypical examples of the phenomena and organisms observed. For 
Daston and Galison, the emergence of objectivity is linked to differing notions of the 
“scientific self,” which shifted over time as new “codes of epistemic virtue” came into play 
(18). This early form of “scientific self” involved a mixture of tacit and explicit knowledge, 
demonstrating what Daston and Galison coin as a “truth-to-nature” (58) code. 
With the development of better instruments and technology, coupled with a rising distrust of 
the accuracy of “sage-like” intuition, a new form of scientific self emerged, whose goal was 
not to interpret nature as such, but instead to “let nature speak for itself” (120). The 
interpretive drawings of the artist slowly gave way to instrument-based measurements and, 
most significantly, photographs. Photographs associated with this mindset were produced in 
a mechanical and direct way that would supposedly eliminate all traces of mediation and 
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subjective interpretation. Through this, the code of “mechanical objectivity,” (121) which 
claimed a direct and unmediated connection to nature itself, was born.  
Of course, photographs can never be made without human interference and/or subjectivity. 
Over time, this mechanical objectivity viewpoint shifted and eventually even photographs 
were deemed untrustworthy. Only purely mathematical and logical structures could be 
considered valid material through which to produce scientific knowledge, thus removing 
science from the physical world and repositioning it in abstraction and purely explicit 
knowledge. Daston and Galison use the term “structural objectivity” to describe this phase of 
the scientific self, though it permeates far beyond the realm of science:   
 Objectivity ... was not about sensation or even about things; it had nothing to with 
 images, made or mental. It was about enduring structural relationships that 
 survived mathematical transformations, scientific revolutions, shifts in linguistic 
 development, cultural diversity, psychology  evolution, the  vagaries of history, and 
 the quirks of individual physiology. (259)   
This may seem like a bit of an endgame where all knowledge of the actual world and of our 
experience in the world has come to be ignored and passed over; however, all is not lost. 
Daston and Galison present a new type of scientific self that makes use of human subjectivity 
through a process of “trained judgement” (309). 2 In reaction to pure, structural objectivity, 
this emergent self makes use of “mechanically objective” images, but interprets such images 
through intuitive means. However, this form of intuition is not the same as that of the sage-
like “truth-to-nature” scientific self, because it is taught and applied as a simple skill. Trained 
judgement does not return scientific knowing fully to the world and to ourselves, but the 
acceptance of such tacit knowledge within science does provide some hope.   
                                                 
2 I can relate to this on a personal level by way of a past engineering job at Ontario Hydro that involved the 
 reading and interpretation of images produced by an ultrasonic inspection system used on nuclear 
 reactor pressure tubes. The images presented time as a physical dimension (relating to the time taken for 
 the ultrasonic wave to travel, which corresponds to a distance in a round-about way). It took me about a 
 month of exposure to this type of imagery before I was able to discern the significant features  seen by other 
 more experienced individuals in the lab. 
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Often this distinction between objectivity and subjectivity is seen as the primary difference 
between science and art; 3 however, as seen by Daston and Galison, objectivity itself not a 
fixed quantity and in earlier times was not even an aspect of science. Additionally, it should 
be fairly obvious that neither science nor art is based solely in either objectivity or 
subjectivity, but that both fields contain aspects of both ways of constructing knowledge. In 
his well-known essay, “The Two Cultures,” C.P. Snow describes the difference between 
science and the humanities (arts) as one based not in epistemology, but rather in cultural 
difference. Each group is invested in its own, mutually exclusive, body of knowledge and 
presents an almost hegemonic disdain for the knowledge of the other, viewing it as 
something not worthy of consideration.  
Such “cultural” differences are indicative of the modern drive towards specialization, 
purification and the separation of knowledge into distinct categories and fields. Bruno Latour 
describes this as a key component in what he terms the “Modern Constitution” (“Modern” 
13); however, for Latour this process of purification is never entirely pure in itself and is 
always coupled with underlying networks of “mediators”,4 “hybrids” and works of 
translation, even though the existence of such hybrids and mediators are strongly denied:   
 The essential point of the modern Constitution is that it renders the work of 
 mediation that assembles hybrids invisible, unthinkable, unrepresentable. Does the 
 lack of representation limit the work of mediation in any way? No, for the modern 
 world would immediately cease to function. Like all other collectives it lives on that 
 blending. (Latour, “Modern” 34)    
Ironically, Latour also claims that it is the very act of purification that makes hybrids possible 
in the first place (“Modern” 12): without a separation into categories, how could a hybrid be 
                                                 
3 By “art” in this case, both the humanities and creative arts will be included together even though they 
 might be considered as separate classes of their own.  
4  Mediators are actors ("entities that do things" [Latour "Masses" 163], be they human or nonhuman - e.g. 
 instruments, visual representations, texts) that transfer information/knowledge/belief through a 
 process of translation. Often this translation takes place between distinct ontological categories (nature/ 
 culture, science/politics) and transform, distort and modify the meaning of the elements they carry. This 
 concept of mediators and mediation is explored further in Chapter 4: An Uncertain Experience. 
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a hybrid of separate categories? So, according to Latour, categories such as art and science, 
science and politics, subjectivity and objectivity, perhaps even explicit and tacit knowledge, 
are never fully separate, and much of their perceived separation belongs to a modern ideal 
that was never actually true.5 It is also interesting to note that the mediators and hybrids 
described by Latour function on an “unthinkable, unrepresentable” tacit level. 
Returning to the general discussion of different modes of knowing brings us to Iain 
McGilchrist. As both a philosopher and psychiatrist, he draws from philosophy, history, 
cognitive science, and neuroscience to present a very thorough and convincing argument not 
only for the existence of the two distinct types of knowledge, but also for the source of this 
divide. McGilchrist associates this divide with the evolved division of the brain into left and 
right hemispheres, claiming that, over time, the left hemisphere’s way of knowing and 
functioning has come to dominate and take precedence over the right hemisphere’s activity 
and way understanding of the world. It should be noted, however, that his analysis goes much 
further than the traditional notion of the “left brain = logical”, “right brain = creative” split-
brain cliché, as McGilchrist presents a model of the brain where the two hemispheres are 
strongly intermingled and dependent upon one another:    
 Gradually, with unfolding [neurological] research, it becomes obvious that 
 both hemispheres seemed to contribute to language, both to visuospatial imagery: 
 both were involved in reason and emotion, which were inextricably involved with one 
 another. In fact it didn’t matter what it was our brains were  engaged with doing, both 
 hemispheres were in it up to the neck (or whatever a hemisphere has for a neck). 
 (McGilchrist, “Unhappy” 8) 
The general thesis of McGilchrist’s argument is that the brains of humans and higher animals 
have evolved into two hemispheres in order to accommodate two distinct modes of 
perception/cognition: the left is focused on details and a short term view, whereas the right 
concerns itself with the bigger picture and a more long-term view. In the case of a simple 
animal, such as a bird, the left hemisphere is useful for detailed tasks such as picking out and 
                                                 
5  As indicated through the title of his book: We Have Never Been Modern. 
8 
 
 
identifying seeds against a background of grit, whereas the right keeps an eye out on the 
general context and detects potential threats (or changes and difference in a more general 
sense) (McGilchrist, “Unhappy” 10). In humans, the roles of the two hemispheres are much 
more complicated, as McGilchrist explains in detail:   
 The world of the left hemisphere, dependent on denotative language and 
 abstraction, yields clarity and power to manipulate things that are known, fixed, 
 static, isolated, decontextualized, explicit, disembodied, general in  nature, but 
 ultimately lifeless. The right hemisphere, by contrast, yields a world of individual, 
 changing, evolving, interconnected, implicit, incarnate, living beings within the 
 context of the lived world, but in a nature of things never fully graspable, always 
 imperfectly known—and to this world it exists within a relationship of care. The 
 knowledge that is mediated by the left hemisphere is knowledge within a closed 
 system. It has the advantage of perfection, but such perfection is bought ultimately at 
 the price of emptiness, or self-reference. It can mediate knowledge, but only in terms 
 of a mechanical arrangement of things already known. It can never really ‘break out’ 
 to know anything new, because its knowledge is of its own representations only. 
 Where the thing itself is ‘present’ to the right hemisphere, it is only ‘re-presented’ by 
 the left hemisphere, now becomes an idea of a thing. Where the right hemisphere is 
 conscious of the Other, whatever that may be, the left hemisphere consciousness is of 
 itself. (McGilchrist, “Master” 174) 
These distinct types of knowing are very useful in that they allow us to look at and 
understand things in a multiplicity of ways depending on purpose and context. To explain 
this, McGilchrist uses the example of viewing a mountain: “A mountain that is a landmark to 
a navigator, a source of wealth to the prospector, a many textured form to the painter, or to 
another the dwelling place of the gods, is changed by the attention given to it. There is no 
‘real’ mountain which can be distinguished from these, no one way of thinking which reveals 
the true mountain” (“Master” 28). Additionally, the left and the right work in tandem to 
detect and identify worldly phenomena, such as in the case of colour perception: the right 
hemisphere would perceive and interpret a particular colour sensation, where the left 
hemisphere would identify and name it “blue.”       
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The problem, according to McGilchrist, is that the left hemisphere has a tendency to 
dominate thinking and place greater value upon its own way of knowing. With the left’s 
focus on utility and its ability to manipulate the world, its worth is easily quantified, which 
provides one with a sense of power “and power is very seductive” (McGilchrist “Unhappy” 
27).  Additionally, the left hemisphere, with its narrow and logical focus, has a tendency to 
reject anything that does not agree with its perspective: “it offers very simple explanations, 
that are in their own terms convincing, because what doesn’t fit the plan is simply declared to 
be meaningless” (McGilchrist, “Unhappy” 27). Following this second rationale, one can see 
how the left hemisphere would easily reject the right hemisphere’s way of knowing as 
intangible and without quantifiable utility. 
McGilchrist’s split-brain explanation echoes many of the ideas presented by other theorists 
mentioned in this essay. Heidegger’s notion of “enframing” can be understood as the left 
hemisphere viewing the world in terms of its utility. And the difference between “mere 
objects” and “things” seems to tie easily to the left and right hemispheres’ respective views.6 
The rise of objectivity, as described by Daston and Galison, correlates with the rise of left-
hemisphere thinking and a gradual rejection of the right.  
C.P. Snow does not specifically demonstrate a conflict between left and right ways of 
knowing, but each “culture” demonstrates a left hemisphere tendency to dismiss as 
meaningless anything that does not fit within its own model. Even Latour’s mediators, 
whether they be air pumps7, microscopes, maps, printing presses, types of varnish, market 
forces, or the use of language itself (Latour, “Iconophilic”), can be seen to transform and 
translate knowledge in tacit ways undetectable (or at least denied and ignored) by the left.  
Even though McGilchrist demonstrates a gradual increase of left-hemisphere dominance in 
recent years, he also explains that this is not a permanent state of affairs and that the left’s 
dominance has waxed and waned in a cyclic manner throughout the course of human history. 
                                                 
6 In fact, in The Master and His Emissary, McGilchrist draws extensively on the philosophy of  Heidegger in 
 terms of these aspects and many others.  
7 Relating to Boyle’s air pump, which is discussed in-depth by Latour. For a discussion of the origin of the 
 experimental method and a vision of knowledge based in “matters of fact,” see Shapin and Schaffer. 
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He specifically discusses phases in history where right-hemisphere ways of knowing existed 
on an equal level with those of the left, such as the Classical period in Greece, the Italian 
Renaissance, and the Romantic era of the late 18th and early 19th centuries in Europe. Not 
surprisingly, these are profound periods of human history in which many of the greatest 
developments in terms of culture, literature, art, science and technology took place. Between 
these phases are long spans of left-hemisphere dominance, such as that seen in our current 
postmodern age. Perhaps we are now coming to the end of a cycle and it is time for a return 
to a more balanced way of knowing. Perhaps the fact that the problems associated with 
overly explicit knowledge are being discussed at all—and the corresponding slight re-
emergence of subjectivity within scientific fields8—provides some indication that this might 
very well be the case. 
In a manner similar to McGilchrist, philosopher Michael Polanyi posits two distinct types of 
knowledge: explicit and tacit. Polanyi does not position these as residing in particular 
hemispheres of the brain; for that matter, he concentrates little on their source at all. Instead, 
his emphasis is on what they are and how they function. Polanyi’s notion of holistic and 
intangible tacit knowledge is akin to McGilchrist’s right-hemisphere way of knowing, while 
explicit knowledge corresponds to the left. Like McGilchrist, Polanyi views these two ways 
of knowing as highly intertwined, with any sort of cognitive or bodily activity requiring both 
modes. 
In a simple sense, explicit knowledge can be defined as a process of “knowing-that,” while 
tacit knowledge is a matter of “knowing-how” (Gill 99). 9 Take, for example, the act of riding 
a bicycle: one might have the explicit knowledge that to turn left, one turns the handle bars 
left; however, having this explicit knowledge alone would not enable someone to make a 
bicycle actually turn left if they do not know how to turn left—something that can only be 
acquired tacitly through experience.  
                                                 
8  For example, Daston and Galison’s notion of trained judgement. 
9  The terms “knowing-that” and “knowing-how” (or “know-how” and “know-that”) are commonly used  in 
 the theory relating to Polanyi, and/or Tacit knowledge in general. It is most likely that they originated in the 
 1949 book, The Concept of Mind by Gilbert Ryle.  
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Tacit knowledge is based in emotion, intuition, bodily awareness, sensory observation, and 
all the ways in which we come to know and understand things that we cannot fully describe. 
It goes far beyond biomechanical knowledge, such as riding a bicycle, and includes things 
like being able to tell the difference between a C and D-minor musical tone, having a sense 
of when a meal could use a little more salt, knowing how to speak a language, being able to 
recognize an individual by looking at their face and being able to identify the emotional state 
of another person. 
Often tacit knowledge consists of information that we are not even directly aware of 
possessing: “we can know things, and important things, that we cannot tell” (Polanyi, “Tacit” 
22). Returning to the example of riding a bicycle, one does not explicitly think about the 
individual muscles that must be flexed in order to shift and sway, and maintain balance; for 
that matter one does not even have to think about which way to lean—it is just something 
one does and something one knows on a subsidiary level. In fact, if you spent your time 
explicitly thinking about your balance you would most likely fall, because your concentration 
would be focused on the specific parts of the activity rather than the activity as a whole. Tacit 
knowledge is a holistic knowledge and not a sum of reductive parts. 
For Polanyi, tacit and explicit ways of knowing exist on perpendicular axes of activity and 
awareness along a diagonal continuum of cognitivity as demonstrated in the chart below:   
 
Figure 1: Tacit and explicit knowledge on axes of activity and awareness (Gill 34). 
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Because tacit knowledge functions on a subsidiary level, coupled with the fact knowers of 
such knowledge may not even be fully aware of it themselves, it is difficult to directly 
transfer tacit knowledge, particularly if one relies solely on explicit methods. Tacit 
knowledge is transferred primarily by imitation and mimicry, where one comes to “indwell” 
such knowledge through their own personal experience. Explicit instructions may aid in such 
an endeavour, but can never accomplish the task on their own. In his book on Michael 
Polanyi, Jerry H. Gill uses the example of his son learning to swim to explain the process of 
indwelling: “When my eldest son was five, he insisted that he could not go swimming until 
he first learned to swim. It took some persistence on my part to convince him that it is by 
swimming that one learns how to swim” (Gill 47).  More specifically indwelling is:   
 ... the interaction between subsidiary awareness and bodily activity that gives rise  to 
 tacit knowing. ... This interaction is accomplished by our bodily participation or 
 dwelling in the particulars of which we are but subsidiarily or subliminally aware. 
 These particulars are not initially encountered as meaningful units but as a  random 
 flow of unrelated elements of sensory data. The key to indwelling is to allow 
 ourselves to participate in these particulars as if we already know what they 
 mean. We do this by imitating the meaningful behaviour of those around us even 
 though we do not understand them fully, because we expect to be able to do so. 
 Moreover, such imitation is accomplished through our embodiment, through 
 putting ourselves in the place of others and behaving as we see and hear them 
 doing. (Gill 46)       
Tacit knowing and indwelling constitute much of what we know and what makes us who we 
are, yet there is still a certain “cult of objectivity,” persistent within contemporary western 
thinking, that rejects any knowledge claims that cannot be explicitly identified and 
articulated: “In fact, it is the cardinal rule of this view that if one cannot focus and articulate 
an idea or theory, one has no right to lay claim to knowledge at all” (Gill 48). Polanyi, like 
many of the others, takes great issue with this outlook and advocates for a return of tacit, 
embodied, right-hemisphere and subjective ways of knowing. 
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1.2 Question 2: Why are these tacit ways of knowing 
 important and why should we care? 
Now that we’ve covered the basics of tacit knowledge and explored some of the key theory, 
we can move on to discussing why its diminished significance is so detrimental. As 
previously stated, many great things have resulted from the emphasis on explicit ways of 
knowing, which have shown themselves to be incredibly powerful and useful. Yet focusing 
solely on explicit knowledge leads to incomplete and unfulfilling understandings. As a 
simple example, we can look to Descartes’ overly explicit description of laughter which, 
according to him:   
 ... results when blood coming from the right-hand cavity of the heart through the 
 central arterial vein causes the lungs to swell up suddenly and repeatedly, forcing  the 
 air they contain to rush out through the windpipe, where it forms an inarticulate 
 explosive sound. As the air is expelled, the lungs are swollen so much that they push 
 against all the muscles of the diaphragm, chest and throat, thus causing movement in 
 the facial muscles with which these organs are connected. And it is just the facial 
 expression, together with the inarticulate and explosive sound, that we call ‘laughter’. 
 (qtd. in McGilchrist, “Master” 356)   
This incredibly mechanical description does little (in fact, nothing at all) to explain the 
experience of laughter, its social/emotional causes, or its effect on others as an infectious 
expression of joy. Basically, it misses almost all of what really matters in terms of a laugh on 
a personal level. Ironically, his description is now understood to be blatantly wrong based on 
our current (explicit) understanding of physiology—which also goes to show that explicit 
forms of knowing are not infallible. This is not to say that such mechanical, explicit 
explanations are without worth. They provide great insight in terms of how much of our 
world works, but do not provide a very complete picture, particularly with regard to our 
experience of the world. 
Returning to Michael Polanyi, he views tacit knowledge as the source of all meaning in 
things of which we are explicitly aware:  “It is our subsidiary awareness of a thing that 
endows it with meaning: with a meaning that bears on an object of which we are focally 
aware. A meaningful relation of a subsidiary to a focal is formed by the action of a person 
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who integrates one to the other, and the relation persists by the fact that the person keeps up 
this integration” (“Knowing” 82). Without accepting and maintaining a combination of both 
tacit and explicit awareness, we lose the meaning behind things, and thus things become 
reduced to mere objects. It may be possible to live life without meaning, but is this really the 
kind of life one would want to live? 
Iain McGilchrist sees the loss of meaning as a key concern related to the dominance of 
explicit (left-hemisphere) knowing, going so far as to view this loss of meaning as the root 
cause of our current state of unhappiness (McGilchrist, “Unhappy” 26). 10 He describes the 
role of the right hemisphere in the construction of meaning as follows:   
 The right hemisphere’s particular strength is in the understanding of meaning as a 
 whole and in context. It is with the right hemisphere that we understand the moral  of 
 a story, as well as the point of a joke. It is able to construe intelligently what 
 others mean, determining from intonation, and from pragmatics, not just from 
 summation of meaning units, subject to the combinatorial rules of syntax, as a 
 computer would. It is therefore particularly important wherever non-literal 
 meaning needs to be understood — practically everywhere, therefore, in human 
 discourse and particularly where irony, humour, indirection or sarcasm are 
 involved. (McGilchrist, “Master” 70–71)  
The meaning constructed and understood through the right hemisphere (tacit knowledge) is 
that which makes live worth living, what makes us human and not simply machines. 
Furthering this concern, McGilchrist argues that we have come detached from our own 
bodies and that the body “has become a thing, a thing we possess, a mechanism, even if a 
mechanism for fun, a bit like a sports car with a smart sound system” (“Master” 438). Thus 
mentally separated from our bodies, how can we even attempt to begin to understand 
ourselves, or anything at all, from the position of the self? Strangely, the body is the one 
thing in this world from which we cannot truly walk away—yet our thinking is premised as if 
                                                 
10 McGilchrist references studies over the past 50 years that indicate a significant decrease in overall 
 happiness despite “staggering improvements in material well-being” (McGilchrist, “Unhappy” 26).  
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we have. McGilchrist sums up the direct result of the loss of meaning, intuition and the body 
as follows:   
 Today all available sources of intuitive life—cultural tradition, the natural world,  the 
 body, religion and art—have been so conceptualized, devitalized and ‘deconstructed’ 
 (ironised) by the world of words, mechanistic systems and  theories constructed by 
 the left hemisphere that their power to help us see beyond the hermetic world that is 
 set up is largely drained from them. (McGilchrist, “Master” 244)  
Without an acceptance and acknowledgement of intuitive, right-hemisphere thinking, most of 
what it is to be human is potentially lost. 
On a more practical level (perhaps one could say to appease the left hemisphere’s desire for 
utility) it can be shown that tacit knowledge has a use of its own and often functions as a key 
component in  the generation of new explicit knowledge, even though is remains hidden and 
below the surface.  
For Michael Polanyi, tacit knowledge lies at the base of all knowledge: even language. As a 
child, one does not learn a language through an explicit understanding of grammatical and 
syntactic structure, but instead through a tacit process of imitation and mimicry that leads to a 
personal indwelling of the language as a whole. For Polanyi, “the use of language is a tacit 
performance; the meaning of language arises, as many other kinds of meaning do, in tacitly 
integrating hitherto meaningless acts into a bearing on a focus that thereby becomes their 
meaning” (“Knowing” 196). It is only later that an explicit understanding can be achieved as 
one must have a sense of the whole before focusing in on the parts. Polanyi also theorizes a 
tacit base to all scientific activity by defining its necessary conditions as follows:    
1. A belief that knowledge of reality is possible. 
2. A personal commitment to the search for truth 
3. An affirmation of the reliability of human cognitive capacities 
4. A reliance on the imagination for the creation of a hypothesis  
5. An acknowledgement that scientific truth is the result of social interaction and 
convention (Gill 53) 
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All of these aspects of science are reliant on a “personal coefficient” that lies outside the 
purely objective ideal presented by the dominant science epistemology and, as such, is firmly 
rooted in tacit forms of knowing.  
This sentiment is echoed by Thomas Kuhn in describing the process by which a new 
scientific paradigm emerges. For Kuhn, it doesn’t just matter that a new paradigm solves 
problems and answers question better than the old, but that it solves problems in a way that 
feels intuitively better:   
 No ordinary sense of the term ‘interpretation’ fits these flashes of intuition through 
 which a new paradigm is born. Though such intuitions depend upon experience, both 
 anomalous and congruent, gained with the old paradigm, they are not logically or 
 piecemeal linked to particular items of that experience as an interpretation would be. 
 Instead, they gather up large portions of that experience and transform them to the 
 rather different bundle of experience that will therefore be linked piecemeal to the 
 new paradigm but not the old. (Kuhn, 123)     
According to Kuhn, it is through intuitive and tacit means that a new paradigm comes to 
replace the old. This is not an instant process, as it takes time for members of the scientific 
community to arrive at similar intuitive conclusions and reach a consensus. In many cases, 
there will still be those that remain true to the old paradigm, perhaps because the new 
paradigm does not tacitly make sense to them, or perhaps because they have a vested interest 
in maintaining the older paradigm, e.g. the new paradigm may render many years of their 
personal research moot.  
Michel Serres echoes Kuhn claim:  
 Even in the sciences the imagination does the ground breaking. Do you want to talk 
 about invention? It’s impossible without the dazzling, obscure, and hard-to-define 
 emotion called intuition. Intuition is, of all things in the world, the rarest, but most 
 equally distributed among inventors — be they artists of scientists.  Yes, intuition 
 strikes the first blow. (Serres and Latour 99)  
17 
 
 
Yet even with such a strong dependency on intuition and tacit knowledge within science, it 
remains below the surface and is not promoted or acknowledged in terms of practice or 
pedagogy. “Science comes from an intuition and then it vanishes instantly” (Serres and 
Latour 122). Even where intuitive, subjective and sensation-based approaches become 
necessary—for instance, visually identifying difference between species—the process is 
deskilled and converted into an algorithm which can then be regulated, controlled and 
deemed acceptable on an objective basis.11 In the words of Michel Serres “Science considers 
existence as a counterweight, a defect.” (Serres 282) As a result, there is a greatly reduced 
possibility of noticing and identifying anything that lies outside such an algorithm, thereby 
restricting the potential of noticing and discovering entirely new phenomena. 
Physicist-turned-philosopher Arthur Zajonc sees this as a major concern, particularly with 
regard to recent developments in physics such as quantum mechanics, which defy 
expectations and common sense:   
 There exists, however, even within the domain of physics, phenomena ... that simply 
 cannot be thought of in mechanical terms without spectacular violations of logic or 
 simple commons sense. Here enters the arrogance of the [scientific] tradition. What 
 cannot be imagined mechanically cannot be imagined at all. One can compute and 
 predict on the basis of computation, but one must forgo the old pleasure of 
 understanding, or at least modify our traditional sense of what it means to understand. 
 (Zajonc, “Light” 309)     
In many cases it is possible to calculate results and do the math, but it is not possible to 
actually know what the equations mean or to fully understand what is going on. A classic 
example of this is seen in the Schrodinger’s Cat thought experiment, used to help explain the 
concept of quantum superposition: one can work through Schrodinger’s equation and get a 
result, but it is essentially impossible to imagine and accept a cat that is both alive and dead 
at the same time. As Richard Feynman, one of the principal figures involved in the 
                                                 
11  As in cases of “trained judgement” described by Daston and Galison. 
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development of quantum theory, stated in a lecture at Cornell University, “I think I can safely 
say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.” (Feynman 129). 
Zajonc sees a great need for a new approach to science and a new type of scientific 
pedagogy. He argues that this can be accomplished by looking backwards and embracing 
aspects of Goethe’s scientific philosophy, which stresses the importance of personal 
observation and intuitive understanding of phenomena as archetype.12 Zajonc explains that a 
Goethean approach should not replace the current objective and mechanical model, but that 
the two should be used in combination. For him, such a combined approach is necessary for 
developing any sort of actual understanding of the many strange phenomena predicted and 
observed in contemporary physics:   
 Might not one develop, parallel to mathematical formulation, a phenomenological 
 formulation which leads ultimately to encounters with the archetypical phenomena 
 within each discipline of physics? Herein lies the intelligent schooling of intuition. 
 Unlike the usual laboratory experiment designed to exemplify physical laws, there 
 would be a structured series of experiments designed to lead the student to a 
 perceptual encounter with the laws of physics! (Zajonc, “Goethe”  332)   
He explains that merely showing phenomena to students will simply let them come to 
identify it in an explicit way; yet when given the opportunity to discover (through a process 
of personal wonder) on their own, students are able to “indwell” the phenomena and begin to 
understand it on a tacit level. Zajonc’s hope is to develop a new form of science “not based 
on measurement, but on keen qualitative observations and intuition” (“Goethe” 332) that may 
help physics to reach a point where it can actually understand its own findings. 
Another case where an objective, explicit approach fails is in cognitive science, in particular 
the study of consciousness. The difficulty lies in the simple fact that one cannot objectively 
observe or measure another’s subjective experience. This turns consciousness into the “hard 
problem” of science, according to David Chalmers (2). To explain this further, Thomas 
                                                 
12  Goethe is a prime example of Daston and Galison’s “truth to nature” form of scientific self. See 
 Chapter 2: The Idea of Colour for further exploration of Goethe’s approach.  
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Nagel uses the example of attempting to understand the subjective experience of a bat 
exploring the world through the use of sonar: “In so far as I can imagine (which is not very 
far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not 
the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat” (Nagel 439). For Nagel, 
“facts” such as those related to the subjective experience of a bat are never knowable in the 
true sense, as we can never truly experience another’s experience; however, he also asks 
“what would be left of what it is to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat?” (443). 
To expand on this idea further, he also uses the example of a blind Martian that might come 
to understand a rainbow in detail by studying its objective properties, yet would never be able 
to know the human experience of seeing a rainbow.  
The hard problem of consciousness is far from being solved. As Nagel points out, “at the 
present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective character of experience 
without relying on imagination—without taking up the point of view of the experiential 
subject” (449). This, of course, is unreliable, but perhaps a new approach involving a 
combination of both tacit and explicit knowledge could be developed, forming what Nagel 
refers to as an “objective phenomenology” (449). While it may not be able to capture the true 
fullness of another being’s experience, it would be able to “describe, at least in part, the 
subjective character of experience in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having 
those experiences” (449); however, the nature of his proposed “objective phenomenology” is 
yet to be determined.  
Beyond the utility of tacit knowledge in furthering scientific development, there are also a 
great many cases where artists—through the use of tacit and intuitive means—have pre-
empted scientific discovery by many years. In his book Proust was a Neuroscientist,13 Johan 
Lehrer describes such occurrences in relation to neuroscience, such as the French chef 
Escoffier, who discovered the taste sensation later named “umami”; Gertrude Stein, who 
through her idiosyncratic poetry presented an intuitive understanding of the underlying 
structure of language not “explicitly” explained until Noam Chomsky came along in the 
                                                 
13 Even though Lehrer has been recently discredited for his manufacturing of Bob Dylan quotes in his 
 recent book Imagine, I am still happy to accept his arguments from Proust was a Neuroscientist for the 
 purposes of this paper and for my own research.   
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1950s; and Marcel Proust, whose description of an intense sensory and affective memory 
recall inspired by his eating of a madeleine cake prefigured the scientific discovery of 
cytoplasmic polyadenylation element binding protein (CPEB) in the brain that is responsible 
for memory storage (Lehrer, 93–94). 
As argued by Lehrer, there are many cases where significant discoveries have been made 
primarily through tacit means. It could even be argued that the restrictions and limitations of 
an objective epistemology may have slowed the process of making the same discoveries in 
the scientific realm. Often it is the case that an over-emphasis on explicit knowing may blind 
a person to what is obvious from a more tacit or right hemisphere approach. As McGilchrist 
explains, “Theory, in the conventional sense of the term, can restrict one’s capacity to see 
things, and the only remedy is to be aware of it” (McGilchrist, “Master” 360). To end this 
section, I would like to leave you with a very tangible example of how concentrating on 
explicit (left hemisphere) knowing may blind us to what are otherwise very obvious and 
observable phenomena. An experiment was conducted by Simons and Chabris (McGilchrist, 
“Master” 163) where subjects were asked to watch a video of a tightly packed group of 
people passing a basketball back and forth. The participants were asked to count the number 
of passes made between people wearing white T-shirts, thus establishing a very left-
hemisphere, quantifiable and explicit frame by which to observe the video. The task itself is 
not overly difficult and most participants obtained the correct answer; however, what they 
completely failed to notice was an external figure walking directly through the middle of the 
scene wearing a gorilla suit, even stopping in the centre and beating its chest for a few 
seconds.14 This goes to show that by concentrating on a single form of knowledge, focusing 
in on the details and quantifiable information, one may miss a lot of the bigger picture.     
 
                                                 
14 You can view this video yourself on Daniel Simons' YouTube channel at: 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJG698U2Mvo 
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1.3 Question 3: What can be done to increase awareness, 
 acceptance and appreciation for this type of knowledge 
 within our contemporary culture?
With regard to my third question, there is little scholarship relating to how one can increase 
an awareness and acceptance of tacit knowledge. Accordingly, it is this third question that 
will be the primary focus for the various articles included in this dissertation, as well as the 
inspiration for my own artistic production. Specifically I am interested in exploring the 
potential for art and arts-based research (forms of tacit knowledge in themselves) to aid in 
this endeavor. How exactly art can make a difference is the question that I will be exploring 
and experimenting with for the remainder of this dissertation. I make no claims that my 
research will result in a major paradigm shift in terms of ways of thinking; however, through 
my writing, I plan to extend the ideas of the theorists I study and, through my artwork, I 
intend to create intuitively understandable experiences that will draw attention to, and stress 
the importance of incorporating tacit knowledge into our accepted ways of knowing. 
Figure 2: Still from the video used in by Simons and Chabris in their selective 
attention experiment. 
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Chapter 2  
2 The Idea of Colour: Newton’s Skeleton, Goethe’s Gentle 
Empiricism and Olafur Eliasson’s Room for One Colour 
What is Colour? On the surface this may seem like a rather simplistic question — after all, 
colour is something we all know and experience on a daily basis — however, an 
understanding of what colour really is, is far from simple. Additionally, there is the question 
of where colour is actually located. Is it a property of an object, an aspect of the external 
world, a byproduct of our sensual mechanisms, or something constructed within the 
subjectivity of the mind? Current views of colour tend to follow in the Cartesian tradition of 
a mind/body split, focusing on colour as either an entirely external objective property or as a 
solely internal, subjective experience, but neither of these views presents a whole 
understanding of colour. In order to gain a more thorough understanding of colour, one must 
find a way to combine objective and subjective approaches.1 The goal of this chapter is to 
outline the shortcomings associated with such one-sided approaches and to present possible 
solutions achieved by means of direct experience with colour phenomena and a knowledge of 
colour arrived at through observation and intuition. These possible solutions will be 
discussed in relation to the writings of theorists including Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 
Walter Heitler, Henri Bortoft, Arthur Zajonc, Henri Bergson, and Alva Noë, as well as in 
relation to Olafur Eliasson’s artwork Room For One Colour (1997). 
Physicist Walter Heitler describes the general problem of sense perception:  
 Sense perception can be understood neither by natural science as it is practiced 
 today, which studies only “external objects,” nor by psychology, which studies 
 only “inner experience.” The Cartesian split completely blocks the path to 
 understanding. Only a mode of thought that overcomes this split and perceives the 
                                                 
1  Michael Polanyi’s terms “explicit” and “tacit” could be used equally well to describe the types of 
 knowledge and approaches required to understand colour. Explicit knowledge relates to objective, 
 codified knowledge that can be directly transferred between individuals through textual, symbolic or 
 verbal means. Tacit knowledge is the subjective knowledge that one comes to personally know through 
 embodied experience and cannot be directly transferred between individuals.  
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 unity of “outside” and “inside” in all our everyday perceptions can gain insight 
 into this problem. (59)  
Heitler promotes an approach to perception based on Goethe’s theory of colours (Goethe 
1848), which Goethe developed in response to the mechanistic explanation of colour that 
Newton presented in Opticks (Newton). Goethe could not accept such a reductive view of 
colour and referred to Newton’s theory of colour as the mere “skeleton of light” (Heitler 57).  
Before turning to an in-depth examination of Goethe’s theory of colour, let us begin by 
looking at Newton’s theory and the general understanding of colour from a physics-based 
perspective. Newton began by observing the deflection of sunlight as it passed through a 
prism, producing a multi-coloured pattern on the far wall.2 From this, he concluded (through 
mathematical means) that white light (sunlight) was in fact composed of many colours and 
that each of the constituent colours were bent (refracted) to varying degrees as they passed 
through the interface between two different transparent mediums (in this case the interface of 
air and glass).3 He added further proof to his theory by using a second prism to recombine 
the separated multi-coloured light back into white light. In so doing, he paved the way for the 
contemporary scientific understanding of light as an electromagnetic wave, and colour as the 
result of perceiving different wavelengths4 within the electromagnetic spectrum.5   
For the most part, Newton’s objective approach works very well in explaining and predicting 
how light of different wavelengths travels, interacts with other light, and is deflected. 
Newton’s mathematical analysis of light has also led to the development of many significant 
optical technologies such as telescopes, cameras, DVD players, and optical 
telecommunication networks. However, there is a serious problem with Newton’s theory, in 
                                                 
2 Newton was not the first to observe this phenomenon, which was fairly well known at the time; 
 however, he was the first to mechanically explain it through mathematical means. 
3 Different in the sense that the two media have different indexes of refraction n, where n = speed of 
 light in a vacuum/speed of light in medium, according to Snell's law. 
4 Newton initially described colour as being associated with a "degree of refrangibility" it was only later  that 
 the concept of wavelength was developed (Bortoft 289) 
5 Visible light (colour) only accounts for a very small portion of the overall electromagnetic spectrum, with 
 the visible range lying within a range of wavelengths between 380 nm and 740 nm. 
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that it does little in the way of explaining colour itself: as a phenomenon and as something 
perceived.   
Philosopher of science Henri Bortoft is critical of Newton for introducing a quantitative, 
mathematical theory of science that accounts only for primary, measurable qualities, such as 
magnitude and position, and entirely omits secondary experiential qualities like colour, taste, 
and sound. Bortoft describes the specific implication of this in relation to colour in his essay 
“Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes: Finding a Means for Dwelling in Nature.” 
 Hence, something that can be measured replaced the phenomena of color, and in this 
 way color as color was eliminated from the scientific account of the world ... 
 The physics of color could now be understood just as well by someone who was 
 color-blind. (289) 
 When considered in relation to how colour is perceived by humans, Newton’s theory6 fails 
to address a number of significant aspects of colour perception: metamers, chromatic 
adaptation, simultaneous contrast, and afterimages.  
Metamers are colours that emerge perceptually as a result of mixing two or more different 
wavelengths of light. For instance, mixing red and green wavelengths of light forms what is 
perceived as “yellow,” and this yellow is perceptually indistinguishable from pure yellow 
light consisting of a single wavelength. However, from a purely physical perspective, such 
mixed light would still remain a mixture of red and green7 — it is only through our 
perception that such a mixing occurs. Chromatic adaptation (also known as colour 
consistency) occurs when one moves from an environment illuminated with light of a certain 
colour temperature into an environment of a different colour temperature, for example, from 
bright sunlight to an interior room illuminated with standard tungsten light bulbs.8 From a 
                                                 
6  Including its more developed form as presented in contemporary physics. 
7 This could be demonstrated by splitting the mixed light back into its constituent colours through the use of 
 a prism or similar device. 
8 The term colour temperature (also referred to as white-balance in photography) comes from the overall 
 hue of light radiation emitted by an ideal black body at a specific temperature in degree Kelvin.  
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physical perspective, the light in the two environments is drastically different, with daylight 
producing an overall blue hue and the light bulbs a reddish-orange hue; however, our 
perception adapts by producing a “subjective white point,” such that colours appear 
essentially the same in both environments.9 Simultaneous contrast occurs when the 
appearance of one colour changes as a result of being surrounded by, or in close proximity to, 
another colour: for example, a region of grey surrounded by a red background will appear 
greenish. Afterimages result from staring at a bright light source or at a particular scene for a 
length of time.10 Particularly significant is that afterimages appear in the absence of any 
direct external stimulus and hence are produced entirely within the eye.   
These preceding aspects of colour perception are not accounted for through the external, 
Newtonian, physicalist approach to colour; however, from a psychology standpoint, they are 
understood and explained as a result of “inner experiences,” in the way previously described 
by Walter Heitler. Psychology, or perhaps more specifically a mixture of physiology and 
neuroscience11, explains such aspects of perception through a combination of the 
Trichromatic Theory and Opponent-Process theories of colour vision. 
The Trichromatic Theory12 is premised on the existence of three types of cone cells13 within 
the retina, each of which is sensitive to a certain range of wavelengths of light.14 Colour 
sensation results from the ratio of activity between the three types of cone cells. The 
Trichromatic Theory works to explain metamers as the result of mixed light (multiple 
wavelengths) exciting multiple types of cones at once in such a way as to produce the same 
                                                 
9 This situation also demonstrates the capability of perception to adjust to different intensities of light, 
 "dark adaptation"; although, this adaptation make take a few seconds to a few minutes to fully occur. 
10  ~30 seconds 
11  Accounting for both the physical/biological aspects as well as the mental/perceptual. 
12  Initially pproposed by Thomas Young in 1802 and later refined by Hermann von Helmholtz in 1852. The 
 Trichromatic Theory of colour vision is also referred to as Young-Hemholtz theory (Goldstein 
 122)    
13  It should also be noted that the retina also contains rod cells, which are more sensitive to and become 
 active in low light; however, rod cells are only capable of perceiving light and dark and do not produce 
 any sensation of colour. 
14  S type cones cells peak at a sensitivity of 420 nm, M type at 560 nm, and L type at 640 nm. 
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ratio of excitation to that of a single wavelength of light (a pure colour), thus producing 
identical sensations of colour.  
The Opponent-Process Theory15 works in combination with the Trichromatic Theory, 
occurring downstream in the chain of excitation, after the cone cells, in higher-order bipolar 
cells.16 These bipolar cells function as three separate mechanisms (or channels, to use an 
electrical signal metaphor), with each one sensitive to a particular continuum of sensation: 
light/dark, red/green, and blue/yellow. These mechanisms work via a buildup or breakdown 
of a specific chemical in the retina, so, for example, a yellow sensation would cause a 
buildup of a chemical whereas a blue sensation would result in a decrease. Due to the fact 
that these mechanisms work in a push/pull manner, and because they are not instantaneous 
(having a slight lag), they work to explain afterimages as a fatigue in a particular pathway 
due to an excess of its opponent sensation. The Opponent process also works to explain 
simultaneous contrast,17 the occurrence of colour blindness,18 and the impossibility for 
humans to perceive colours such as reddish-green and bluish-yellow.19  
This leaves us to address chromatic adaptation, which is where things get more complicated. 
To understand chromatic adaptation we must go further inward, continuing on the trajectory 
from an understanding of colour in the external, objective world (via physics), to the 
subjective realm involving the body and sensory organs, and on to the further subjective 
realm of colour as a product of the mind, because colour adaptation is something that 
happens due to the functioning of the mind. At this point, we are confronted with the classic 
                                                 
15  Originally proposed by Ewald Hering in 1878 (Goldstein 125) 
16  These bipolar cells are a specialized and specific type of neuron. 
17  Through an overwhelming of a particular opponent sensation. 
18  Which usually occur as a malfunction of one of these mechanisms leading to a failure to perceive the 
 colours of that particular mechanism e.g. red-green colour blindness. 
19  It is thought possible to trick the brain into perceiving a brief hallucination of the so-called “impossible” or 
 “forbidden” colours, reddish-green and bluish-yellow, through a process of  “perceptual fading”, perceptual 
 filling-in” or “binocular fusion” (e.g. where one eye is constrained to see a yellow field and the other a blue 
 field) (Crane and Piatarida 1078); however, there are other scientists that claim these reported 
 hallucinations are not true experiences of forbidden colours, but instead are simply a failure in verbal 
 reporting (which is necessary to report personal phenomenological experience) on the part of experimental 
 subjects, in that they lacked the appropriate vocabulary to describe the colour they perceived (Hsieh and 
 Tse 2256). 
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Cartesian mind/body split as explicitly stated in Descartes’ own treatise on light and colour, 
Optics:  
 We know for certain that it is the soul which has sensory awareness, and not the 
 body….We know, lastly, that it is through the nerves that the impression formed  by 
 objects in the external part of the body reach the soul through the brain. (Descartes 
 120)   
Of course, the term “the soul” has fallen out of favor in recent years, but if we replace it with 
the term “consciousness,” we see that this is still the commonly held view of the mind.  
So, returning to our earlier question, “where is colour located?” we can see that according to 
an objective, physics-based perspective, colour exists as electromagnetic waves, of varying 
wavelength, existing out in the material world. Yet this perspective does not account for the 
way in which we actually perceive colour, and is not in direct correlation to our experience of 
colour (as seen in the phenomena of metamers, chromatic adaptation, etc.). From the 
alternative, subjective point of view, colour experience is something that is formed in the 
mind as a result of passive stimulation in the visual organs. The source of such stimulation is 
essentially irrelevant and in fact, the material existence of the stimulation’s source may even 
be called into question (as with Descartes’ distrust of the senses), which can lead to a very 
reductive input-output picture of perception, as described by philosopher Alva Noë: 
 [According to the input-output picture] perception is input from world to mind, 
 action is output from mind to world, thought is the mediating process. If the input-
 output picture is right, then it must be possible, at least in principle, to 
 disassociate capacities for perception, action and thought. (“Action” 3)   
Noë is highly critical of the input-output picture and sees it as presenting a limited and 
incomplete understanding of perception. In fact, his recent book Action in Perception is 
essentially an argument against such a picture in favor of a view of perception as a skillful 
and active engagement between body, the mind, and the material world. Noë takes his cue 
from Goethe’s Theory of Colours and even begins Action in Perception with a Goethian 
quote, which seems like a reasonable segue into the earlier promise of a return to Goethe: 
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 It is really vain to express the nature of something. We notice effects and a 
 complete account of these effects would perhaps comprise the nature of this thing. 
 We attempt in  vain to describe the character of a man; but a description of his 
 actions and his deeds will create for us a picture of his character. — Goethe, The 
 Theory of Colour (qtd. In Noë, “Action” 1) 
Goethe, although best known today for his literary contributions, was also very active in 
scientific research. Of particular significance was his foray into developing a theory of colour 
as a polemic against Newton’s theory.20 Goethe began his exploration of colour after he 
experienced purple afterimages following an intense and lengthy observation of yellow 
crocuses. From this experience, he concluded that “while on one hand the eye perceives 
color, on the other hand, it produces complementary colors as after-images of those 
perceived” (Cottrell 263). This led Goethe to view Newton’s theory as overly mechanistic 
and fixed in a strictly mathematical perspective, therefore incapable of explaining the 
sensation of colour occurring through the actions of the eye and brain. For Goethe, colour 
exists only through sensation, and to ignore sensation is to ignore colour itself.  
Goethe’s method was premised on direct observation and engagement with the phenomena of 
colour as a whole occurring over an extended period of time (as described in the passage 
quoted above), as opposed to Newton’s method, which only involved individual instances of 
crucial and defining experimental events. Goethe’s theory described a pushing and pulling of 
light through darkness and of darkness through light (where darkness was considered a 
presence of a type of light instead of an absence of light), with colour emerging from the 
meetings of light and darkness. Unfortunately, Goethe’s theory did not yield the same 
repeatable and predictable results as Newton’s, which is why it is little known and even less 
accepted today. However, it was the first theory to significantly acknowledge the physiology 
of colour perception, it was the first to include a symmetrically opposed (complementary) 
colour wheel21 (which came to be used by many influential artists of the day, including 
                                                 
20 As presented in Opticks, 1704 
21  Goethe’s colour wheel is based on red yellow and blue (RYB) functioning as primary colours. Even 
 though this collection of primary colours is still taught in some art school painting classes, it has pretty  
 much been replaced by contemporary models of additive (applied to the mixing of light) and  subtractive 
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J.M.W. Turner), and it prefigured the opponent-process theory of colour vision developed by 
Ewald Hering in 1878.22   
The 20th and 21st centuries have seen a renewed interest in Goethe’s Theory of Colours on the 
part of contemporary theorists including Arthur Zajonc, Walter Heitler, Alva Noë, Henri 
Bortoft, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Jonathan Crary, to name but a few. However, their interest 
lies not so much in the “results” of Goethe’s theory, but more in his application of intuitive 
experience and an approach to science coming from the position of a human, present-in and 
engaging-with the world. Goethe termed his approach “Anschauung,” which “may be held to 
signify the intuitive knowledge gained through contemplation of the visible aspect” (Bortoft 
291). Through his process of “gentle empiricism,” Goethe in his own words believed that 
“every new object, well contemplated, opens up a new organ within us,” and that “the 
intimate intertwining of the human being into nature in this way does much to overcome the 
experience of alienation common to ‘objective’ Enlightenment science” (qtd. In Zajonc, 
“Goethe and the Science of his Time” 27). Goethe considered this experiential, intuitive 
approach to be a new form of “theory” harkening back to the original meaning of the word, 
derived from the Greek theoria, “to behold” (Zajonc, “Light” 311), and was critical of overly 
intellectual approaches to theory that would impose structures not actually present in the 
thing itself. As stated by Goethe, “How difficult it is ... to refrain from replacing the thing 
with its sign, to keep the object alive before us instead of killing it with the word” (qtd. in 
Seamon 3). However, it is important to remember that Goethe did not reject or oppose 
science outright: rather, he wanted to transform it to include “the reality of ‘intuitive’ 
experiences of natural laws as complementary to the more formal mathematical formulation 
of such laws” (Zajonc, “Goethe’s Theory of Color” 327). Goethe may have referred to 
Newton’s theory as the “skeleton of light” (Heitler 57), but the skeleton is still part of the 
whole and it is the whole that interested Goethe.  
                                                 
 (applied to the mixing of light absorbing pigments) colour, which use red green blue (RGB) and cyan 
 yellow magenta (CMY) as primary colours respectively.     
22 Although Ewald Hering's theory was not widely accepted until further experiments performed in the 
 1950s and 60s produced similar results (Goldstein 126–129).  
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An understanding of “authentic wholeness” was indeed Goethe’s goal. The science of his 
time (much like our own time) was focused almost entirely on measurement, exactitude, and 
quantification of primary qualities (number, magnitude, position). Any unquantifiable, 
secondary qualities (colour, taste, smell, feel) were rejected, ignored, or relegated to the 
realm of insignificant subjectivity, thus producing a less-than-whole understanding of almost 
anything that was to be studied. Goethe referred to authentic wholeness as a form of pure or 
archetypical phenomena and used the neologism “ur-phenomenon” (Urphänomen) to denote 
“the essential core of a thing that makes it what it is and what it becomes” (Seamon 4). The 
ur-phenomena, or authentic wholeness, is not simply a sum of parts (a totality) because for 
Goethe no part is independent of the whole. Philosopher Henri Bortoft uses the analogy of a 
text to explain this further:23  
 The whole is present throughout all of the text, so that it is present in any region of 
 the text. It is the presence of the whole in any region of the text that constitutes the 
 meaning of that region of the text. Indeed, we can sometimes find that it is just the 
 understanding of a single passage that suddenly illuminates for us the whole meaning 
 of the text. (Bortoft 280) 
Ur-phenomena are not immediately obvious and it is only through an extended duration of 
experience that one might achieve such an intuitive understanding, in much the same way as 
one acquires understanding and meaning through the experience of a text. Ur-phenomena are 
emergent processes of theory development considered by Goethe to involve three significant 
stages, as described by Arthur Zajonc: 
 (1) the empirical phenomenon, which everyone finds in nature, and which is then 
 raised through experiments to the level of (2) the scientific phenomenon, by 
 producing it under circumstances and conditions different from those in which it 
 was first observed, and in a sequence that is more or less successful. The final result 
 is (3) the pure phenomenon [ur-phenomenon], which now stands before us as the 
                                                 
23 Bortoft also uses the analogy of a hologram that when broken still retains the original image in each of  its 
 broken shards, but for the purpose of this essay the text analogy is more accessible. 
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 result of all our observations and experiments. The pure phenomenon can  never be 
 isolated but appears in a continuous sequence of events. (Zajonc, “Light” 311)   
It is important to note that for Goethe the ur-phenomenon is always developing and in flux. 
In Goethe’s own words, “in all that we have observed we should always remember that the 
phenomenon must not be thought of as fixed or complete, but rather as evolving, growing, 
and open in many ways to modification” (qtd. in Amrine 43). As such, Goethe’s ur-
phenomenon colour represents a process of becoming, in stark contrast to Newton’s theory, 
which is regarded as fixed and complete. 
Goethe’s approach to a theory of colour may not be an accurate understanding of colour 
mechanics, but it does allow for a combination of objective and subjective approaches, thus 
eliminating the limitations of each approach when used in isolation. It also works to break 
down the mind/body, subject/object Cartesian split and encourages direct engagement with 
the world to produce a form of theory based in experience of the phenomenon itself. In 
Goethe’s words:  
 The highest is to understand that all facts are really theory. The blue of the sky 
 reveals to us the basic law of color. Search nothing beyond the phenomena, they 
 themselves are the theory. (qtd. in Seamon 4)  
In this approach, Goethe in many ways became a precursor to the philosophical school of 
phenomenology as well as to the burgeoning field of affect theory24 and paved the way to a 
further, more engaged and active understanding of colour that includes the subjectivity of the 
body and mind in addition to the objective material world. 
An active understanding of colour (and of perception in general) involving both mind and 
body is also the goal for Alva Noë: 
 We need to finally break with the dogma that you are something inside of you — 
 whether we think of this as the brain or an immaterial soul — and we need finally 
                                                 
24 See The Transmission of Affect, by Teresa Brennan and The Affect Theory Reader edited by Melissa 
 Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth for more information on this field. 
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 take seriously  the possibility that the conscious mind is achieved by persons and 
 other animals thanks to their dynamic exchange with the world around them (a 
 dynamic exchange that no doubt depends on the brain, among other things). (Noë, 
 “Limits of Neuroscience” 2)  
Or, as expressed more concisely, “Experience isn’t something that happens to us. It is 
something we do; it is a temporally extended process of skillful probing” (Noë, “Action” 
216). According to Noë, vision (and colour experience) is not a simple input-output process 
where the brain simply receives stimulation from the external world via the retina. Instead, it 
involves movement of the body and “sensory motor skills” functioning in a touch-like 
manner where vision becomes, in the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “palpitation with the 
eyes” (qtd. in Noë, “Action” 73). In much the same way as one might haptically perceive the 
whole form of a bottle through an assortment of contact points made with one’s fingers and 
the movement of the hand over time, one visually perceives through the movement of one’s 
eyes and body in relation to the environment, constructing a virtual image through the use of 
memory, both of the movement itself and of past perceptual experience. This virtual image is 
not a complete and accurate “picture” of the world, but a sampling of what is relevant, much 
like the process of reading a page of text: one does not “see” the whole page at once, but only 
a select few characters or words at a time, yet one is still able to gather the content and an 
overall meaning of the page through the movement of one’s eyes over time. 
Noë describes the virtual image as follows:  
 …phenomenologically speaking, virtual presence is a kind of presence, not a kind 
 of non-presence or illusory presence. My sense of the perceptual presence of 
 items at the periphery of my visual field, or of partially occluded items, is not a 
 sense that I actually see these features, but that I have access to them, due to the fact 
 that my relation to them is mediated by patterns of sensorimotor contingency. 
 (Noë, “Action” 216)  
In many ways, his idea of a virtual presence is reminiscent of Henri Bergson’s notion of the 
virtual. Bergson developed his idea of the virtual mainly in relation to an experiential 
perception of time as duration, where time is not absolute and may seem to contract or 
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expand (depending on one’s degree of interest or mood) as well as combining with memory 
of the past as a form of the present. As describes by Gilles Deleuze in his text on Bergson: 
 …duration was presented as the virtual or the subjective, because it was less that 
 which cannot be divided than that which changes its nature by being divided. We 
 must understand that the virtual is not something actual but is for that no less a 
 mode of being, and is, moreover, in a way, being itself; neither duration, nor life, nor 
 movement is actual, but that in which all actuality, all reality is distinguished and 
 comprehended and takes root. (Deleuze 28) 
Although Bergson primarily uses the virtual in relation to duration, duration becomes a broad 
concept that can be used to describe a change of nature and of quality. In Bergson’s words, 
“Between light and darkness, between colors, between nuances, difference is absolute. The 
passage from one to the other is itself also an absolutely real phenomenon”(qtd. in Deleuze 
28). This would include the perception of a difference in colour, relating to Goethe’s idea of 
colour as emerging from the transition between light and dark. 
Returning to the virtual, or virtual presence, in relation to the perception of colour, Noë 
acknowledges that such an approach presents an anthropocentric view of colour, in the sense 
that colours exists for us only because we can see them. However, he is emphatic that this 
does not mean that there are no colours in the world, just that there is no experience of colour 
in a world without a perceiver: For Noë, “any adequate understanding of such a phenomenon 
as the experience of the color of a rose needs to account for both its subjectivity and its 
objectivity. For both its experience directedness and its world directedness” (“Brain” 7). He 
uses the example of a pigeon, which is a pentachromat, having five types of cones cells in 
contrast to our three.25 Pigeons have the capability of perceiving colours that are 
imperceptible to us; the fact that we cannot see such colours does not imply that they do not 
exist, merely that they lie outside of our perceptual system.26  
                                                 
25 As explained earlier with regard to the trichromatic theory of colour vision. 
26 This also allows for so-called the "impossible colours," reddish-green and bluish-yellow, to actually be 
 real, just existing outside of our perceptual system. It also allows for the potential of colours in the 
 ultraviolet or infrared regions of the electromagnetic spectrum.  
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This active approach to perception posited by Noë also results from, and works to explain, a 
number of physiological and perceptual effects. Experiential blindness or “blindsight” is a 
form of consciousness blindness named by Lawrence Weiskrantz in the early 1970s (Lehrer, 
“Proust” 183) where the patient is able to “see” in the sense that the retina still transfers its 
stimulation due to light to the brain, but is missing an awareness of sight and is unable to 
form a virtual presence of vision; hence, the patient is unable to actually “see” and is 
essentially blind. This phenomenon presents a strong argument against the input-output 
approach to visual perception that simply considers stimulation of the retina as all that is 
required for vision. According to Noë, “The existence of experiential blindness is of great 
importance. It demonstrates that merely to be given visual impressions is not yet to be made 
to see. To see, one must have visual impressions that one understands” (Noë, “Action” 6). 
The enactive approach also functions to explain “cyclopean vision,” where the input from our 
two separate eyes is understood by the brain and combined into a single virtual presence,27 as 
well as our accommodation to the inverted retinal image. It also explains the aforementioned 
phenomenon of “chromatic adaptation” (or colour consistency), which will be explored later 
in further detail. 
Noë’s enactive approach to colour begins with the understanding that colour is not something 
inherent to an object and the idea that we do not directly interact and engage with the object 
itself in order to perceive it. Colour is a product of illumination and the ways in which the 
object reflects, refracts, and disturbs the light-filled environment, a process referred to by 
Noë as the “ambient optical array.” It is the disturbances and ripples in this array that we 
actually perceive, much like the way we would perceive the sound of a car backfiring (as a 
disturbance in the ambient acoustic field):28   
                                                 
27 Descartes explains cyclopean vision as functioning in the same manner as a blind individual feeling 
 their way through the world using two sticks or canes and that even with two such appendages their 
 perception of the environment would still be singular (Noë "Action" 6). 
28 It should also be remembered that not only do we perceive the ambient optical array (and ambient 
 acoustic array) but that we are also immersed in this array and are thus part of it, and, as such, our 
 presence and actions affect the environment array itself (for example, we cast a shadow or our body acts to 
 baffle the sound).  
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 To hear that the car is backfiring a block or so over there is thus to hear a 
 disturbance and to understand, implicitly, that the sound of that disturbance would 
 change as your spatial relation to the sound source changed. (Noë, “Action” 161)  
From knowledge gained through past experience, we develop sensorimotor skills that allow 
us to understand the relationship of the apparent sound received by our body to that of the 
actual sound source (the car). This functions in a way similar to visual perspective where, for 
instance, we can recognize the apparent elliptical shape of a plate as an actual circular object 
by drawing upon our understanding of perspectival effects (obtained through past perceptual 
experience) as well as our active movement in relation to the object.  
In the case of colour, over time we develop a “sensorimotor profile” of colour based on our 
experience and understanding of how colour changes as a result of different illumination or 
different “colour critical conditions”: 
 To experience something as red, then, is to experience not merely how it looks 
 here and now, but how it would look as color-critical conditions vary. Only a 
 perceiver with an understanding of these laws of transformation — who grasps the 
 color aspect profile — can experience a determinate color. To experience a color you 
 must grasp its color aspect profile, that is, its sensorimotor profile.  (Noë, “Action” 
 132) 
The development of such a sensorimotor profile is an automatic, subconscious, and tacit 
process that explains the chromatic adaptation that occurs when, for instance, one moves 
from a daylight colour-critical condition to an indoor, tungsten light situation and still sees 
colours as essentially the same: a shirt that appeared red in the daylight may now be 
apparently perceived as brown, but still virtually perceived as red. The sensorimotor profile 
concept also allows for us to see a wall as a single colour, when in fact the apparent colour of 
the wall shifts through varying hues and brightness levels as the light falls unevenly on its 
surface; however, it should be noted that through concentration one is still able to see the 
wall as a mix of hues if one so desires, much like one can “see” a round plate as elliptical.   
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The trick with colour perception is that unlike the perspectival case of a plate that appears 
elliptical, for which there is a real physical and circular object,29 there is no actual colour to 
serve as a datum. To know red, one must see red — unlike the plate whose circular shape can 
be known through touch.30 Goethe proposed that to really understand colour as a 
phenomenon (ideally as an ur-phenomenon), one must be actively engaged with and 
carefully observant of colour phenomena over an extended period of time, and must also be 
aware that this understanding will change and evolve with further experience. To assist with 
this process, Goethe set out an ordered set of experiential experiments that readers could try 
for themselves, claiming that if one conducts these experiments with “constant and rigorous 
effort” (qtd. in Seamon 5) they could come to know, through their own experience, “the 
underlying process through which all colour appears.” (Seamon 5) 
And in a similar fashion, Noë explains that “how you experience the flower or the sculpture 
depends on your perceptual knowledge and on the skill with which you bring this knowledge 
to bear on what you encounter” (Noë, “Action” 32). So, to really understand what colour is, 
one must carefully observe and engage with colour under a wide and varied range of colour-
critical conditions. Through this process one may also become aware of the nature of 
perception itself. Such an understanding will not be arrived at through rational thought or 
conveyed information, but instead will come about due to the intuitive knowledge acquired 
through direct experience. Such tacit knowledge could be developed through Goethe’s series 
of experiments, as laid out in Theory of Colours, or through a personally driven endeavor to 
experience unusual and uncommon colour-critical situations.  
A possible avenue to pursue in such an endeavor to understand colour would be to look at 
and experience the work of visual artists. Visual art is a field primarily based in the type of 
indirect, experiential, and intuitive transfers of knowledge promoted by Goethe, and often the 
content of such knowledge is an extended understanding of our own perception. A prime 
example of this is Olafur Eliasson’s installation-based artwork Room for One Colour(1997), 
                                                 
29 Noë refers to the "actual" physical characteristic of the object independent of perspective as "P-properties." 
30
  It is interesting to note that certain colours beyond our visual range, such as infra-red, can be felt as heat 
 even though they cannot be seen. 
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which specifically deals with the human perception of colour through the presentation of a 
novel, colour-critical situation. 
The installation Room for One Colour varies slightly depending on the specific site of 
installation, but the basic parameters remain consistent: an empty space (a room or a 
hallway) solely illuminated by low-pressure sodium vapour lamps. Low-pressure sodium 
vapour lamps have the unusual quality of emitting, essentially, a single wavelength of light,31 
thus producing a monochromatic colour sensation of yellow. When sunlight (which contains 
most colours present in the visible spectrum),32 and other type of mixed wavelength light 
(tungsten, fluorescent, etc.) strike a surface, certain wavelengths are absorbed while others 
are reflected back: it is in this manner that the sensation of multiple colours is produced as 
the various reflected wavelengths strike one’s retina. In the case of the monochromatic 
sodium-vapour lamp light, there is only one wavelength to reflect back, so only surfaces that 
reflect pure yellow show up as bright, in contrast to dark (non-yellow-reflecting surfaces), 
and there is no variation of colour at all. The result is a yellow and black perceptual 
environment that through the additional mechanics of colour adaptation (which essentially 
sets a subjective white point for the yellow illumination), becomes a black and white 
environment reminiscent of black-and-white cinema — only now it is a “film” in which one 
is actively engaged, immersed in and interacting with.33 The experience presents an unusual 
and rare colour-critical condition (to use Noë’s terminology), one wherein objects react and 
interact differently with the ambient optical-array to produce a novel and uncanny set of 
conditions, making one much more aware of the complexity, flexibility, and nuances of 
colour perception. As described by Eliasson: 
                                                 
31 589.3 nanometers 
32 The missing colours correspond to the Fraunhofer lines, which result from spectral absorption of 
 various elements in the sun.  
33 It should be noted that Eliasson did not invent this type of lighting, but that it is a commonly used for 
 street lighting applications. However, in such applications, the light levels are low and one might easily 
 assume that the produced monochrome perception is a result of low-light rod cell (instead of cone cell) 
 perception, which is monochrome due to the mechanics of the retina. In Room for One Colour, the 
 light levels are intense enough that such an assumption would be near impossible to make. 
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 The experience of being in a monochrome space thus, of course, varies with each 
 visitor, but the most obvious impact of the yellow light is the realization that 
 perception is acquired: the representational filter, or the sudden feeling that our 
 vision simply is not objective, is brought into our awareness and with that our 
 ability to see ourselves in a different light. (Eliasson 75) 
The awareness of a different colour-critical condition becomes most apparent at the boundary 
conditions of the installation where, through one’s own movement or through observation of 
the movement of others, one is able to directly witness the process of colour elimination upon 
entering the environment, or a return to colouration upon egress. Such an awareness expands 
one’s colour sensorimotor profile and increases one’s intuitive understanding of the 
phenomenon (potentially the ur-phenomenon) of colour, but most importantly, it makes one 
aware of the virtual and subjective nature of perception. Eliasson explains: 
 This points to the fact that color doesn’t exist in itself but only when looked at. 
 The unique fact that color only materializes when light bounces off a surface onto  our 
 retinas shows us that the analysis of colors is, in fact, about the ability to  analyze 
 ourselves. (Eliasson 76)    
Eliasson’s project achieves what Noë feels experiential artwork should accomplish. For Noë, 
“The task of phenomenology, and of experiential art, ought to be not so much to depict or 
represent or describe experience, but rather to catch experience in the act of making the 
world available” (Noë, “Action” 176) — it is about the process of perceiving our own 
perception. Through this experience, Eliasson makes us aware that our understanding of 
colour involves much more than an explicit knowledge of the Newtonian “skeleton of 
light”34 or the memorized colour names and colour-mixing combinations35 one learns in a 
colour-theory course. It shows us that colour, like much of our knowledge, also involves a 
substantial subjective, intuitive way of knowing that stems from our experience, and that this 
                                                 
34  The term Goethe used to describe Newton's theory of light (Heitler 57). 
35  For instance green and red make yellow in the additive RGB model or cyan and yellow make green in the 
 subtractive CMYK model, or blue and yellow make green in the antiquated, subtractive RYB  model.  
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subjective way of knowing is continuously evolving as our personal experience expands, as 
we encounter new phenomena like those presented in Room for One Colour. Eliasson’s 
artwork reminds us that we should not undervalue and cannot neglect this way of knowing.  
My own project, The One Pixel Camera, also deals with the complexities of colour 
perception, but coming at it from a very different angle. By averaging the scene to a single, 
average point of data, The One Pixel Camera presents an absurdly reductive, mechanistic and 
objective approach to colour perception in order to contrast and highlight the nuances of our 
embodied experience of colour. The One Pixel Camera epitomizes the input-output model of 
perception that Noé is critical of, and its “perception” lacks any indication of detail, shading 
or form. The resultant images accurately represent some aspects of the scene, but come very 
far from conveying anything like the human experience of the situation occurring before the 
lens. 
Returning to the original questions posed at the beginning of this essay — “where is colour 
located?” and “what is colour?” — we can see through the various approaches to colour that 
it is not located simply in one area, be it in the object itself, the external world, the senses, or 
the mind, but is in fact a contingent combination of all four regions. As for “what colour is”, 
this is a much more complicated question, due to the dispersed and partially subjective nature 
of colour. In fact, I would argue that this is a question unanswerable through the use of words 
and rational thought alone. Instead, it is a question dependent upon a mixture of both 
rational/objective and intuitive/subjective ways of knowing. However, this mixture cannot 
take the form of a homogeneous purée; instead it must be a heterogeneous composite, like 
that of reinforced concrete,36 where the steel rebar takes on the tensile forces while the 
concrete resists the compressive load. In this way, each aspect of the composite maintains its 
specific qualities and strengths, while having its weaknesses compensated for by the other. 
The two aspects are additive, becoming a new form with the combined strengths of both.  
                                                 
36  Goethe's phrase the mere "skeleton of light" (Heitler 57) used to describe Newton's theory can also be 
 used to construct another example of a composite: a body. The "skeleton" needs the fleshy intuitive 
 muscle to move and the muscle needs the skeleton for support. Both must maintain their own form 
 within the composite because a purée would result in a nonviable and bloody mess.  
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Goethe, and Eliasson, remind us of the importance of a subjective/intuitive way of knowing 
within our composite understanding of the world — even if we are not fully aware of such 
seemingly intangible knowledge. As Goethe wrote, “I may rejoice that I have ideas without 
knowing it, and can even see them with my own eyes” (qtd. in Daston and Galison 69). 
Ultimately, I would agree that colour is just such an unknowable yet intuitively accessible 
idea.  
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Chapter 3  
3 Design of the Absurd: The One Pixel Camera  
When considering the impact of a new technology one cannot view it merely as a neutral 
tool,1 nor should one consider it a “black box”2 that simply allows for new possibilities in 
terms of function. The technological artifact—the thing itself—has a political quality, with 
certain prescriptive and restrictive behaviors encoded within its mechanism that establish 
patterns of power and authority: affecting us on an almost invisible, intuitive, tacit and 
subjective level. This chapter will discuss the political qualities of technological artifacts, 
looking at how they can both replace human action, and come to shape and constrain human 
behavior. I will examine the programmed behaviors present in photographic technologies, 
specifically in contemporary camera phones, and will explore sites of resistance to such 
embedded technological politics. Finally, I will discuss my recent artwork The One Pixel 
Camera as a form of arts-based research in this area. 
In his essay “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Langdon Winner is critical of what he describes as 
the two primary approaches used in the analysis of technology: technological determinism 
and social constructivism.3 Technological determinism views technology as the dominant 
driving force in society and considers all social change as a direct result of technological 
development. The problem with this approach, according to Winner, is that beyond being 
naïve and reductive, it assumes that technology emerges independently from a laboratory 
bubble uninfluenced by any social, political, or economic forces. Unfortunately, 
technological determinism still seems to be the dominant commonsense understanding of the 
                                                 
1  As exemplified by the old firearm advocate adage “guns don’t kill people, people kill people”.  
2  “Black box” is a term used in science and engineering referring to a way of considering a device based  on 
 its inputs and outputs alone. The contents of the “box,” how it functions, and any information  related to its 
 history or the external influences that impacted its design are deemed irrelevant. The term is also readily 
 used in Science and Technology Studies (STS), in general as the thing to be opened up and analyzed, and 
 specifically in Actor-Network Theory to indicate a portion of the network (which could potentially be an 
 individual technological artifact or a system of distribution, etc.) that has become stable and in no great 
 need of consideration (beyond inputs and outputs). Vilém Flusser also uses the term “black box” as a way 
 to describe a view of the camera that does not account for its internal functionality. 
3  Also known as the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT). Key theorists in this area include 
 Thomas P. Hughes, Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch. 
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relationship between technology and society. The second approach, social constructivism, 
acknowledges that external influences are always a major factor in any technological 
development. Winner agrees with this approach for the most part; however, he see the social 
constructivists’ emphasis on social origins and stakeholders as problematic in that it leaves 
out the things themselves: the technological artifacts. As an alternative, Winner proposes a 
theory of technological politics, which he describes as follows: 
 Its starting point is a decision to take technical artifacts seriously. Rather than  
 insist that we immediately reduce everything to the interplay of social forces, the  
 theory of technological politics suggests that we pay attention to the   
 characteristics of technical objects and the meaning of those characteristics. A  
 necessary complement to, rather than a replacement for, theories of the social  
 determination of technology, this approach identifies certain technologies as  
 political phenomena in their own right. (Winner, “Artifacts” 20) 
To illustrate his theory, he uses the example of a series of overpasses in Long Island, New 
York designed by Robert Moses and built between 1920 and 1970. These seemingly 
mundane technological artifacts are in fact highly political in that they were designed with 
intentionally low clearances so as not to allow buses to pass beneath. The implications of 
this, is that the poor, and, more specifically, blacks, who relied on buses and public 
transportation were prevented from traveling to large areas of New York State. This kept 
certain sites, such as Moses’s widely acclaimed public park at Jones Beach, exclusive to 
“automobile-owning whites of ‘upper’ and ‘comfortable middle’ class status” (Winner, 
“Artifacts” 21). 
This first example shows clear intention behind the design decisions that came to imbue the 
artifact with political qualities,4 but this is not always the case; often, seemingly benign 
design decisions or a simple lack of consideration can have political implications. Winner 
uses a second and more general case: the organized movement of people with disabilities in 
                                                 
4  Winner backs-up the argument that these bridges were deliberately built with low clearances though 
 citing evidence of Moses’s social-class bias (Winner, “Artifacts” 21), including the fact that Moses also 
 explicitly vetoed a proposed railway extension to Jones Beach. 
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the 1970s. The disabled community “pointed out the countless ways in which machines, 
instruments, and structures of common use—buses, buildings, sidewalks, plumbing fixtures 
and so forth—made it impossible for many handicapped persons to move freely about, a 
condition that systematically excluded them from public life” (Winner, “Artifacts” 22). It 
was not that disabled individuals were being intentionally discriminated against, but rather 
that they were not deemed to be part of a relevant social group when designers were 
considering the parameters for their designs. Regardless of intention, the various artifacts 
(doors, sidewalks, buses, etc.) were indeed political in their active restriction and prevention 
of daily activity and, as such, were (and still are) a great matter of concern for the disabled.  
However, acknowledgement of the artifacts themselves is not entirely absent from all areas 
of social constructivism. Technological artifacts do receive serious attention in the offshoot 
known as Actor-Network Theory.5 In his essay “Where are the Missing Masses? The 
Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts”, Bruno Latour, one of the principal founders of 
Actor-Network Theory,6 looks at the simple objects around us—such as door closers, speed 
bumps, and parking barricades—that are designed to replace human action and authority, 
prescribing certain behaviors while restricting others. For Latour, these objects function with 
agency as non-human actors within larger sociopolitical networks.7  
He uses the example of the seat belt alarm in his car, which, through the penalty of an 
unbearable, high-pitched pinging, keeps him from his desire to break the law and drive away 
unbuckled. In so doing, this mindless device exerts a degree of power and authority, and 
imposes a prescribed morality on his course of action. Latour also explains that this power 
could easily be magnified through the simple addition of an interlock that would inhibit the 
                                                 
5  In a later essay, Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty, Winner expresses an expanded 
 criticism of social constructivism on the grounds that it displays “an almost total disregard for the social 
 consequences of technical choice.” He writes that “what the introduction of new artifacts means for 
 people’s sense of self, for the texture of human communities, for qualities of everyday living, and for the 
 broader distribution of power in society—these are not matters of explicit concern” (Winner, “Opening” 
 368). Interestingly, Bruno Latour responds to this criticism in his 2004 essay Why has Critique Run out of 
 Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern, in which he questions his own involvement with 
 Social Constructivism on similar grounds and worries that his own methods are now being used by 
 “interested” parties to debunk inconvenient scientific knowledge such as that related to global warming. 
6  Along with Michel Callon and John Law. 
7  In Actor-Network Theory, “actors” are defined as “entities that do things.” (Latour, “Masses” 163) 
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car from running while the seat belt was unbuckled, thus eliminating all possibility of his 
breaking the law no matter how great his desire to do so (Latour “Masses” 151-152). For 
Latour, these technological artifacts, these non-human actors, contain agency and power, and, 
as such, cannot be left out of any sociological analysis. 
When speaking of technological artifacts, the discussion is not restricted to “hard” things in 
the physical realm. A technological artifact, much like a technology, can also be “soft”: a 
system, a methodology, a technique, a set of instructions—and, most significant in today’s 
digital environment, software. However, the analysis of software, like other technological 
artifacts, tends to follow the technological determinist framework, focusing on “effects rather 
than causes” (Manovich, “Software” 9). In his recent book, Software takes Command, Lev 
Manovich claims that “even today … when people are constantly interacting with and 
updating dozens of apps on their mobile phones and other computer devices, software as a 
theoretical category is still invisible to most academics, artists, and cultural professionals 
interested in IT and its cultural and social effects” (Manovich, “Software” 9). With a special 
interest in media design software, Manovich, like both Latour and Winner, expresses an 
urgent need to look at “How … software shapes the media being created, making some 
design choices seem natural and easy to execute, while hiding other design possibilities 
(Manovich, “Cultural” 14)—in other words, the politics and tacitly prescribed behaviors 
embedded within software itself. 
Within the field of photography, the role played by the camera in creating an image has long 
been acknowledged. As Andre Bazin writes in The Ontology of the Photographic Image: 
 For the first time, between originating object and its reproduction there intervenes 
 only the instrumentality of a non-living agent. For the first time an image of the  
 world is formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man” (7).     
But what is the nature of this automation; how does it function; what does it allow; what does 
it restrict; where did it come from; who designed it; and what interests might it serve? These 
are not common questions within photographic discourse, which tends to be deeply 
embedded in a technological determinist worldview.  
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 Vilém Flusser takes a different approach; in addition to analyzing the “technical image”8 
coming from the camera and the “information” contained within that image, he also places 
great importance upon the “apparatus” itself and, most significantly, what he refers to as the 
“program” of the camera.9 The program, according to Flusser, is the sum of all design 
features and functionality within the camera that comprise its “automatic” nature, which in 
turn dictate, prescribe, and limit the types of images that the camera, and hence the 
photographer, is able to produce.10 For Flusser, it is essential that the significance of the 
program not be overlooked: 
 The encoding of technical images, however, is what is going on in the interior of  
 this black box and consequently any criticism of technical images must be aimed  
 at an elucidation of its inner workings. As long as there is no way of engaging in  
 such criticism of technical images, we shall remain illiterate. (Flusser, “Towards”  
 16)      
This program may consist of software, as in the case of a digital camera,11 although it can 
just as easily involve physical and mechanical elements, like the “programs” seen in 
Winner’s bridges and Latour’s seat-belt alarm.  
As a simple example of how a camera’s program might tacitly prescribe a certain type of 
image-making, consider the placement and orientation of the camera’s viewfinder. Most SLR 
                                                 
8  Flusser draws a distinction between the “technical image” and the “traditional image.” A technical image is 
 an image produced by an apparatus, whereas traditional images are produced by a human as an abstraction 
 of the concrete world. (Flusser, “Towards 14).  
9  For Flusser, “technical image”, “information”, “apparatus” and “program”  are the four components 
 which one must take into consideration in the theoretical analysis of photography “…the interpretation  of 
 the technical image becomes an act of grasping the transcendent—functional and circular interactions 
 between the four essential and non-causal determinants of the photographic universe: image, apparatus, 
 program and information. (Flusser, “Towards” 91). 
10  He links the origins of these features to their potential for serving political and economic interests: 
 “The camera functions on behalf of the photographic industry, which functions on behalf of the 
 industrial complex, which functions on behalf of the socio-economic apparatus and so on (Flusser 
 (Towards” 30).  
11  Towards a Philosophy of Photography was written in 1983, when most cameras were still entirely 
 mechanical, so it is unlikely that Flusser was directly alluding to software through his use of the term 
 “program”; However, it is possible that he was looking ahead, as he does make mention of the day 
 when photography will be “taken over by electromagnetic technology” (Flusser, “Towards” 50).   
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and DSLR camera have a through-lens, eye-level finder, whereas older medium-format 
cameras tend to have a waist-level finder (Figure 1). Through these simple arrangements of 
viewing elements, it becomes “intuitively obvious” and “tacitly convenient” that the camera 
be used in a particular manner. This in turn affects the perspective of the image, which can 
come to alter the viewer’s reading, and thus the meaning, of the image; for instance, the 
difference between looking up at a subject versus looking down upon a subject may alter the 
viewer’s perception of a power dynamic.12 It is possible to use the camera in a manner not 
intended by its design, but it takes a degree of effort and ingenuity to circumvent, or at least 
bend, the program (Figure 2).  Not surprisingly, Flusser encourages such circumvention and 
advocates for the photographer to take on an experimental role and to push the limits of the 
program in order to produce what he refers to as “interesting images,” in contrast to 
redundant images” that result from merely following the program’s prescription.13  
 
 
Figure 3: Cameras used as prescribed by the “program” 
                                                 
12  Of course, the photographer’s height also comes into play to some degree here.  
13  According to Flusser, photography critics consider the “best” photographs to be “those in which 
 photographers win out against the camera’s program in the sense of their human intentions, i.e. 
 subordinate the camera to human intention” (Flusser, “Towards” 47). 
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Figure 4: Circumventing the camera’s “program” 
Extending the discussion related to Flusser’s program of the camera, we can bring it into the 
present moment by looking at contemporary camera-phone technologies, which have 
drastically altered the way photographs are produced, used and distributed. There have been 
a number of ethnographic studies looking at camera-phone usage in detail;14 however, most 
of this analysis shows little concern for the social and political forces that might be in play.15 
Nonetheless, these studies do shed some light on the emergent activities and new possibilities 
opened up by these small, portable, discreet cameras that have the ability to communicate 
with other devices. For the most part, these studies do not see the camera phone as taking 
over the role of traditional photography, which Ballagas et al. describe as being to produce 
                                                 
14  Examples of such studies include The Ubiquitous Camera: An In-Depth Study of Camera Phone Use, 
 Kindberg et al.; Taking and Sharing Pictures with Phonecams: An Ethnographic Study, Ballagas et al.; 
 and Everyday Contexts of Camera Phone Use: Steps towards Technosocial Ethnographic Frameworks, 
 Okabe and Ito. 
15  Kindberg et al. also claim that most of this research “focuses on the sending of images rather than on the 
 range of ways in which people use their camera phones” (43); however, even the studies that do look at the 
 phones themselves pay little attention to their social and political influence and implications.  
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archival documents.16 Instead, they see entirely new areas of photographic activity opening 
up, which they separate into categories of “communication,” “spontaneous,” and “covert.”  
According to Ballagas, the “communication” category involves a form of everyday image-
based communication used in lieu of text or speech. Rather than describing what you are 
doing to an absent friend, you can simply send them a picture—or you might send a picture 
of an empty milk jug to a partner as a way of reminding them to stop at the store on the way 
home.   
The “spontaneous” category stems from the fact that most people almost always have a 
camera on them; as such, they are more readily able to capture any random, strange, funny, 
or shocking situations they may encounter. This has also led to new forms of citizen 
journalism, which has become quite prevalent in recent years. 
The “covert” category takes advantage of the less-invasive look of the camera phone, as 
compared to a traditional camera, and the simple fact that it is difficult to tell whether the 
device is being used as a phone or as a camera at any given moment. This can lead to 
touching, candid images of friends and family, hidden-camera journalism, and, of course, a 
slew of less-than desirable and problematic activities.  
Another interesting arena of activity discussed in these studies is related to the use of the 
phone itself to share photos: not in the sense of sending an image or uploading to a website, 
but rather the idea of using the phone itself as a digital wallet—a viewing platform by which 
to share and distribute images on a personal and physical level.  
As stated earlier, these studies focus primarily on the effects of the technology rather than its 
causes, or even the mechanics that bring about such behaviors. Returning to the earlier look 
at viewfinder placement, the camera phone typically has a small screen that allows the user to 
view from a distance, away from the eye and away from the face. Such viewing 
arrangements tend to facilitate a particular type of mirror-based self-portraiture, which has 
                                                 
16  However, this analysis was grounded in part on the low-quality and low-resolution of camera phone 
 images, with increasing improvements in camera phone quality, future studies might very well come to 
 a different conclusion.   
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come to be commonly known as the “selfie.”17 Of course, the selfie existed in the past,18 but 
it has become much more prevalent since the emergence of camera phones with this viewing 
arrangement19. The recent addition of screen-side cameras intended for video-chat purposes 
encourages this even further, as one can now see oneself in the viewfinder without the use of 
a mirror. 
Admittedly, the emergence of the selfie is not a major political problem, with the possible 
exception of the issues surrounding underage “sexting.” Nor is it an example of power being 
intentionally embedded in an artifact to tacitly control and prescribe human activity. 
However, there are other design features present in camera phones that can become 
problematic and highly political. An example of this can be seen in the proposed 2009 U.S. 
Bill H.R. 414, known as the Camera Phone Predator Alert Act, which sought to mandate that 
all camera phones sold in the U.S. emit a “tone or other sound audible within a reasonable 
radius” during image capture, with no option available for the user to disable this sound 
(King). This act was directed at covert and predatory camera phone use in private spaces 
such as change rooms and bathrooms, and voyeuristic activities like “upskirt” photography. 
Even though such acts are illegal and should in no way be condoned, the bill demonstrates an 
authoritarian mode of policing achieved through a technological artifact, much like Latour’s 
seat belt alarm. Beyond the irony and nostalgia of adding a mechanical shutter sound to a 
silent digital camera, this action also restricts a large field of legitimate photographic activity. 
There are many intimate occasions such as weddings, plays, poetry readings, quiet musical 
recitals, and even performance art festivals that would be compromised by the interruption of 
a loud click or tone. Additionally, there are times when a silent covert camera may be 
necessary for journalistic or artistic purpose. Fortunately, this legislation did not pass; 
nonetheless, almost all camera phone manufacturers include an audible click by default, and 
                                                 
17  The term “selfie” has recently been added to the Oxford English Dictionary, defining it as a  
 “photograph that one has taken of oneself, typically one taken with a smartphone or webcam and 
 uploaded to a social media website” (Eler 1).    
18  But would have to be shot blind because putting the camera viewfinder to one’s eye would block their 
 face. 
19  Of course, the rise of social media and the simple fact that the “selfie” is now a known cultural 
 phenomenon also play a significant role in its popularity; however, the physical design parameters, 
 which facilitate the process and make it tacitly convenient, cannot be neglected. Even with the rise of 
 social media, if such images took any real effort to produce, I expect very few would exist.       
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the user must demonstrate a degree of technical savvy and take extensive measures should 
they want to turn it off.20 
An even more invasive and troubling account is seen in the recent patent application by 
Apple Inc.: Patent 8254902, Apparatus and methods for enforcement of policies upon 
wireless devices. Grounded in a desire to eliminate disturbances such as those caused by 
pesky camera phone “clicks”21 and to reduce the potential for copyright infringement, this 
patent covers a technology, to be embedded within the phone itself, that upon receiving a 
transmitted kill signal, would put the phone into a mandatory sleep mode without the owner 
of the phone’s consent. In this way, all cell phones within a certain geographic area could be 
instantly disabled at the touch of a button. This would serve to eliminate the possibility of 
illegal taping in movie theatres or at concerts, enforce the shutting-down of phones on 
airplanes, restrict external communication during exams, and, as stated in the patent 
application, ensure that camera phones cannot be used in and around “covert police or 
government operations that may require complete ‘blackout’ conditions,” which, of course, 
opens up the possibility of government censorship and the elimination of “inconvenient” 
citizen journalism during anything from an out-of-control protest to an occurrence of police 
brutality.22 Moreover, this policing of image recording would be accomplished by proxy 
through the inanimate device that you hold in your hand.  
This particular functionality still remains in patent form, but it is likely to be invisibly added 
to future iPhone models. This may sound a bit conspiratorial and perhaps to a degree it is. I 
would hope that governments establish fair policies regarding technologies such as Apple’s 
kill switch, but you never know. Nonetheless, I strongly agree with Winner, Latour, 
Manovich, and Flusser in thinking that the political aspects of technology and how 
technological artifacts come to affect our actions in an intuitive and tacit manner is 
                                                 
20  This often involves replacing the “click” sound file with a blank sound file or sourcing an alternative 
 camera app. Some phones do allow a full mute mode which will disable the click, but this also disables 
 all other sounds and the user must remember to activate it prior to taking the image and then deactivated 
 when finished. 
21  As well as cell phone ring tones and blinding camera flashes. 
22  This would also eliminate the possibility on-the-fly reporting through texting or tweets. 
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unacknowledged for the most part by both the general public and academia, and that this is 
something in great need of serious consideration.   
Fortunately, sites of resistance to technological politics and embedded prescriptive behaviors 
are emerging at a grassroots level, found most notably in the free and open-source software 
initiatives, hacker culture, and the maker movement. The concept of free and open-source 
software began in 1983 with Richard Stallman, who felt that the user should have the ability 
to share, copy, and, most importantly, have access to the code so that they might modify the 
software for their own purposes. In other words, Stallman felt that software should be free—
“free as in freedom, not as in free beer” (“What is Free Software?”). With this goal in mind, 
he created the GNU operating system23 as an alternative to Unix. Along with it, he created 
the GNU General Public license (GPL), which laid out a set of criteria that would ensure that 
his software remain “free”. This license, and variations thereof, are used to this day as a way 
of designating software as free and/or open source. 
In a similar fashion, the intertwined hacker and maker cultures also take a DIY approach to 
technology, by building things from scratch, tearing things apart, and modifying things to 
have them function according to their own desire. In this sense, these groups work to 
acknowledge, analyze, and circumvent the politics and tacitly prescribed behaviors 
embedded within technological artifacts. Even the simple act of jamming an object in a door 
frame to prevent an automatic door closer from locking you out, as described by Latour 
(“Masses” 159), could be considered a form of hacking—as would his commissioning of a 
mechanic to disable the annoying and authoritarian seat-belt alarm (“Masses” 152).24 
Similarly, there are numerous ways to hack camera phones, through methods such as 
                                                 
23  GNU is a recursive acronym: “Gnu’s Not Unix”. 
24  I had a similar problem with a seatbelt alarm that would go off when I placed a heavy backpack on the 
 passenger seat of my car. Through some internet research, I was able to find a rather convoluted and un-
 intuitive hack that involved 1) Opening the driver’s side door and starting the car without placing 
 pressure on the driver’s side seat; 2) Pressing the Odo/Trip button on the dashboard until it reads  
 “Odo”; 3) Turning the ignition switch off and then back on while holding the Odo/Trip button for 10 
 seconds; 4) While still holding the Odo/Trip button, fastening the driver’s side seatbelt, which causes the 
 display to change to “B-on”; 5) Releasing the Odo/Trip button, which should then change to “B-
 off”; and 6) Turning the ignition off, unbuckling the seatbelt, and sitting in the seat. Only after 
 completing these steps and starting the car with the brake pedal depressed would the seat belt alarm be 
 deactivated. As strange as it sounds, it actually worked.  
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jailbreaking,25 rooting,26 writing or installing custom “apps,”27 and using an assortment of 
novel physical add-on devices.28 However, circumvention and hacks often involve a high 
degree of technical know-how, time, and/or money and are not always feasible or even a 
possibility. 
Such acts of resistance can also be aligned with what Matt Ratto from the University of 
Toronto refers to as “Critical Making.” Critical making, according to Ratto, is a method of 
furthering our critical and conceptual understanding of technology through joint material 
production:  
 The use of the term critical making to describe our work signals a desire to  
 theoretically and pragmatically connect two modes of engagement with the world  
 that are often held separate—critical thinking, typically understood as   
 conceptually and linguistically based, and physical ‘making,’ goal-based material  
 work…. Our goal is therefore to use material forms of engagement with   
 technologies to supplement and extend critical reflection and, in doing so, to  
 reconnect our lived experiences with technologies to social and conceptual  
 critique. (Ratto 253)  
In a sense, this methodology opens up the possibility for developing a tacit and intuitive 
understanding of a technological artifact—and how it might prescribe certain actions and 
activities—through an embodied process of making. Such practical engagement with the 
                                                 
25  A method by which to bypass the digital rights management (DRM) policies put in place by Apple, thus 
 allowing for non-authorized software to be installed and for the user to gain root access to the  operating 
 system so that they might have more control over the functioning of the device. Writes Keller, “iPhone 
 hackers first coined the term ‘jailbreaking’ in reference to breaking the iPhone out of  Apple’s iTunes 
 ‘jail.’”  
26  A method to gain “root” or “super-user” access on an Android-based device. Rooting is related to 
 “jailbreaking,” but less complex, and, unlike jailbreaking, rooting is not required to run custom apps.  
27  This still involves “jailbreaking” for iPhones and is more feasible to accomplish on open-source 
 Android-based products, which do not require a “jailbreak” to run custom software or apps. 
28  See the online Photojojo store (http://photojojo.com/store/) for various examples including add-on 
 lenses, filters, external flashes, tripods and even specialized mounts to allow for the use of regular SLR 
 lenses. 
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artifact itself would then come to augment the theoretical understanding of a technology as it 
exists in textual form. 
With this notion of critical making in mind, and because I am working on a studio-based 
PhD, my investigation into the politics of technological artifacts also includes arts-based 
research in the form of my project, The One Pixel Camera (Figure 3 and Figure 4).  
 
Figure 5: The One Pixel Camera 
 
Figure 6: Interior view of The One Pixel Camera
58 
 
 
For me, arts-based research is distinct from research-based art in that I am not performing 
research simply to facilitate the making of an art object, but that the process of design and the 
subsequent use of the produced thing become a form of research in itself.29 
Grounded in an absurdist position,30 the goal of this project was to make a camera that would 
only allow for image capture at a resolution of a single pixel, thereby producing a camera 
with embedded politics and an incredibly restrictive design that tacitly prescribes and limits 
the types of images that can be produced. The politics in the case of The One Pixel Camera 
exist in the form of the camera governing my actions and exerting its power by not allowing 
me to produce a “normal” photograph that actually looks like something. By developing a 
camera with my own program—both figuratively, in Flusser’s sense, and literally, in that I 
actually wrote the code that runs the camera—and through using that programmed camera 
myself, I am able to directly see and experience how even the smallest design decisions 
greatly affect the ways in which the camera can be used. I have displaced my own agency 
into the camera, which now polices my actions and limits photographic activity, allowing 
only for the production of coloured squares.31 It is now up to me to attempt to circumvent my 
own politics and embedded prescriptive behaviors.  
Overall, the project exists as three main components: 1) The camera itself, which functions as 
a sculptural object or potentially an interactive artwork32; 2) The images produced by the 
                                                 
29  A more detailed definition of arts-based research and how it differs from research-based art is  presented in 
 the Chapter 8 of this dissertation.   
30  Here I am applying the term “absurdist” in accordance to the notion of the “Theatre of the Absurd” as 
 coined by Martin Esslin, to describe a theatrical movement involving plays written by Samuel Beckett, 
 Arthur Adamov, and Eugene Ionesco. “Absurd is that which has no purpose, or goal, or objective” 
 (Esslin 4) and “the spectators of the Theatre of the Absurd are thus confronted with a grotesque 
 heightened picture of their own world: a world without faith, meaning, or genuine freedom of will.” 
 (Esslin 6). In a similar sense, use of The One Pixel Camera is futile, for it will never actually capture an 
 image. Additionally, it presents a heightened and exaggerated version of technological politics and 
 tacitly prescribed behaviors.    
31  A connection could be made between the one pixel images and the discussion in Chapter 1: The Idea of 
 Colour. These coloured pixels present a different way to understand the colour present in a given situation: 
 even in this absurd reduction of colour to an average, we can still intuit a faint character of the scene. 
32  Viewer engagement and interaction with the artwork will depend upon the specifics of the exhibition 
 venue. 
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camera, labelled with explicit captions indicating subject matter; and 3) Photographs of the 
camera in use as documentation of my “performing” the program of the camera.  
So far, I have been using the camera to produce a series of images depicting clichéd and 
conventional photographic subject material such as sunsets, family events, outdoor activities, 
portraits, personal belongings, and tourist locations (Figs. 5 – 7). For each of these images, 
documentation of the process was also recorded (Fig. 8). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sunset at Grand Bend (2013), one pixel image, archival pigment print 15” x 
15”.33 
                                                 
33   Printed at a resolution of 0.0667 pixels per inch (ppi). 
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Figure 8: Giselle Holding the Fish She Just Caught (2013), one pixel image, archival 
pigment print 15” x 15”. 
 
 
Figure 9: Niagara Falls (2013), one pixel image, archival pigment print 15” x 15”. 
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Figure 10: Performance documentation of The One Pixel Camera in use
 
I have found that it is possible to work with the camera if I accept its limitations34 and 
attempt to turn them to my advantage35. Through my experience working with The One Pixel 
Camera, I have acquired a limited ability to ever-so-slightly tune qualities in the resultant 
single-pixel images. By applying an understanding of light and knowing the colour of the 
subject matter before the lens, I am now able achieve moderate control over the final 
appearance/colour of the image. However, my bending of the camera’s “program” is still 
very minimal and no matter how hard I try, I will never produce an image that actually looks 
like something or is anything more than an index of light and a representation of reflected 
colour.  
By going through the complete process from designing a technological artifact with 
intentional politics and a predetermined set of tacitly prescribed behaviors, through to the 
                                                 
34  The limitations of the camera go beyond the single pixel sensor. The large size, weight of the camera 
 necessitate the use of the tripod and the waist-level viewfinder prescribes a certain viewing 
 angle/position—even though the viewfinder isn’t overly useful in terms of framing, it still serves only  to 
 give an indication of colour in the final image. 
35  Although, I will not allow myself to “hack” the camera as this would work to defeat the whole notion,  and 
 testing out, of self-imposed design limitations, which is the overall goal of the project as absurd as it may 
 be.  
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attempt to use this same artifact with full knowledge of its embedded politics, I have gained a 
more thorough and intuitive understanding of how technological politics function. This 
exploration has been a personal one, but I expect that through the presentation of The One 
Pixel Camera along with the resultant one pixel images and documentation of the camera in 
use, others may come to establish a more enhanced and intuitive understanding of their own.  
The final one pixel images may also open up other conversations about the nature of 
photography,36 but within the framework of our current discussion, it is the process of design 
and of use that I see as the crux of the work. My hope is that this project will work to draw 
greater attention to the notion that the devices and objects around us contain embedded 
politics and that they affect us on a tacit and intuitive level: prescribing certain actions and 
behaviors while restricting others, thereby effecting seemingly invisible structures of power 
and control.  
It is not the case that all technological politics are problematic. I expect even Latour would 
agree that his annoying seatbelt alarm is in essence a positive thing backed by good 
intentions. The issue here is the lack of attention and consideration paid to such politics. We 
are increasingly surrounded by technological devices that cause us to drastically alter the way 
we live, yet we accommodate with little question or concern — whereas we would actively 
resist similarly profound changes had they been mandated through policy or law. We tend to 
focus on the explicitly stated and obvious forms of politics while ignoring those that function 
below the surface, on a tacit and intuitive level. The One Pixel Camera Project attempts to 
make these tacit politics more tangible for the viewer, by working on an intuitive and 
practical level itself, rather than through abstracted theory. 
                                                 
36  The One Pixel Camera project also reduces the camera and image to a primary essence—a pure index  of 
 light and the base unit or “quantum” of the digital image: the pixel. Angela Bulloch, an artist who also 
 works with the pixel describes it as “the smallest units of technological images, which cannot and are not 
 supposed to be seen when one is under the spell of the culture industry’s images”(Diederichsen 12). In a 
 similar fashion, Craig Dworkin, writing about Jason Salavon’s The Top Grossing Film of All Time 1 x1 
 (which reduces the film Titanic to a grid-ordered, frame-by-frame display of each frame in the film, blurred 
 to its average pixel colour), states that “one of the long-standing problems with thinking of visual works in 
 structural terms has been that they seem to lack discrete units of double articulation; the formal structure of 
 painting, for instance, had nothing neatly analogous to Western writing’s system of alphabetic letters and 
 words. Digital imaging and analysis, however, provides the necessary unit of articulation: the pixel” 
 (Dworkin 96). However, this is beyond the scope of the current discussion. 
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Chapter 4  
4 An Uncertain Experience: the Production and Viewing of 
Photographic Documentation from Performance Art 
Events 
As I recall, it was the fall of 2001 when I witnessed my first performance art event. The 
performance took place at Art System, a gallery loosely affiliated with the Ontario College of 
Art and Design and located on the second story of a commercial space on Spadina Avenue in 
Toronto. Art System had gained a fair bit of notoriety at the time, partially due to it being run 
by Jubal Brown—an artist best known for throwing-up in primary-coloured vomit on 
paintings in both the AGO and the MOMA (DePalma “Student,” “No Stomach”)—and partly 
for the gallery’s public support of a video by Jesse Power depicting a cat being tortured, 
skinned alive, and eventually killed through strangulation (Smith; Stevens). With this in 
mind, I went to the event with an expectation that something shocking and sensational would 
occur.  
I am unable to remember the name of the artist or the title of the exhibition, but can share a 
detailed description of the performance—as I remember it—and my visceral response to the 
experience of having-been-there myself. The piece began with a male performer entering the 
room wearing a dilapidated blond wig, a white tutu, and a pair of translucent white tights 
through which a large adult diaper was visible. “Flashdance... What a Feeling” by Irene Cara 
began to play and the performer proceeded to dance in a pseudo-sexual fashion.1 As he 
continued to dance, you could see his facial expression contort; these contortions were 
explained when, at the end of the song, he reached into the diaper and pulled out a handful of 
fecal matter (or at least a substance that strongly resembled fecal matter). He then placed this 
handful, along with a few more, in a skillet on a hotplate, where he fried the mass up, with 
the addition of some spicy black-bean sauce. After a few minutes of cooking, he took out a 
spoon and began to eat the newly produced “meal,” then paused for a moment to offer a 
sample to the audience. I opted out of this opportunity to add a taste sensation to my 
                                                 
1  A song made famous through the film Flashdance (Lyne). 
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phenomenological experience of the event, but there was one woman in the audience who 
took him up on his offer. I believe she was calling his bluff, perhaps thinking that the meal 
was in some way simulated, but ended up gagging and spitting out the contents onto the 
floor. Following this foray into scatological cuisine, the “artist” produced a spiral-shaped 
piece of metal attached to a wooden handle, which he placed on the hotplate, allowing it to 
heat up. Lying down on a couch, he removed the tutu, and his assistant took the red-hot metal 
and applied it to the bare flesh of his back, branding him with an abstract spiral pattern. The 
performer then stood up and walked out of the room, and the audience cautiously applauded. 
Through my experience of witnessing this live performance, I can claim to know the event in 
a certain way—having been there myself to acquire the full sensory experience, in the 
moment, as the events unfolded. Through my word-of-mouth description, you have now 
gained an explicit and “factual” knowledge of the event, yet are also able to draw from your 
own tacit experience and imagine something of what it was like to be there: the smell of 
frying shit and burning flesh, the sounds of the audience members’ gasps and the performer’s 
scream as the red-hot iron made contact with his flesh. However, both of these modes of 
knowledge are based upon my specific memory and my ability to accurately recall what 
actually happened. As such, they are quite suspect and prone to error, and can never be held 
to be an “objective” or true version of the event.  
The question of how one can actually know an experiential and ephemeral thing such as a 
performance art event becomes central to our understanding of the art form. Due to the 
limitations of time and space, it is rarely possible to experience the performance as a live 
event. Even when it is possible, one’s memory of the event may be selective, or may shift 
and grow vague over time. Photographic and video documentation provide a potential 
solution to this,2 but many artists and theorists resist the use of documentation because it 
works against the supposedly “authentic” live experience and the ephemeral ideal of 
performance, or simply because they feel that the photographic record does not tell the 
“whole truth” and represents a biased viewpoint contaminated by the subjectivity of the 
                                                 
2  This chapter will primarily focus on photographic documentation because that is where my personal 
 experience lies. 
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photographer. This essay will explore such debates through an analysis of texts by key 
figures such as Peggy Phelan, Amelia Jones, and Philip Auslander, as well as drawing upon 
my own personal experience documenting performance art over many years. The goal of the 
chapter will be to present a notion of viewing photographic documentation as a 
phenomenological experience in itself where (to paraphrase Maurice Merleau-Ponty) one 
does not see the image, but instead sees according to the image.3 Additionally, this essay will 
take into consideration the typically neglected role of the photographer. Where others have 
seen the photographer as problematic, complicating understandings of the performance event 
that would seek to see it as a self-contained work, I argue in favour of an embracing of the 
photographer’s subjectivity, both in terms of how their aesthetic decisions shape the eventual 
visual document and how the photographer’s body and the mere presence of the camera alter 
and influence the dynamic of the originating performance event. Through consideration of 
the photographer’s mediation in this manner, the photographic documentation becomes an 
experience of an individual’s experience rather than a mere document. 
As a genre, performance art is complicated to define, especially seeing as it is not associated 
with a specific medium or a particular artistic movement.4 It is distinct from theatre in that is 
it not based upon the live demonstration of a skilled technique (e.g. acting, singing, dancing, 
or playing a musical instrument),5 but rather upon the artist temporarily transforming their 
body (and occasionally the bodies of those in the audience) into an art object. Additionally, 
there is often an element of chance where, unlike the repeated performances of theatre, the 
                                                 
3  Of the cave paintings in Lascaux, Merleau-Ponty writes: “I would be at great pains to say where is the 
 painting I am looking at. For I do not look at it as I do a thing; I do not fix it in place. My gaze wanders 
 in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or with it, than I see  it” 
 (164).  
4  In the words of Frazer Ward, “Rather, performance has surfaced and disappeared throughout the 
 twentieth century as a kind of undercurrent, periodically bubbling up within – or in some relation to – 
 various avant-garde movements: the Soviet Avant-gardes, Futurism, Dada, the Bauhaus, neo-Dada, 
 Fluxus, Pop, Minimalism, perhaps even Abstract Expressionism if we consider the arena-like quality of 
 Jackson Pollock’s canvases rolled out on the studio floor” (38). 
5  An extended discussion on the significance of skill within theatre can be found in What is Performance, the 
 introduction to Marvin Carlson’s Performance: a Critical Introduction.  
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event is not fully predetermined, but simply based on a loose set of parameters,6 or a 
constructed situation. In such cases, events are allowed to unfold on their own, under the 
influence of the audience’s response and interaction—thus the work also becomes a form of 
social experiment.  
In her attempt to define performance art,  RoseLee Goldberg states that “it is the very 
presence of the performance artist in real time, of live performers ‘stopping time,’ that gives 
the medium its central position” (“From Futurism” 248–249). 7 However, this description 
does not fully account for performances without an audience, such as Vito Acconci’s Step 
Piece (1970), which was performed privately in his apartment every morning for a period of 
four months; extreme durational performances that would far exceed the audience’s attention 
span, such as Linda Montano and Tehching Hsieh’s Art/Life: One Year Performance (a.k.a. 
Rope Piece) (4 July 1983–3 July 1984), in which the artists spent a full year tied together at 
the waist by an eight-foot length of rope; or actions performed specifically for the camera, 
such as Yves Klein’s Leap into the Void (1960), which involved a photomontage of two 
separate images. Anne Marsh provides a more general description of performance art as: “a 
form of art that happens at a particular time in a particular place where the artist engages in 
some sort of activity, usually before an audience” (qtd. in Ward 36), which through its 
vagueness seems to function fairly well, but at the same time could include many things that 
would probably not be considered performance art proper. Overall, performance art is a 
difficult category to pin down, but for the purposes of this essay, performance art will be 
considered as a form of art that involves space, time, the performer’s body, and some sort of 
relationship between performer and audience. 
                                                 
6  A prime example of parameters being laid out for an otherwise open-ended performance can be seen in 
 the Fluxus-produced Event Scores: “taut little propositions, exercises, or word-objects, usually printed  on 
 small, often disposable, cards or sheets of paper. For example: 
 Disappearing Music For Face 
  smile 
  stop to smile 
 C. Shiomi, February 1964” (Doris 99). 
7  Goldberg maintains that “the definition of performance art is open-ended” (“Performance” 12) so her 
 “attempt” as I have described it tries to get at some essential quality that unites performative works 
 without delimiting their scope. 
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Regardless of the subtle variations in definition, many theorists, such as Peggy Phelan, see 
the live and ephemeral nature of performance art as essential to the genre’s form:  
 Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded,  
 documented or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of  
 representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance.  
 (146) 
Phelan promotes the idea of an “authentic” way of knowing the performance piece that is 
only possible through the visceral, fully sensorial, live experience, and the idea that the 
performance is meant to disappear, living on only in the memory of the select few who were 
present at the event. As romantic as this view may be, it is limiting, both in terms of the work 
being seen by a large a large audience and for it to have any life at all after the initial 
engagement. Performance artist Laurie Anderson describes her own experience with this 
same ideal: 
 I myself used to be very proud that I didn’t document my work. I felt that, since  
 much of it was about time and memory, that was the way it should be recorded— 
 in the memories of the viewers—with all the inevitable distortions, associations  
 and elaborations. Gradually I changed my mind about making records of events  
 because people would say things like, “I really loved that orange dog you had in  
 the show!” And I never had an orange dog ever. I started to keep track of things  
 after that. I just didn’t want it to disappear. (6–7)8 
Much like my own recollection of the performance at Art System, there are bound to be gaps 
in the memories of those who were present, and memory is prone to morphing and shifting 
over time, thus distorting pivotal aspects of the original piece.  
In some cases, performance works are re-performed as a way to renew the possibility of an 
“authentic experience” and to revive the living memory of the work; however, due to the 
                                                 
8 Marina Abramović has expressed a similar change of heart: early on, she says, “we decided that we 
 wouldn’t make any documentation of our work. It would only exist afterward by word of mouth” (qtd. in 
 Chalmers 33). “At a certain point,” writes Chalmers, “she simply changed her mind about documentation” 
 (Chalmers 33). 
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element of chance involved in most performance art, these re-performances unfold in a 
divergent manner and occur under drastically different circumstances. Even the occurrence of 
the event during a different historical moment has the potential to drastically alter the 
audience’s reaction, the meaning of the work and the overall experience of the piece, so one 
does not acquire an “authentic experience” of the original event, but rather an experience of a 
new performance that is essentially a “cover” of the original (Chalmers 25). Notable 
examples of this practice would include Marina Abramović’s Seven Easy Pieces (2005), 
where she re-performed performance works by a number of well-known artists,9 and the 
BBC Symphony Orchestra’s re-performance of John Cage’s 4’33” (“Radio 3”).10 
For most viewers, including the art historian Amelia Jones, photographic documentation is 
the only way through which to acquire knowledge related to the experience of the event 
without having been there, especially for events that occurred before one’s birth. The 
photographic record may not present the same full-fledged and fleshy phenomenological 
experience as the live event, but according to Jones “neither has a privileged relationship to 
the historic ‘truth’ of the performance” (11).11  
Jones proposes that when we consider the photographic documentation along with other 
supplementary materials,12 we can come to form, in the words of Jacques Derrida, “the 
mirage of the thing itself, of immediate presence, or originary perception” (qtd. in Jones 14). 
Additionally, Jones argues that, much like the relationship between audience and performer, 
                                                 
9  Seven Easy Pieces consisted of re-performances of Bruce Nauman’s Body Pressure (1974), Vito 
 Acconci’s Seedbed (1972), VALIE EXPORT’s Action Pants: Genital Panic (1969), Gina Pane’s The 
 Conditioning, first action of Self-Portrait(s) (1973), Joseph Beuys’ How to Explain Pictures to a Dead 
 Hare (1965) and Abramović’s own Lips of Thomas (1975) – along with a new piece titled Entering the 
 Other Side (2005). 
10  4’33” could be considered a “musical” performance rather than a piece of performance art; however, I 
 would argue that it is indeed performance art because it depends upon the artist’s body being present in 
 the space while actively not-playing their instrument.    
11  Jones extends this idea, proposing that the subsequent view may in fact be the more thorough 
 understanding of the work: “While the viewer of a live performance may seem to have certain 
 advantages in understanding such a context, on a certain level she may find it more difficult to 
 comprehend the histories/narrative/processes she is experiencing until later, when she too can look 
 back and evaluate them in hindsight.…it is hard to identify the patterns of history while one is 
 embedded in them” (12). 
12  The other supplementary materials Jones mentions include “the spoken narrative, the video and other 
 visuals within the piece, the video, film, photograph and text documenting it for posterity” (14). 
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the exchange between viewer and document is intersubjective,13 albeit in a mediated way. 
But then for Jones, “there is no possibility of an unmediated relationship to any kind of 
cultural product, including body art” (12). Using Carolee Schneeman’s Interior Scroll (1975) 
as a specific example, Jones states that “having direct physical contact with an artist who 
pulls a scroll from her vaginal canal does not ensure “knowledge” of her subjectivity or 
intentionality any more than does looking at a film or picture of this activity” (13). For Jones, 
the very notion of an “authentic” live experience is no more than an idealistic fantasy or a 
“modernist dream” (17). 
Philip Auslander takes this idea further by proposing that the live event is, for the most part, 
incidental.14 For Auslander, the “performance” lies within the documentation itself, 
specifically within the relationship between viewer and image: “Perhaps the authenticity of 
the performance document resides in its relationship to its beholder rather than to an 
ostensibly originary event: perhaps its authority is phenomenological rather than ontological” 
(“Performativity” 9). In emphasizing the relationship between the viewer and the image over 
the relationship between the performance and its documentation, he allows for what he refers 
to as theatrical documentation or performed photography,15 such as Yves Klein’s Leap into 
the Void (1960), to be considered as valid performances in their own right. Using the 
example of Klein’s Leap, Auslander states:  
 [T]o argue that Klein’s leap was not a performance because it only took place  
 within photographic space would be equivalent to arguing that the Beatles did not  
 perform the music on their Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band album because 
                                                 
13  Jones writes, “While the live situation may enable the phenomenological relations of flesh-to flesh 
 engagement, the documentary exchange (viewer/reader <->document) is equally intersubjective” (12). 
14  “In other words, while the presence of an initial audience may be important to performers, it is merely 
 incidental to the performance as documented” (Auslander “Performativity” 7). 
15  Theatrical as opposed to documentary, the latter referring the traditional notion of performance 
 documentation that serves as “proof” of the event and is considered to have an ontological and 
 indexical relationship to the original performance (Auslander “Performativity” 1). The Theatrical 
 category pertains to “ ‘performed photography’ ranging from Marcel Duchamp’s photos of himself as 
 Rrose Selavy to Cindy Sherman’s photographs of herself in various guises to Mathew Barney’s 
 Cremaster films” (Auslander “Performativity” 2).  
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 that performance exists only in the space of the recording: the group never  
 actually performed the music as we hear it. ( “Performativity” 9).  
For Auslander, it does not matter whether the documentation is truthful, deceitful, or 
manipulated. The indexical relationship to the original event is mostly irrelevant—the 
performance exists within the viewer’s imagination, in their current present as they recreate 
the event for their self, through an experience of the performance documents 
(“Hermeneutics” 95). This does not mean that the document holds no connection to the 
past—just that it does not afford the viewer direct access to the originating event. Instead, 
Auslander proposes that the photographic documentation functions “as a text from which we 
can imaginatively reactivate historical performances in the present, allowing us to understand 
experientially both the past and our present as they are disclosed in and through an ongoing 
dialogue with one another” (“Hermeneutics” 95). 
Hans Belting also proposes a phenomenological, experiential approach to photographic 
documentation by considering the viewing of an image as an event in itself: “Images are 
neither on the wall (or on the screen) nor in the head alone. They do not exist by themselves, 
but they happen; they take place” (Belting, “Iconography” 302).  Belting proposes a new 
way to consider photography that consists of three components: image, medium and the 
viewer’s body.16  
 We must address the image not only as a product of a given medium, be it   
 photography, painting, or video, but also as a product of ourselves [our body], for  
 we generate images of our own (dreams, imaginings, personal perceptions) that  
 we play out against other images of the visible world. (“Anthropology” 2) 
In essence, the viewer’s body “performs the image” (Belting, “Iconography” 311) and the 
image event is a negotiation between the viewer’s body and the medium. However, for 
Belting, there is no direct or “truthful” connection between the viewer and the image (or the 
originating event) as “no visible images reach us unmediated” (“Iconography” 304). 
                                                 
16  Belting explains these terms further: “Medium here is to be understood not in the usual sense but in the 
 sense of the agent by which the images are transmitted, while body means either the performing or the 
 perceiving body on which images depend no less than on their respective media” (302). 
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In a similar fashion, Georges Didi-Huberman, writing about four specific images that depict 
the mass killing of Jews during the Holocaust,17 acknowledges the problems that arise due to 
considering images as matters of fact and holding on to an expectation that they carry the 
complete and absolute “truth”: 
 [W]e often ask too much or too little of an image. Ask too much of it—“the  
 whole truth” for example—and we will quickly be disappointed. … Or else we  
 ask too little of images: by immediately relegating them to the sphere of   
 simulacrum … we exclude them from the historic field as such. By immediately  
 relegating them to the sphere of the document—something easier and more  
 current—we sever them from their phenomenology, from their specificity, and  
 from their very substance. In every case the result will be identical: the historian  
 will continue to feel that … ‘the images whatever their nature, cannot tell what  
 happened.’ (32–33) 
Of course the cultural and historical stakes around images of the Holocaust far exceed the 
parameters of this discussion, but Didi-Huberman’s discussion, like Auslander’s and 
Belting’s, helps us to consider photographs in a new way. Didi-Huberman argues that the 
power residing in such documentary images is situated not in their ability to depict events 
through any sort of direct indexical relationship, but instead in their capacity to aid and 
inspire our imagination—because, as he states, “To remember, one must imagine” (30) and 
“In order to know, we must imagine for ourselves” (1). 
Didi-Huberman describes the process of viewing a photograph as a quasi observation that 
functions as an interpretation augmented by the “historical imagination—written documents, 
contemporary testimonies, other visual sources” (113–114). Much like Amelia Jones’ notion 
of a “mirage,” these elements combine to form a tacit montage of knowledge within one’s 
imagination. However, he also states that “an image without imagination is quite simply an 
image that one didn’t spend the time to work on” (116). Imagining, on the part of the viewer, 
                                                 
17  These four images were produced by a member of the Jewish Sonderkommando, a group of Jews 
 “recruited” to facilitate the gas chamber exterminations, and smuggled out in order to bear witness and 
 provide testimony of the events taking place.  
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involves mental work, a consideration of external information and an acknowledgement of 
the various mediators involved in the production of the image in question.  
In terms of such mediators, the most obvious and influential is the photographer. As Hans 
Belting states, “Our bodies function as media themselves, living media as opposed to 
fabricated media. Images rely on two symbolic acts which both involve our living body: the 
act of fabrication and the act of perception, the one being the purpose of the other.” 
(“Anthropology” 3). The act of image fabrication is obviously contingent upon the living 
body of the performer who performs in front of the camera, but also upon the living body of 
the photographer performing behind the camera—which in turn is visible to, and has an 
effect upon, the performance occurring in front of the lens. Yet, the role played by the 
photographer in performance art documentation is rarely considered, let alone acknowledged. 
Typically, the photographer is viewed simply as a black box through which one gains access 
to a supposedly unmediated, objective, and mechanical depiction of the event.  
This neglect is explicitly acknowledged by Kathy O’Dell in her essay “Behold!” which 
appears in the Live Art on Camera exhibition catalogue:  
 Ironically, the photographer has been historically invisible in the contract-like  
 agreement that pertains to the recording of live events, even though he or she may 
 have been most engaged in the material sense.  (35) 
The Live Art on Camera: Performance and Photography exhibition attempted to “disallow 
such invisibility” of the photographer (O’Dell 35) and to present the idea of a hybrid identity 
for the performance art document.18 As Stephen Foster explains in the catalogue’s 
introduction, “the document of a performance is not the work and neither is it a document; in 
every case it holds a position somewhere between the two” (Foster v–vi). However, Live Art 
on Camera is a distinct outlier and with few exceptions,19 the photographer’s influence is 
almost never mentioned.   
                                                 
18  The Live Art on Camera: Performance and Photography exhibition took place from September 18 to 
 November 10, 2007 at the John Hansard Gallery in Southhampton UK.  
19  These rare instances include Philip Auslander’s inclusion of a quote by Gina Pane, where she recounts, 
 “So, the photographer is not an external factor, he is positioned inside the action space with me, just a few 
 centimeters away. There were times when he obstructed the [audiences] view!” (qtd in “Performativity” 3); 
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This general omission of the photographer’s influence seems to reflect a desire for a form of 
mechanical objectivity,20 where the use of the camera is seen to produce a direct and 
unmediated connection to the originating event/phenomena. Any acknowledgement of an 
author would introduce an element of subjectivity, thus defeating the objective ideal. This 
sentiment is demonstrated in the essay In Our Image by Morris Wright where he states: “In 
the anonymous photograph, the loss of the photographer often proves to be a gain. We see 
only the photograph” (540). Using the hypothetical example of photographs from Golgotha 
or the sacking of Rome, he explains further:  
 I would personally prefer that the photograph be stamped Photographer   
 Unknown. This would assure me, rightly or wrongly, that I was seeing a fragment  
 of life, a moment of time, as it was. The photographer who has no hand to hide  
 will conceal it with the least difficulty. (544)  
Nevertheless, Wright implies that even though he wishes for the photographer’s “hand” to be 
omitted, it is never truly absent, but merely concealed. Perhaps a better approach would be to 
simply embrace the subjectivity of the photographer, allowing for their “hand,” which 
necessarily shapes the resulting images, to be revealed and considered as a mediator. In this 
way, the photographer’s subjectivity could provide additional information that assists in the 
construction of a personal understanding of the event acquired through the use of one’s 
imagination.  
Based on my own experience documenting performance art, I can attest that I, as a 
photographer, am never an objective black box that merely takes in input from the event and 
spews out the “truth” from the other, nor am I ever an invisible fly on the wall. I would be 
more aptly described as the elephant in the room.    
                                                 
 Babette Mangolte’s essay, “Balancing Act Between Reason and Instinct: or How to Organize Volumes on a 
 Flat Surface in Shooting Photographs, Films, and Videos of Performance,” detailing her own experiences 
 and approach to documenting performance art; as well as Philip Auslander’s subsequent article “Towards a 
 Hermeneutics of Performance Art Documentation,” which drew heavily from Mangolte’s article.   
20  “By mechanical objectivity we mean the insistent drive to repress the willful intervention of the artist-
 author, and to put in its stead a set of procedures that would, as it were, move nature [the original 
 event] to the page through a strict protocol, if not automatically" (Daston and Galison 121) 
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Over the years, I have photographed performances by Gale Allen, Guillaume Désanges (with 
Hélène Meise), Michael Dudeck, Redmond Entwistle, Michael Farnan, Francisco-Fernando 
Granados, Reena Katz, Sung Hwan Kim, Tanya Mars, Jon McCurley, Freya Olafson, Ignacio 
Peréz Peréz, Don Simmons, Zoe Stonyk, and Claudia Wittmann, as well as covering the 
7a*11d International Festival of Performance Art and numerous events hosted by the FADO 
Performance Art Centre—and in every case, I have interfered and become implicated in the 
performance. I am well aware that my presence as a photographer is always an issue and it is 
always something that I discuss with the artist(s) before the performance begins. During this 
discussion, I review the challenges of getting decent images without interfering, in order to 
gauge where the performer’s priorities lie: in the event itself or in its documentation. We 
agree upon parameters such as whether or not I can move around during the performance, 
whether I can move in front of audience members, if I can use a flash or not, and whether I 
should hold back from shooting during quiet periods lest the sound of the camera’s click 
break the solemn quality of the moment. The results of this discussion vary, but in most 
cases, artists lean towards allowing me to do what is necessary in order to get good images, 
as they usually appreciate and acknowledge the significance of documentation for the 
viability of their work. 
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Figure 11: Gale Allen – Free My Voice (Hysteria Festival, Oct 22, 2009), photo by Dave 
Kemp 
 
 
Figure 12: Guillaume Désanges – A History of Performance in 20 Minutes: A 
Performance Lecture with Hélène Meisel (Gallery TPW, June 10 , 2010), photos by Dave 
Kemp 
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Figure 13: Redmond Entwistle – Satellite (Gallery TPW, October 17, 2009), photo by 
Dave Kemp 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Tanya Mars – In Pursuit of Happiness (Nuit Blanche, Sept. 30, 2006), photos 
by Dave Kemp  
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Figure 15: Sung Hwan Kim – In the Room (Gallery TPW, April 7, 2009), photo by Dave 
Kemp  
 
 
 
Figure 16: Jon McCurley – Double Double Land Land (Gallery TPW, January 8, 2009), 
photos by Dave Kemp 
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Figure 17: Don Simmons – Sweet Ecstasy: Plans for an Escape Route (Rhubarb! 
Festival, February 7, 2009), photo by Dave Kemp 
 
 
Figure 18: 7a*11D – International Festival of Performance Art (October 2006) - 
Mebuyan (Left), Les Fermières Obsédées (Right), photos by Dave Kemp 
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Figure 19: Ignacio Peréz Peréz – Open Barter Market (Part of the Escapist Action: 
Performance in Recession festival, November 26, 2009), photos by Dave Kemp 
 
An extreme example of my interference occurred when I was commissioned to photograph 
Michael Dudeck’s performance Parthenogenesis at the Pari Nadimi Gallery in Toronto in 
2009. Being a young performer, Dudeck wanted to obtain high-quality documentation in 
order to help establish his career, so he gave me free reign to do whatever was required. The 
performance involved a number of mannequins covered in hockey tape, gas masks, and deer 
antlers and scattered around a large room, functioning for the artist as shamanic objects with 
which he would interact in a ritualistic and sexualized manner. When the audience arrived, 
they lined up, in a conventional manner, with their backs against the outer walls, looking in 
toward the main space of the gallery. The only figures on display in the centre of the room 
were the artist (dressed in shamanic garb), the mannequins, and me (dressed all in black at 
the artist’s request). Compounding my situation as a spectacle in the middle of the gallery 
was the fact that I had recently suffered a severe Judo injury,21 which had left my knee stuck 
in a bent position and had me walking with a significant hobble for a number of months 
                                                 
21  I had a torn the meniscus in my right knee which had shifted to become jammed in the joint created a 
 “locked knee” condition. This resulted in my knee being stuck in a bent position. Ironically, the 
 identical injury occurred to my left knee in 2012 – also a result of Judo practice.    
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while I awaited surgery. So, as the performance progressed, the artist was followed by a 
limping, clicking, shadowy figure who was in no way part of the intended display, but had, 
through the need for documentation, become a part of the spectacle – thus drastically altering 
the audience’s experience of the performance as a live event. 
 
 
Figure 20: Michael Dudeck – Parthenogenesis (Pari Nadimi Gallery, Feb 5, 2009), 
photos by Dave Kemp22 
 
In many ways, the photographer, through necessity, becomes a performer in their own right. 
In her analysis of Vito Acconci’s Following Piece (1969), Margaret Iverson describes such a 
dynamic. In the performance, Acconci would follow a randomly selected stranger while 
remaining unobserved. The task/performance would end when the followee entered a private 
space. Acconci repeated this action every day for three weeks. Towards the end of this 
period, he commissioned a photographer to document his actions, which, as described by 
                                                 
22  Through looking at the two images together, you can imagine where I would have been standing in 
 order to capture the image of the left. 
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Iverson, “lengthened the parade of followers by two: the photographer and the viewer of the 
photographer” (Iverson 99). By commissioning the photographer, Acconci opened up the 
possibility for an audience to experience his artwork, but at the same time altered the 
“essence” of the performance: he himself being visibly followed while following creates an 
entirely new dynamic.   
This interference on the part of the photographer is not always a negative influence and at 
times can become a beneficial extension. Carolee Schneemann describes experiencing the 
photographer’s flash as a form of positive feedback: 
 Within the solo works, being blinded by a flash is a most positive interaction! In  
 the pieces where I am working with projections I am in darkness, I don’t see the  
 audience. So when the flash goes off—it is vibrant, participatory—like some kind 
 of lightning bugs, opening space within space. At that point I can tell, ‘They’ve  
 got it!’ Absolutely the right moment! At the back of my reptilian brain I know  
 that is the moment I needed them to capture: an energy communication.  
 (Schneeman 9)     
In a similar fashion, during a recent performance of The 5th Annual Power Animal Party by 
Michael Farnan, my presence, as the photographer, was reconfigured as I became a form of 
paparazzi that accentuated the “celebrity” status of his fictional character, AssFace, the 
Plastic Shaman to the Stars.23 
 
                                                 
23  After the performance it was also suggested (in a jovial manner) that I could have manifested an even 
 greater influence by also taking on the role of bouncer and helping to manage and potentially eject some 
 excessively drunken audience members who became a disruptive presences towards the end of  the 
 performance; however, I held back in that particular role, deciding that ejecting audience members 
 without explicit directions to do so went beyond my expected role as photographer. 
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Figure 21: Michael Farnan – The 5th Annual Power Animal Party (Gallery West, 
January 10, 2014), photo by Dave Kemp 
       
Beyond the influence of the photographer’s body within the space of the performance, the 
mere presence of the camera significantly alters the way in which events unfold. With an 
awareness that their image may be captured and scrutinized by others at a later date, both 
performers and people in the audience tend to act differently: they pose and make attempts to 
appear in a self-flattering way, or they alter their path and actions in order to avoid the 
camera’s gaze altogether. As Henry M. Sayre states, “Clearly the very presence of the 
camera alters its object; it is the camera that defines and requires the moment’s very 
staginess” and “our awareness of such posturing undermines the seeming objectivity of 
photography as a medium” (52–53). Similarly, in the words of Roland Barthes: 
 In front of the lens, I am at the same time: the one I think I am, the one I want  
 others to think I am, the one the photographer thinks I am, and the one he makes  
 use of to exhibit his art. In other words, a strange action: I do not stop imitating  
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 myself, and because of this, each time I am (or let myself be) photographed, I  
 invariably suffer from a sensation of inauthenticity, sometimes of imposture.   
 (Barthes “Camera” 13) 
Not only does the camera induce a degree of pretense in both performers and audience 
members, but it also functions to turn the event into a spectacle. The presence of the camera 
visually indicates that the situation occurring before the lens is worthy of documentation, 
hence is worthy of attention and, as such, passers-by take notice. A simple example of this is 
seen in the “documentary” Exit Through the Gift Shop in a scene where documentary 
filmmaker Thierry Guetta (Mr. Brainwash) is following graffiti artist Shepard Fairey as he 
makes a new piece of street art on a public wall (a performative act in itself).24 As Fairey 
begins, he turns to Guetta, directing him to shoot from the other side of the street: “Don’t 
film from that side, film from this side over here. You understand why, right? Because you’re 
going to attract attention.” But it is already too late and the police show up a few seconds 
later.    
As for my own experience in this regard, the best example occurred while I was documenting 
the relational/public performance work Each Hand as They are Called by Reena Katz. This 
was an extended piece involving numerous public performances taking place in Toronto’s 
Kensington Market over the course of one week in October of 2009. Included in Katz’s piece 
was a series of minor performances involving the spontaneous appearance of a duo singing 
traditional Yiddish songs backwards. The time and location of these small, intimate 
performances were left to chance (determined by a roll of dice) in order to facilitate 
serendipitous encounters with unsuspecting members of the public. A number of these 
performances occurred exactly as intended, as quiet little surprises, but due to the need for 
documentation, a majority took place with me in tow as the photographer (as well as, in a 
few cases, a second individual with a video camera on a tripod), lying visibly in wait for the 
event to begin, thus diminishing the potential of a serendipitous and surprise encounter.  
                                                 
24  It should be noted that the film is most likely a hoax and a parody constructed by Banksy as a critique on 
 the commercialization of the art world and the character of Thierry Guetta (Mr. Brainwash) is most 
 likely a constructed persona; however, it still serves as an excellent example of this type of interaction 
 between artist and photo/video documentarian. 
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Figure 22: Reena Katz – each hand as they are called (Kensington Market, October 1-
25, 2009), photos by Dave Kemp 
 
My intent is not to be critical of these artists for choosing to obtain good documentation at 
some expense to the intimacy of their live performances. After all, the reality, as described by 
Jones and Auslander, is that the performance lives on and will be experienced primarily 
through its documentation. Therefore, satisfactory documentation is a crucial part of the 
performance’s existence as an artwork.25 My intent is simply to show that the photographer 
and the camera are always implicated in some way in the performance they document, and it 
is a trade-off that the performing artist must always carefully weigh.  
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle is a useful analogy through which to think through the 
potential influence of the photographer on a performance art event:26 
                                                 
25  This also opens up potential problems in terms of authorship and ownership, if one considers the 
 documentation photograph as an art object that is to be bought and sold in the art market. Is this 
 document a product of the artist, the photographer, or a collaborative production by both? In any case, who 
 should receive the proceeds from such a sale? I once had an artist approach me indicating a desire to sell 
 my documentation of his performance through his dealer in New York. He offered me a percentage of the 
 sale, which seemed fair enough in my opinion, but I have yet to hear back – I am not  sure if they were 
 never put up for sale, never sold, or if his dealer simply convinced him that my role in making the actual 
 images was incidental. An interesting example of this dynamic is described by Alice Maude-Roxby in her 
 article on the “performance to camera” collaborations between the photographer Manuel Vason and 
 various performance artists, for which copyright is collectively shared (Maude-Roxby 54). 
26  It should be noted that Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle pertains specifically to the quantum scale, so I 
 reference it here only as an analogy – it is not the case that it actually comes into play in the observation of 
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 The mathematics of Heisenberg’s theory implied that gathering information about 
 one of a pair of complementary observables would cause you to lose information  
 about the other. (Seife168) 
So, should you measure the particle’s position, you would lose information about its 
momentum. Conversely, if you measure its momentum, you increase the uncertainty of 
where it might be located.  
 At its logical extreme, if you somehow were able to determine with 100 percent 
 accuracy how much momentum a particle carries, you would know nothing about 
 where it is. It could be anywhere in the universe.” (Seife 169)     
In much the same way, the experience of the live event is in balance with the experience of 
the documentation, as a pair of complementary observables. Having a pure, unadulterated, 
and “authentic” live experience would mean absolutely no interference on the part of the 
photographer—which would mean, in turn, that no documentation is produced and hence 
there exists no possibility for a viewer to experience the documentation after the fact. 
Conversely, a perfectly documented event would allow the photographer total control over 
all aspects of the performance without the presence or interference of an audience—this, in 
turn, would eliminate all possibility of a “live” experience as a member of the audience.27 
Klein’s Leap into the Void would safely fall into this second category. Yet in most cases the 
photographer’s effect lies somewhere along the continuum, with a degree of photographic 
influence distorting the live event and a degree of rawness or missed information within the 
documentation. However, the viewer can avoid seeing these necessary conditions of 
performance v. documentation as “deficiencies” or problems, by simply considering them as 
part of the event—and not to attempting to remove, ignore, or erase them as Morris Wright 
would suggest.  
                                                 
 a performance art event. On a more macro scale, such as observing a performance event, the more accurate 
 scientific analogy would be the so-called Observer Effect (Sassoli de Bianchi 3), where any act of 
 observation or measurement is seen to have an effect on the thing being observed or measured. For 
 instance, if one places a thermometer in a glass of water to measure its temperature, the thermometer will 
 have its own pre-established temperature, which will subtly heat-up or cool-down the water in the glass 
 thus affecting the final reading to a small, but not always insignificant, degree. 
27  Except perhaps for the performers and the photographer. 
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In his essay “How to Be Iconophilic in Art Science, and Religion?” Bruno Latour examines 
such mediators and proposes that viewers should approach images according to an 
iconophilic approach rather than as an idolatry of the image.28 To illustrate this, Latour uses 
the example of a map as a mediator between a group of scientists in a Brazilian café and an 
actual location in the Amazon rainforest. The map allows the scientists to point to, designate, 
and “see” the very real spot they plan to visit the next morning.29 The question Latour asks is: 
what do they actually “see”? If one embraces idolatry, they would claim that they see nothing 
but the piece of paper before them, since the designated landscape is absent. However, if one 
takes an iconophilic approach and considers the scientists as relating to the location “through 
a long series of intermediary steps” (419), they are indeed able to see according to the map 
and thus imagine the location for themselves. As explained by Latour, “Iconophilia is respect 
not for the image itself but the movement of the image” (421). It should also be noted that 
even though the map, or a photograph for that matter, is a construction achieved through 
intensive mediation, this does not make it a fiction or a simulacrum—there are still what 
Latour calls “immutable mobiles” that exist as informational constants that are “carried intact 
through the transformation of the media” (426). One example of an immutable mobile would 
be the content of a text, as opposed to its form—Shakespeare’s Hamlet, for instance. 
Whether it is transformed from parchment to paper, from leather-bound hardcover to poorly 
glued pocket book, from screen to eBook, audio book to cinema—in all the cases, the content 
of Hamlet remains essentially constant. Even when translated into a different language, the 
plot and the spirit of the words remain faithful to the original source. According to Latour, 
through an iconophilia approach, one is able “to be a constructivist and a realist at the same 
time” (423).  
In terms of images, the immutable mobiles are more difficult to determine, due to the 
uncoded nature of the information they present; however, there are still certain aspects that 
remain constant, for instance what the performer actually looked like.  
                                                 
28
  “[I]dolatry would be defined by attention to the visual per se.” (Latour, 421) 
29
  Although not explicitly stated by Latour, it is assumed that they have not previously visited this 
 location, so through the use of the map they are able to imagine a geography and a location that they 
 have never seen.  
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Latour looks to Art History as a constructivist model—one from which other fields such as 
the sciences might learn—where the “mediators” are seen as adding to the overall quality and 
informative value of an image:  
 [T]he beauty of a Rembrandt, for instance, could be accounted for by multiplying  
 the mediators—going from the quality of the varnish, the types of market force,  
 the name of all the successive buyers and sellers, the critical accounts evaluating  
 the painting throughout history, the narrative of the theme and its successful  
 transformations, the competition among painters, the slow invention of a taste, the 
 laws of composition  and the ways they were taught, the type of studio life, and so 
 on in a bewildering gamut of heterogeneous elements that, together, composed  
 the quality of a Rembrandt. In Art History the more mediators the better. (422)     
However, and somewhat ironically, art historians do not apply this iconophilic view to 
performance art documentation. Instead, the common practice is to ignore the mediators and 
embrace idolatry. Viewing the document as a form of black-boxed, objective fact—then to 
criticize it for not living up to this imposed ideal. Perhaps this is because the performance art 
document is not considered as an artwork in its own right, thus is seen as unworthy of a 
constructivist interpretation. But as Stephen Foster writes, the performance art document is 
not a simply a document either: “it holds a position somewhere between the two” (Foster v–
vi). 
With this in mind, a constructivist view could potentially shed great light on the 
understanding of the performance as experienced by the viewer through such a 
document/artwork hybrid. As described by Kathy O’Dell, one of the few art historians to 
embrace such an approach: 
 [T]he viewer’s experience is one of narrative-in-reverse. An unconscious haptic  
 response is mobilized as the viewer touches a photograph taken by a photographer 
 who touched the trigger of the camera as the performer touched his or her own  
 skin, used his or her own body both as an instrument of touch and as performance  
 material. This chain of experience, working backward in time, subtly locks the  
 viewer into a metaphoric complicity with the photographer/viewer, as well as with 
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 the performer. These links recreate the largely tacit bond that allowed the   
 performer’s actions to be played out in the first place. (qtd. in Maude-Roxby 51) 
O’Dell acknowledges the series of transformations that occur in the construction of the 
image, described by her as a chain of touches. Through consideration of this chain, a greater 
understanding and an “intersubjective relationship,” like that described by Amelia Jones (12), 
is constructed between the viewer of the performance art document and the original 
performer. 
Another way to think of the performance art photographer would be to align them with the 
figure of the art critic or a writer reviewing an art exhibition—only in this case, the 
photographer is working in an uncoded, non-linguistic, and tacit form of interpretation.30 In 
the same way that a writer chooses what to highlight and what to ignore, what to present in a 
positive light and what to pan, so does the photographer. Yet the photographer is typically 
not seen as a subject or as an author, but merely as an instrument: an intermediary black box 
through which information passes supposedly unaltered.  
Babette Mangolte, one of the few performance art photographers to have written about her 
own practice, describes her approach as a “balancing act between instinct and reason” (1). 
She states that even though she was striving for objectivity,31 she also valued her “instinctive 
reactions in confronting a performance” (3) and the significance of her intuition in 
interpreting the event:  
                                                 
30  Performance art photographer Dona Ann McAdams describes her practice in exactly this way: “The 
 performance photographs are an interpretation of the events on stage. They are my visceral responses to 
 light, movement and frame. I compose in the camera and interpret movement and gesture.” (McAdams 
 103)   
31  Mangolte’s text is actually somewhat conflicted, in that at certain points she makes the claim for pure 
 objectivity – “Clearly in my mind, photography was not about passing judgment, on the contrary, it was 
 about absolute objectivity” (2) – yet later she describes the importance of her subjective response and 
 intuition –  “for photography, all you need is intuition” (3) and then of her subjective decisions in 
 terms of lens use, camera position, depth-of-field and composition (5). I believe her position is best 
 summed-up in the statement “Although striving for objectivity in my documentation, I also valued my 
 instinctive reactions in confronting the performance work” (3). 
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 While respecting the structure of the performance, I felt free to do some   
 interpretation by merely using my own reactions, based on the specificity I saw in 
 one work that was absent in another. (Mangolte 4) 
In so doing, she is able to present a fair and accurate portrayal of events, yet one that still 
incorporates her own personal, instinctive, and visceral response. This leads to a richer 
phenomenological experience of the image itself, as viewers can then place themselves in her 
position, thus constructing a much more detailed and affective “mental image” (Magnolte 5) 
through the use of their own imagination. 
We return to Peggy Phelan’s claim that once performance art is documented it becomes 
something else (146). It may very well be the case that the full sensory experience of a 
performance event is not entirely transferred through the documentation, but only a select 
few are ever able to experience the performance in its initial form. This “something other” 
(Phelan 146) that it becomes, Jones reminds us, is what the vast majority of viewers 
experience as the actual artwork. Auslander extends this notion, claiming that the experience 
of the documentation is what actually matters in terms of an “authentic” experience and that 
the originating performance is merely a process by which to produce the artwork in the form 
of its documentation. Both Jones and Auslander also propose the possibility of a 
phenomenological experience and of an intersubjective relationship with the performer, by 
way of the image, through the use of one’s imagination—and this sentiment is echoed by 
Hans Belting and Georges Didi-Huberman.  
With the notion that the documentation functions, for the viewer, as an experience of an 
experience, the typically omitted role of the photographer rises to the forefront—because it is 
the photographer’s experience that the viewer of the documentation experiences by proxy. 
The photographer is not a mechanical tool, or an objective black box that simply transfers 
information unaltered from input to output, but is instead a mediator who plays a role in 
shaping the imagery through technical decisions and subjective interpretation—as well as 
through their physical presence as a corporeal body implicated in the dynamics of the 
performance itself. Acknowledgment of this mediation on the part of the photographer 
should not be seen negatively by the viewer of a performance art document, or as a challenge 
to the documents’s objectivity, but instead, as described by Latour, as a contributor to the 
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overall understanding of the document and as a way to augment the viewer’s ability to 
imagine their self experiencing the event in the photographer’s place.  
As a way to better acknowledge the mediation of the photographer, the viewer might begin 
by considering the photographer as a form of critic, interpreting the event through non-
linguistic and tacit means. Regardless of the specifics, the key point, to paraphrase Georges 
Didi-Huberman, is that we should not ask too much, or too little, of the images (32–33). The 
viewer cannot expect the photographic documentation of an event to contain the whole truth 
and the full sensory experience of the event, nor should they demand that it represent only an 
objective record of fact. Instead, they should allow for the subjective influence of the 
photographer to carry through as a form of personal storytelling, intermixed with immutable 
mobiles and indexes to historic fact, that when combined together help them to better 
imagine and experience the event for their self through the eyes of the photographer—by way 
of our encounter with the photograph.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
4.1 Works Cited 
Anderson, Laurie. “Foreword: This is the Time and this is the Record of Time.” 
 Performance: Live Art Since 1960. By RoseLee Goldberg. London: Thames and 
 Hudson, 1998. 6–7. Print. 
Auslander, Philip. “The Performativity of Performance Documentation.” Performance  Art
 Journal 84 (2006): 1–10. Print. 
---. “Towards a Hermeneutics of Performance Art Documentation.” Kunsten A Falle: 
 Lessons in the Art of Falling. Ed. Jonas Ekeborg. Horten. Norway: Preus Museum, 
 2009. Web. 25 Jan 2014. <http://lmc.gatech.edu/~auslander/publications/Auslander-
 Toward%20a%20Hermeneutics.pdf>    
Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. Trans. Richard Howard. 
 New York: Hill and Wang, 1998. Print. 
---. “Rhetoric of the Image.” Image, Music, Text. Ed. and trans. Stephen Heath. New 
 York: Hill and Wang, 1977. 32–51. Print. 
Belting, Hans. An Anthropology of Images: Picture, Medium, Body. Trans. Thomas 
 Dunlap. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014. Print. 
---. “Image, Medium, Body: A New Approach to Iconology.” Critical Inquiry 31  (2005): 
 302–319. Print. 
Carlson, Marvin. Performance: a Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 
 2004. 
Chalmers, Jessica. “Marina Abromovic and the Re-performance of Authenticity.”  Journal of 
 Dramatic Theory and Criticism 22.2 (2008): 23–39. Web. 21 Jan. 2014. < 
 https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/jdtc/article/view/4343/4072> 
Vicki Goldberg. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981. 480–491.Print. 
Daston, Lorraine, and Peter Galison. Objectivity. New York: Zone Books, 2007. Print. 
DePalma, Anthony. “No Stomach for Art.” New York Times 8 Dec. 1996. Web. 21 Jan. 
2014.<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/08/weekinreview/no-stomach-for-art.html>  
---. “Student Says Vomiting on Painting Was an Artistic Act.” New York  Times 4 Dec. 
 1996. Web. 21 Jan. 2014. <www.nytimes.com/1996/12/04/nyregion/student-says-
 vomiting-on-painting-was-an-artistic-act.html> 
Didi-Huberman, Georges. Images in Spite of All: Four Photographs from Auschwitz. 
 Trans. Shane B. Lillis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008. Print.  
95 
 
 
Doris, David T. and Zen Vaudeville. “A Medi(t)ation in the Margins of Fluxus.”  The 
 Fluxus Reader. Ed. Ken Friedman. West Sussex: Academy Editions. 1998. 91–135. 
 Print. 
Exit Through the Giftshop. Dir. Banksy. Paranoid Pictures, 2010. DVD.  
Flashdance. Dir. Adrian Lyne. Paramount Pictures, 1983. DVD. 
Foster, Stephen. Foreword. Live Art on Camera: Performance and Photography. Ed. 
 Alice Maude-Roxby. Southampton: John Hansen Gallery, 2007. v–vi. Print.  
Goldberg, RoseLee. Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present. 3rd ed. London: 
 Thames and Hudson, 2011. Print. 
---. Performance: Live Art Since 1960. London: Thames and Hudson, 1998. Print. 
Jones, Amelia. “‘‘Presence’ in Absentia: Experiencing Performance as Documentation.”  Art
 Journal 54.4 (1997): 11–18. JSTOR. Web. 21 Jan 2014. 
Latour, Bruno. “How to Be Iconophilic in Art Science, and Religion?” Picturing Science, 
 Producing Art. Eds. Caroline A. Jones and Perter Galison. New York: Routledge, 
 1998. 418–440. Print. 
Iversen, Margaret. “Following Pieces: On Performative Photography.” Photography 
 Theory. Ed. James Elkins. New York: Routledge, 2007. 91–108. Print. 
Mangolte, Babette. “Balancing Act Between Instinct and Reason or How to Organize 
 Volumes on a Flat Surface in Shooting Photographs, Films, and Videos of 
 Performance.” After the Act: The (Re)Presentation of Performance Art. Ed. Barbara 
 Clausen. Vienna: Museum Moderner Kunst Stiftung Ludwig, 2007. 35–50. Web. 21 
 Jan. 2014. <http://www.perfomap.de/map1/i.-bewegung-plus-archiv/balancing-act-
 between-instinct-and-reason/pdf-download> 
Maude-Roxby, Alice. “Photographs from Manuael Vason’s Encounters.” Live Art on 
 Camera: Performance and Photography. Ed. Alice Maude-Roxby. Southampton: 
 John Hansen Gallery, 2007. 30–38. Print. 
McAdams, Donna Ann. “Performance-Life-Photography.” Live Art on Camera: 
 Performance and Photography. Ed. Alice Maude-Roxby. Southampton: John  Hansen 
 Gallery, 2007. 103–109. Print. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “Eye and Mind.” Trans. Carelton Dallery. The Primacy of 
 Perception. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964.159–190. Print. 
O’Dell, Kathy. “Behold!” Live Art on Camera: Performance and Photography. Ed. Alice 
 Maude-Roxby. Southampton: John Hansen Gallery, 2007. 30–38. Print. 
Phelan, Peggy. Unmarked: The Politics of Performance. London: Routledge, 1993. Print. 
96 
 
 
“Radio 3 plays ‘silent symphony.’” BBC NEWS 19 Jan. 2004. Web. 23 Jan 2014.             < 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3401901.stm>  
Sassoli de Bianchi, Massimiliano. The Observer Effect. Switzerland: Laboratorio di 
 Autoricerca di Base, 2012. Web. 30 Jan 2014.<http://arxiv.org/pdf/1109.3536v3.pdf> 
Sayre, Henry M. The Object of Performance: The American Avant-Garde since 1970. 
 Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989. Print. 
Schneeman, Carolee. “The Meat Joy Photographers.” Interview by Alice Maude-Roxby. 
 Live Art on Camera: Performance and Photography. Ed. Alice Maude-Roxby. 
 Southampton, UK: John Hansen Gallery, 2007. 8–22. Print. 
Seife, Charles. Decoding the Universe: How the New Science of Information is Explaining 
 Everything in the Cosmos, from our Brains to Black Holes. New York: Penguin, 2007. 
 Print. 
Smith, Foster. “Skinning of Cat Divides Art Community: ‘Between art and snuff’: 
 Gallery’s Directors stand by the accused.” National Post 19 Jul. 2001. Web. 22 Jan 
 2014. 
Stevens, Dana. “A Self-Proclaimed Artist and an Inexplicable Act of Cruelty.” New York 
 Times 27 Apr. 2005. Web. 21 Jan. 2014. 
 <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D07E0DF1331F934A15757C0A9
 639C8B63> 
Ward, Frazer. “Some Relations between Conceptual and Performance Art.” Art Journal 
 55.4 (1997): 36-40. JSTOR. Web. 21 Jan. 2014. 
Wright, Morris. “In Our Image.” Photography in Print. Photography in Print. Ed. 
97 
 
 
Chapter 5  
5 A Brief Statement on Locations 
In contrast to the One Pixel Camera Project,1 which is reliant on the use of explicit captions 
as a form of parergon,2 Locations (2014) does away with didactic text altogether,3 leaving 
only the uncoded content of the images to explain and provide meaning in the work. 
Locations was inspired by a section of W.J.T. Mitchell’s essay, “What is an Image”, where 
Mitchell responds to Mark Twain’s criticism that pictorial representation is dependent upon 
supplementary text to produce meaning and context. Twain presents his critique through 
Guido Reni’s painting of Beatrice Cenci: 
 A good legible label is usually worth, for information, a ton of significant attitude  
 and expression in a historical picture. In Rome, people with fine sympathetic
 natures stand up and weep in front of the celebrated Beatrice Cenci the Day 
 Before Her Execution. It shows what a label can do. If they did not know the  
 picture, they would inspect it unmoved, and say, “Young Girl with Hay Fever;  
 Young Girl with Her Head in a Bag.” (qtd. in Mitchell, 527) 
Mitchell counters, “But we might ask Twain how much the label would be worth, for 
information or for anything else, without this picture by Guido Reni” (528). Mitchell argues 
that the understanding of the painting is dependent upon a “confluence of pictorial and verbal 
traditions” (528), so that neither the label, nor the image tells the whole story in itself. 
With the One Pixel Camera Project functioning analogously to a label without an image, I 
felt it was fitting to produce a series of images devoid of textual or explicit support. 
Locations consists of a series of images depicting banal, yet enigmatic landscapes; there is a 
                                                 
1  See Chapter 3 of this dissertation, “Design of the Absurd: The One Pixel Camera,” for an extended 
 discussion of this project. 
2  As described by Craig Dworkin with reference to Derrida: “something that at first glance appears to be 
 an external supplement to the work, but that in fact participates as a necessary and essential part of the 
 work itself.” (23).  
3  The ambiguous title, Locations, will be the only text presented with the work. 
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logic and rational behind the images and selected locales, but this will remain intentionally 
unstated.  
Both projects involve a limited mode of knowledge transfer, a deliberate “blurring”,4 to 
induce an element of mystery and the unknown. In the case of The One Pixel Camera 
Project, the uncoded, pictorial image is blurred beyond all recognition, and in Locations it is 
the explicit, “verbal image” that becomes obscured.5 
The images in the Locations series will be printed and framed exactly like those of The One 
Pixel Camera.6 For my dissertation exhibition,7 the two projects will face each other on 
opposite walls at the McIntosh Gallery in order to establish a visual conversation between the 
two bodies of artwork. 
 
                                                 
4  As described by James Elkins: “Blur is a strategy for some fine-art photographers and painters, and a 
 nuisance for some astronomers; yet for their different reasons, the two groups of images makers end up 
 producing pictures that are intriguing because they show so little.”(63). 
5  Mitchell breaks the word “image” down into a family tree consisting of Graphic, Optical, Perceptual, 
 Mental and Verbal images, proposing that all images be “understood as a kind of language.” (504) 
6  As 15”x15” square images, window-matted and presented in a plain white 20”x20” frame. 
7  The things you know but cannot explain, Thursday June 12 to Saturday July 12, 2014. 
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Figure 23: from the series Locations, archival pigment print 15” x 15” 
 
 
Figure 24: from the series Locations, archival pigment print 15” x 15” 
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Figure 25: from the series Locations, archival pigment print 15” x 15” 
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Chapter 6  
6 How to Watch Video: The Benefits of Becoming Bored 
Over the years, I have worked with a fair bit of video,1 but have always found its presentation 
within a gallery context to be both challenging and problematic. This difficulty primarily 
stems from a conflict between the intangible and durational nature of video, and the gallery 
or museum’s mandate to present work as a static “art object”.2 My current project, A Series of 
Boring Videos: Watched, Watching and Watch, functions as a form of arts-based research 
that qualitatively explores the ways various presentation strategies inspire an extended and 
considered viewing experience.3 
Each of the videos in A Series of Boring Videos: Watched (2011), Watching (2012), Watch 
(2013) pertains to a specific idiom of boredom: “a watched pot never boils”, “watching paint 
dry” and “to watch grass grow”, respectively. Beyond a simple tongue-in-cheek literalization 
of these adages, the videos are meant to encourage the viewer to engage in a close and 
considered look at what, in actual fact, are very complex physical, chemical, biological and 
psychological phenomena.4 
This kind of close-viewing yields an intuitive and tacit type of knowledge that extends from 
personal experience. It is something that cannot be transferred through explicit statements, 
mathematical calculations or verbal descriptions.5 In many ways, it is the type of knowledge 
through which we come to understand the world; yet, this way of knowing is simply not 
valued within science or the academic sphere because it cannot be adequately quantified or 
                                                 
1  This is in terms of my own art production, my experience helping others to produce video, and the 
 work I have done as a gallery installation technician. 
2  I would argue that, because of its materiality and generally-static presence, an installation is a form of 
 object. For the most part, an installation work is an assemblage of objects within a space.  
3  See Chapter 7 for a more detailed account and definition of arts-based research.   
4  As a bit of an aside, Watched is primarily a physical phenomenon, Watching centers on a chemical 
 phenomenon and Watch is chiefly a biological phenomenon. Three major areas of science are  represented.  
5  This type of close and considered viewing is also what Goethe promotes as a way to understand the 
 Authentic Wholeness or Ur-Phenomenon of the thing or event being observed. Further discussion of this 
 concept and way of observing is included in Chapter 2 of this dissertation: The Idea of Colour. 
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demonstrated. It is true that, for A Series of Boring Videos, these phenomena are re-presented 
through the mediation of video, which may work against the ideal notion of “direct access” to 
said phenomena; however, through the processes of re-presentation and artistic mediation, 
the videos work to persuade the viewer to revisit these phenomena from a different angle—to 
see the situations with fresh eyes. In keeping with the arts-based research approach, they 
enable “others to vicariously re-experience the world” (Barone, 20).  
Beyond simply drawing attention to these underappreciated phenomena, the videos also work 
to encourage a rethinking of how our perception functions, the ways understanding is 
generated and the role “boredom” plays in ushering us beyond an exclusively explicit way of 
knowing. Boredom, as a process through which one may enter a very different state of mind, 
is described by Siegfried Kracauer: “If, however, one has the patience specific to legitimate 
boredom, then one experiences a kind of bliss that is almost unearthly” (304) and, for those 
who “no longer know where their head is” due to the hustle and bustle of modern life, it is 
the “extraordinary, radical boredom that might be able to reunite them with their heads” 
(302). According to Kracauer, it is through boredom that one becomes present in the world 
and aware of one’s own existence; however, due to the “ubiquitous abstract racket” of 
modern life, this can be a very difficult state to achieve.   
This bored state of mind can also be attributed to an activation of the right hemisphere of the 
brain, where a personal, tacit and “felt” understanding of the bigger picture (context) takes 
place rather than an explicit naming and identifying of what one sees. This becomes a matter 
of knowing versus simply seeing.6 In his essay, The Computer as a Prosthetic Organ of 
Philosophy (2003), David Rokeby provides a personal and detailed description of his 
experience of becoming bored: 
 
                                                 
6  A further discussion of the role played by the right hemisphere of the mind is presented in Chapter 1 of this 
 dissertation, through an analysis of Ian McGilchrist’s book The Master and His Emissary: The Divided 
 Brain and the Making of the Western World. A condensed version of McGilchrist’s position is stated in his 
 short lecture, The Divided Brain, which can be found online through RSA Animate.  
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 At art school, I had the great fortune of encountering some very challenging  
 teachers. One day, one of my professors told the class that we would be looking  
 out a window for the whole three-hour class. I was incensed. I stood at my  
 assigned window and glared out through the pane. I saw cars, two buildings, a  
 person on the street. Another person, another car, the sky, a cloud. For fifteen  
 minutes I fumed, and muttered to myself. Suddenly I started to notice things. The  
 flow of traffic down the street was like a river, each car seemingly drawn along by 
 the next, connected. The blinds in each of the windows of the facing building  
 were each a slightly different colour. The shadow of a maple tree in the wind  
 shifted shape like some giant amoeba. For the remaining hours of the class I was  
 electrified by the scene outside. After fifteen minutes, the "names" had started  
 separating from the objects. 
 Reflecting on this afterwards, it seemed to me that for the first 15-minute period, I 
 had stopped seeing things as soon as I had positively identified them. At that point of 
 identification, the word took the place of the sensed object in my consciousness and I 
 no longer "saw" it. After fifteen minutes some part of me got very bored and shut 
 down, some part of me let go, and the raw sense and perception data started flooding 
 in again. (Rokeby) 
I had a similar experience during my first year in art school, which in many ways served as 
the inspiration for A Series of Boring Videos. At the time, I had little money, and wound up 
moving back to my parent’s place in Mississauga. This meant that I had a lengthy 
bus/subway commute to Ryerson University in downtown Toronto, where I was attending 
school. If perfectly timed, the trip could be done in 45 minutes; it generally took about an 
hour and a half and, on a bad day, could require up to two and a half hours. Being an art 
student, I was constantly toting a large quantity of equipment and materials (camera bags, 
tripods, hard cases full of lighting gear, portfolio cases, etc.) and this heavy and cumbersome 
load made rush-hour on the subway rather unpleasant. It was both impossible to find a seat, 
as a source of reprieve from the weight, and I was constantly bumping others or being 
bumped into because of the wide berth of my luggage.  
104 
 
To avoid this situation, I simply waited until rush hour was over and my favorite way to pass 
the time was by attending a regular experimental film series hosted by the Loop Collective in 
the Cinematheque Theatre at the Art Gallery of Ontario.7 The series included films by artists 
such as Michael Snow, Stan Brakhage, Bruce Elder, Chris Welsby and Sergei Eisenstein, 
which tended to be very slow and often involved flashing colours, or some other form of 
lyrical structure, as opposed to a classic narrative. I have to admit that on my first visit, I 
found the films extremely dull but, seeing as I had nowhere else to go, I stuck with them. 
Like the experience of extended looking described by Rokeby, there was a certain point 
where everything changed and I began to see the films in a different way: they became quite 
wonderful as a sensual experience of light, colour and form. Beyond this enhanced awareness 
of the content on the screen—and perhaps more profoundly—I had become very aware of 
this shift in my own perception. I was able to perceive myself perceiving.  
Quite fittingly, Stan Brakhage, whose films featured prominently in this film series, 
expresses a longing for a return to an idealized prelinguistic perceptual state of being present 
during infancy:  
 Imagine an eye unruled by man-made laws of perspective, an eye unprejudiced by 
 compositional logic, an eye which does not respond to the name of everything but 
 which must know each object encountered in life through an adventure of  perception. 
 How many colors are there in a field of grass to the crawling baby  unaware of 
 "Green?" How many rainbows can light create for the untutored eye? How aware of 
 variations in heat waves can that eye be? Imagine a world alive with 
 incomprehensible objects and shimmering with an endless variety of movement and 
 innumerable gradations of color. Imagine a world before the "beginning was the 
 word." (Brakhage 31) 
Brakhage acknowledges the impossibility of returning to such an unadulterated state once 
one has acquired language; however, this does not preclude “a pursuit of knowledge foreign 
to language” (Brakhage 31). I would argue that this is the primary goal of his filmic practice.  
                                                 
7  For more information on the Loop Collective refer to http://www.loopcollective.com/ 
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In a similar fashion, this is my intent with A Series of Boring Videos: to initiate a mental state 
in the viewer, through the process of “boredom”, where one stops thinking explicitly—with 
language—and begins to appreciate something familiar in a different and more profound 
manner. In the process of entering a different state of perception, ideally the viewer would 
also become more aware of the process of their own perception itself, thus breaking down 
what Alva Noë describes as “the transparency of experience”:  
 When we try to make perceptual experience itself the object of our reflection, we 
 tend to see through it (so to speak) to the object of experience. We encounter what 
 is seen, not the qualities of the seeing itself. (124)  
In order to make the qualities of “seeing itself” apparent, something beyond the mere 
presentation of an object or image must be at play. In David Rokeby’s example and in my 
own experience at the experimental film nights, it was an enforced situation of intense 
looking, resulting in a state of “boredom,” that freed us from this condition of seeing through 
our own perception.8 Our minds grew tired and we became desensitised to the process of  
identifying the phenomena, thus moving on to an awareness of other features, not readily 
apparent at first, including an awareness of this very shift in our own perception. Noë sees 
artworks as a place where such a shift can occur. He specifically cites Richard Serra’s large 
metal sculptures, such as Running Arcs (For John Cage), where through a “temporally 
extended pattern of exploratory activity” (occurring through one’s movement around and 
within the large metal forms) “Serra’s work enables us to catch ourselves in the act of 
                                                 
8  I have made use of a similarly enforced state of viewership in my project Taken: A Camera Obscura Van 
 Project (2003, 2007, and 2008). The project involved the very dim, inverted image within a camera obscura 
 as a means to replicat aspects of George M. Stratton’s retinal inversion experiments of 1896: Some 
 Preliminary Experiments on Vision Without Inversion of the Retinal Image (Stratton). In order to perceive 
 the dim obscura image, the viewer must remain in the dark for approximately five minutes so that his or her 
 night vision can become fully active. This would be difficult to accomplish  in a gallery space, as most 
 viewers would simply grow tired and move on to the next work, thus missing the image’s manifestation. In 
 order to “enforce” a sufficient amount time spent with the piece, I installed the camera obscura in the back 
 of a van, and took participants for a 20-minute journey. Beyond providing a captively enforced form of 
 extended viewership, the van provided additional points of interest in the form of a moving obscura image 
 and the visceral sensation of motion.   
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perceiving and can allow us thus to catch hold of the fact that experience is not a passive 
interior state, but a model of active engagement with the world” (128).9     
Beyond the specific artworks10 described by Noë, I would argue that there are instances 
where such “temporally extended pattern[s] of exploratory activity” occur. For example, 
consider visually engaging with the passing landscape while on a train, experiencing the slow 
fade of a sunset or observing the flicker of the flames in a campfire. For some reason, 
possibly rooted in cultural convention, these activities are seen as worthy of our 
consideration. They are situations when people seem willing to become truly “bored”.11 
Unfortunately, such cases are rare and we seldom allow ourselves to get past the initial stage 
of explicit identification. This also holds true for the way we typically view artwork. Artist 
Paul Chan explains it is a common desire to read an artwork as if it were a written text:  
 Many viewers treat the movement and elements within the works, whether they’re 
 installations or videos or drawings, as hieroglyphs to be deciphered. They think  
 that if you decipher them you’ll have the secret, when in fact there is no secret.  
 It’s just as strange to me as it is to them. … They want art with a message and if  
 you get the message, you can dispense with the art itself. (95)  
Like in Rokeby’s description of looking out the window, the initial impulse is to try to name 
and identify (decode). Without effort on the part of the viewer, the experience of the work 
will not move past this stage of decryption. However, as Chan suggests, the core of an 
artwork and the rational for it to be an artwork (rather than a written text) lies beyond such 
                                                 
9  Referring also to Noë’s concept of Active Perception, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, The 
 Idea of Colour. Active perception is a model of perception premised upon embodied and durational 
 experience: to perceive something, you move around it and your eyes dart over the surface, you experience 
 it over time from different angles. From this build-up of active experience you gradually garner an 
 understanding of the object or phenomena in your mind. This stands in contrast to the standard input-output 
 mode of perception where the eye (or other sensory apparatus) simply captures the data in an instant, 
 forming a complete and identical picture in the brain.    
10  Noë makes specific mention of Richard Serra, Robert Smithson, Robert Irwin and James Turrell as 
 artists working in this manner. He does not, however, limit the category to these four. 
11  The “active” part of the engagement with phenomena such as passing landscapes, campfires and 
 sunsets would be less active in terms of the body moving around (even though this is what Noë 
 describes in relation to Serra’s sculptures). The viewer is nevertheless, active in the sense of eye and 
 head movement, and in terms of an extended observation that prompts her or him to notice gradual and 
 subtle change that take place over time. 
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stringent readings.  Often it is a failure to decode that yields the “I don’t get it” response, 
common to many gallery visitors—perhaps an extended viewing might result in a tacit 
understanding on a nonliteral and personal level. However, an extended viewing of art is 
quite rare as concluded by Jeffery Smith and Lisa Smith’s study Spending Time on Art. Smith 
and Smith found that “The mean time spent viewing a work of art was found to be 27.2 
seconds, with a median time of 17.0 seconds”,12 which is hardly enough for even a cursory 
identification of content. The challenge is to find ways of engaging the viewer and inspiring 
the desire to spend more time with a particular artwork. 
The Slow Art Day initiative provides one example of an organizational strategy, adopted 
within the art world to inspire extended viewership. Slow Art Day occurs annually at select 
institutions.13 Participants are encouraged to “look at five works of art for 10 minutes each 
and then meet together over lunch to talk about their experience.” (Slow Art Day) The impact 
of this initiative is limited by the fact that it only occurs on a single day and involves only a 
small group of volunteers. A preferable and more effective method would be to develop 
strategies of display that inspire active and extended engagement on their own without the 
need for external organization.   
I would argue that, in a basic sense, the presentation of a photograph, video or film can 
inspire a greater consideration of the captured subject than an encounter with the same 
subject in daily life.14 This may be true even if the extra consideration is premised simply on 
a curiosity as to why the photographer or filmmaker chose to generate such a reproduction. 
Additionally, ever since Duchamp placed a urinal on a plinth in the gallery, it is generally 
accepted that the context of the gallery alters (or influences) the significance of a given 
object or artwork. Both of these strategies apply to A Series of Boring Videos. On a basic 
level the videos do work to initiate a look at the phenomena depicted and the gallery setting 
                                                 
12  These figures relate to viewer’s experiencing of a diverse sample of artworks at the Metropolitan 
 Museum of Modern Art. It should be noted that the recorded time spent looking also included the time 
 spent reading the label. Times of less than 3 seconds were omitted because these were not seen as an 
 actual observation. (Smith and Smith, 231)  
13  Slow Art Day was held on April 12th in 2014. 
14  As André Bazin argues, “the photograph allows us on the one hand to admire in reproduction  something 
 that our eyes alone could not have taught us to love.” (Bazin 9) 
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does bestow a sense of importance upon them, but something more is required to get the 
viewer to encounter the work on a higher level of extended engagement. This “something 
more” becomes particularly difficult with durational media such as video because an 
extended engagement also involves a significant investment of time. 
Tom Sherman, a proponent of video as an “explicit, bare-bones, non-nonsense” (61) medium, 
problematizes the display of video in a gallery context: framing it as a perversion of video’s 
inherent, raw qualities through “attempts to commodify moving images as objects” (62).15 He 
views video installations as rooted in a desire to make video “paintings”: videos “that can 
still manage to hold a wall nicely in competition with paintings” (62), but are unable to tell a 
story or present a narrative, which he sees as video’s primary function. In a similar fashion, 
Martha Rosler describes the museumization of video, which has “heightened the importance 
of installations that make video into sculpture, painting, or still life, because installations can 
live only in museums.”(49) Aware of these arguments, I am not personally worried about 
preserving the “essential” character of the medium so much as I recognize that the 
museological transformation of the moving image into an object presents some fundamental 
difficulties. I see these rooted primarily in two specific features: looping and overload.          
Unlike cinema or private viewership at home, when installed in a gallery video is 
experienced by multiple, mobile viewers that do not travel according to a common schedule. 
As a result, the video constantly runs on a cyclic loop and the viewer may enter the video at 
any point in its duration. Should the video have any sort of narrative structure or progression 
from point A to point B, this build-up and revelation of plot is lost to the viewer. In a sense, 
the punch line is delivered before the joke. One way around this is to produce “video 
paintings”, like those condemned by Sherman, which function more as morphing, lyrical 
experiences to be entered at any stage during their cycle. However, for narrative video, 
looping is definitely a problem.         
                                                 
15  The desire to make the intangible moving image of video into commodifiable objects is also seen in the art 
 market’s sale of limited edition DVDs or video artworks sold as a unit (embedded within a TV or media 
 player).  
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The issue of overload addresses the limited time a viewer has to visit the gallery in contrast 
to the vast number of objects on display. This produces an anxious desire to move through 
the gallery quickly in order to see as much as possible. I would argue that this is also a factor 
behind the quick viewing times recorded in Smith and Smith’s study. In the case of video, 
this anxiety becomes even greater because video work typically demands many minutes, or 
even hours, to be seen—far more than the measured 17-second average. Compounding the 
problem of overload are the “changing patterns of contemporary perception” (2), described 
by Claire Bishop. These are based in the digital archive and the ability to compile vast 
quantities of data. Bishop uses Documenta 11 as an example of this change:  
 Documenta 11 (2002) was significant in many respects, not least of which was its  
 inauguration of a tendency to include more work than the viewer could possibly  
 see—in this case, six hundred hours of film and video. We don't ask how big a  
 show is anymore, but how long: A tiny gallery can contain days of art. The result  
 is that we filter and graze, skim and forward. (Bishop) 
With so many hours of video, resulting from the desire to include a vast array of video 
“objects”, it is no wonder that viewers do not sit and actually engage with the work in an 
extended manner.  
The objectification of video can be turned into an advantage if we take into consideration the 
mediation of the technological apparatus: the physical aspects that become the actual 
“object” for gallery-based presentation of video artwork. As explained by Boris Groys: 
 So we can say: The digital image is a copy—but the event of its visualization is an 
 original event, because the digital copy is a copy that has no visible original. That  
 further means: A digital image, to be seen, should not be merely exhibited but  
 staged, performed. Here the image begins to function analogously to a piece of  
 music,” (85)     
This potential advantage here is contingent upon the overall quality of the video as an 
“event”—as it is “performed” by the technological apparatus and “staged” by the architecture 
of the installation. After all, a talented performer should be able to engage the audience and 
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hold their attention. Therefore, the “event” of the video is something that should be designed 
as a part of the overall artwork.16 
A perfect example of a successful video “event” is seen in Christian Marclay’s The Clock 
(2010).17 Marclay’s video installation makes use of a cinematic presentation strategy through 
replicating the darkened room, large screen and comfortable seating of a movie theatre. 
Additionally, the content itself is derived from cinema: each real-time minute of the actual 
day is presented through a depiction of a timepiece sampled from a Hollywood film that 
displays that exact same time. Using this strategy, the viewer is primed through the 
convention of cinema to sit down and really watch.18 Once past the initial barrier, she or he 
begins to engage on a serious level, often spending many hours with the work. Meghan 
O’Rourke a reporter for The New Yorker reports her experience with the piece as follows: 
 I left Christian Marclay’s “The Clock” about twelve minutes after “High Noon.”  
 I’d been there since about 10:30 A.M., thinking that I’d stay for about twenty  
 minutes and get the feel of the thing; any longer, and the minutes might drag. But  
 I was wrong. Time flew—it hypnotized.   
In a similar fashion, Daniel Zalewski also from The New Yorker explains: 
 I let “The Clock” wash over me in dreamy, overlapping waves: three hours here,  
 four hours there. Though Marclay’s montage is fun to watch, what I relished most 
 was entering and exiting the gallery where it was showing. 
The gallery itself inspired the condition of viewing that functioned as an indeterminate, 
almost magical, space where the fantasy of Hollywood meets with the reality of daily time. 
The overall experience of both the video and its performance creates a situation where the 
                                                 
16  And not left to the figure of the curator, who, otherwise, through the selection of technology used to 
 visualize the image data, “becomes even more powerful than it was before…the curator becomes now not 
 only the exhibitor but the performer of the image.” (Groys, 85) 
17  The original source material is primarily film, but the presentation itself is a video transfer from film. 
18  The fact that people often have to wait in line also adds a degree of extra engagement (even if it is only 
 a case of spending time in the exhibition to make time spent waiting in line worthwhile). Moreover, the 
 existence of the line itself adds a degree of credibility to the piece in signifying that the piece is 
 indeed worth the wait.   
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viewer is inspired to remain and engage with the work in an extended manner.19 The Clock 
also deals with the issue of looping because the viewer can quite literally enter at any “time” 
and achieve a full experience of the work. Moreover, the isolated space of the installation is 
separated from the gallery, so the viewer’s attention is fully absorbed in a way that limits the 
desire to see what’s next and thereby precludes the potential for overload.  
On the other end of the spectrum is the exhibition I Just Want to Watch: Warhol's Film, 
Video, and Television, which I recently saw at the Andy Warhol Museum in Pittsburgh.20 
The exhibition consisted of two rooms, one dedicated to film and the other to TV. The better 
of the two was the film room, which had about twenty screens hanging by wires, each 
showing a projection of one of his films. There was no place to sit, the audio from one 
flowed into the other. Many of his durational films, including Empire (1964) and Sleep 
(1963) were included, but through this presentation, they demanded nothing more than the 
most cursory of glances. The TV room was even worse in this regard, with rows and rows of 
TVs (I would estimate about 100 all together) in front of uncomfortable star-shaped stools, 
each playing a loop of some sort of Warhol produced TV episode. The room was so 
overwhelming that I did not sit down to watch even a small portion of a single looping 
episode.  
Of course, this was a curatorial design not conceived of by the artist. It could be argued the 
exhibition functioned as a way to create an object-based aura for these pivotal artworks,21 
and to act as an extension of Warhol’s predilection for “aesthetic equalizing” (Reigelnegg). 
However, through this arrangement the experience of the work is lost to the viewer, as is 
Warhol’s desire to cultivate “boredom”. 
                                                 
19  It is also interesting to note that Marclay comes from a background as a DJ and a musician, as 
 demonstrated in his earlier works, so Groys analogy of “performing” video as if it were music is 
 particularly fitting in this case.   
20  I Just Want to Watch: Warhol's Film, Video, and Television ran from March 2010 - March 19, 2014. 
21  “Aura” in the sense described by Walter Benjamin in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
 Reproduction. 
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In terms of my own work, each of the three video in the series, Watched, Watching and 
Watch, has its own mechanics and conditions of performance that work to turn the exhibition 
of the video into an “event”—one coupled to fit with the specific nature of its content.  
Watched (2011) begins with the appearance of a black speckled surface and the sound of 
hissing in the background. At first, the viewer is unsure of what they are looking at and, 
ideally, this element of mystery inspires a degree of curiosity, which draws them in through 
an inclination to identify and name. Over time, small circles start to form on the black surface 
and dance around in a chaotic fashion. Observing viewers with the work, I have found that at 
this stage they start to speculate and make guesses about what they are watching.22 It is only 
when the first bubble releases itself from the base of the pot, and breaks the surface of the 
water with a ripple, that they realize that what they are watching 
 
 
Figure 26: Watched (2011) - 1080p high-definition video with audio, playback initiated 
by viewer. 
                                                 
22  I have become aware of this process by listening in on conversations at the gallery, and through direct 
 feedback in cases where I have shown the work in a one-on-one situation such as a critique or studio 
 visit.  
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is the slow transformation of water from liquid to gas through a process of boiling.23 
Hopefully, by this stage, they have also become slightly “bored”, and have begun to watch 
the movement and shape of the bubbles in a different and more engaged way. Moreover, a 
sense of narrative has been introduced, which will hopefully inspire viewing (past the point 
of recognition), in order to determine what might happen next and to see the boiling process 
through to its end.  
I see engagement with this video as dependent upon the element of mystery, the slow 
revelation of what is happening and curiosity about the trajectory of the imagery. If the video 
was presented as a loop, this aspect would be lost.24 Instead, it is set up as a kiosk with a 
button to initiate playback upon viewer interaction. In this way, it is almost guaranteed that 
the viewer will experience the video as an unfolding narrative without receiving any spoilers 
in terms of the plot.25 The video itself is relatively short;26 so beyond the use of the button, 
the installation of this work is fairly minimal. Playback is on a large flat-screen monitor in 
the common space of the gallery and audio from the video is allowed to mix with that of the 
space. A simple bench is present to provide an option for seating should the viewer desire. 
Through observing engagement with this video in past installations, I have noticed that it is 
very rare for a viewer to get up and leave before the video comes to an end. 
                                                 
23  Additionally, it should become obvious that the black field is the textured surface of a Teflon pan and the 
 hissing is the sound of a propane burner used to heat the water. 
24  In fact the video has been show as a loop on two occasions: once on large outdoor screens at the Art 
 Gallery of Mississauga for the Celebrate the Square Festival of Video Art (June-August 2011) and 
 once in an abandoned storefront window for the Switch: Contemporary Video Art Exhibition in 
 Nenagh, Ireland (March 2013). I was unable to view the work as installed in Ireland, but in Mississauga, it 
 functioned in a very different way, more as an ambient pattern to be glanced at rather than something to 
 fully engage with. I believe the work was still effective in this context, but through this strategy of 
 presentation, it became a very different work.  
25  Unless of course the viewer encounters the work shortly after another viewer has initiated playback, in 
 which case they would come into the video part way through.  
26  The actual length of the video will not be displayed in order to sustain a sense of mystery in terms of 
 where the video will go and how long it will run before reaching a perceived endpoint.  
114 
 
 
Figure 27: Watching (2012) - 1080p high-definition video with audio, 20 minutes, 
looping. 
 
Watching (2012) functions in a very different way and is quite literally a moving painting—
which Tom Sherman would most likely despise.27 The screen is divided in two, with the left 
side depicting a forward flow of time and the right side a reverse flow of time for the same 
coherent image. The 20 minute video begins with the left side as a yellow field, upon which 
black spray paint is visibly applied, while the right side displays a dull grey and rippled 
surface: the end point for the drying paint. The contrast of the side-by-side comparison, 
coupled with the magnification of the time differential achieved through the two time frames 
flowing toward one another, enables the viewer to visibly discern subtle changes in the 
freshly applied glossy black paint as it slowly morphs into a dull-grey matt finish.  The work 
invites the viewer to actually witness the process of paint drying, which when presented in 
this manner becomes quite mesmerizing. During a preliminary exhibition of the video in a 
                                                 
27  It could also be described as a “durational photograph”: a term used by Owen Kydd to describe his own, 
 mostly static, short looped video works which are presented on vertically oriented, flat-screen TVs (Kydd). 
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gallery context,28 I was pleasantly surprised to see people spending an extended period of 
time with the artwork.29  
For the installed presentation of Watching, a looping playback is used. Even though the spray 
paint is applied at the beginning and removed in reverse at the end—and despite the few 
frames in the middle where the dividing line between two time-frames vanishes30—there is 
little in the way of a developing narrative. The viewer can easily enter the work at any stage 
during the drying process. The video is ideally viewed as an emitted image on a high-quality 
flat-screen TV, which will render the subtle changes in contrast and hue better than the 
reflected image of a projection on a screen. Like Watched, the minimal audio is allowed to 
mix with other audio in the space and seating is provided. 
 
Figure 28: Watch (2014) - 1080p high-definition video with audio, 490 hours (14 hours 
per day for 30 days). 
                                                 
28  I am referring here to my solo exhibition, Prototypes, Experiments and Carefully-Considered  Observations 
 at the ArtLAB Gallery at Western University, London, ON in 2012. 
29  Often five to ten minutes, but in some cases they would stay for the full 20-minute duration. 
30  These few frames where the line between the two temporal frames vanishes could also be seen as an 
 example of Duchamp’s notion of a minimal identifiable difference or l’inframince (the infrathin) – as 
 described by Craig Dworkin “that point at which one can just barely begin to perceive the threshold 
 between two states.”  
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Watch (2014) is on another order of magnitude. While the duration of Watched (2011) in 
minutes and Watching (2012) is in the tens of minutes, Watch is in the tens of thousands of 
minutes. Depicting the gradual process of grass growing from seed to full blades, the video 
for Watch was recorded sun-up to sundown, 14 hours a day for 35 days.31 The grass was not 
grown in an isolated, controlled environment; instead the video was shot in my parents’ 
backyard, located in suburban Mississauga. Because of this, the video depicts more than just 
the growing of grass. Included are hints of the surrounding environment with occasional, 
brief and serendipitous events taking place both on-screen and off (as depicted through audio 
cues). However, these events are intermittent and minimal, so the tiniest movement becomes 
an unlikely source of tension and visual interest.  
Writing about Andy Warhol’s film, Empire (1964), which uses a strategy similar to that of 
Watch, Pamela M. Lee states: 
 Not to say that the movie is without interest or incident. Many things happen, if  
 very small things, and all the more importance is accorded them given the   
 noneventfulness of the rest of the film. … In the first thirty minutes, as dusk gives 
 way to night, the building is illuminated and we nearly jump out of our seats.  
 Noiselessly, something like a pigeon flaps by and the audience bursts into   
 applause. (283-284) 
This state of “boredom” induced through an extended watching of Empire, allows us to 
appreciate smaller things on a deeper level, and perhaps become more aware of just how 
much we overlook on a daily basis. I would argue the same holds true for Watch. 
In Watch, the occasional squirrel or bird appears within the frame and, on rainy days, 
droplets emerge from behind the camera projecting themselves upon the turf below. Near the 
start of the video the trees above unleash a constant stream of maple keys upon the patch of 
what, at that point, was still bare soil. On sunny days, rays of light shine through the gaps 
between the leaves overhead, producing dynamic dancing patterns of light and shadow.32 Off 
                                                 
31  The video is 420 hours or 25,200 minutes in total length.  
32  Drawing attention, in this way, to the patterns of light and shadow upon the grass is reminiscent of 
 Robert Irwin’s Sting Drawing– Filtered Light (1976) shown at the U.S Pavilion in the Venice  Biennale. 
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screen, a constant drone of cars is audible along with the occasional airplane because my 
parents’ house backs up on a busy road and is situated relatively close to the Toronto airport. 
There are also the typical sounds of suburbia, including lawnmowers, chainsaws and other 
tools used for yard work and home renovation, and the voices of neighbors speaking Polish 
on one side or with a thick Irish accent on the other. Additionally, my daughter and myself, 
can be heard as we play in a small inflatable pool during warm summer days. 
The installation of Watch will be reminiscent of Marclay’s The Clock, as it will be the 
singular work in a dimly lit room, separated from the interference of any external audio. The 
video will be projected on a large screen. It will not be on a loop, but will play through once 
during the course of the exhibition. Should the viewer miss a particular moment, once it’s 
gone, it’s gone. At the point of writing this essay, some of the exhibition specifics are still to 
be determined. The current plan is to include seating of an extremely comfortable nature and 
I am considering using lawn chairs, which would seem only fitting for a video about grass. I 
also hope that through the course of the exhibition, as the grass gradually grows from seed, 
visitors will be encouraged to return and check in on its progress.  
Later exhibitions of the work could take on different formats to further this arts-based 
investigation of presentation strategies and even non-gallery presentations could be explored. 
For the moment, I feel that this presentation strategy will be able to induce a state of blissful 
“boredom”, like that described by Kracauer, where the phenomena is seen and understood by 
the viewer in a new and profound manner—and where the viewer also becomes more aware 
of the processes of their own perception. In a way, I hope A Series of Boring Videos will help 
people see a little more than they did before.  
 
                                                 
 Irwin’s work involved a simple string square to define a patch of ground upon which light through the trees 
 flickered: “With such economy of means, Irwin had defined this subtle, two-dimensional found canvas, and 
 through the simple act of framing, he revealed a delightful naturally occurring event, one that would 
 otherwise have remained unseen.” (Davies, 31) , “Indeed, once he  brought your attention to this previously 
 invisible – or at least ignored – epiphany, the revelation of the flickering sunlight projected right at your 
 feet became an endless source of fascination.” (Davies, 31)     
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Chapter 7  
7 Documentation of The Things You Know but Cannot 
Explain (McIntosh Gallery, June 12 - July 12, 2014)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: The Things You Know but Cannot Explain. Main gallery. 
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Figure 30: The Things You Know but Cannot Explain. Main gallery, photographic works 
– The One Pixel Camera images (top and bottom left) and Locations (middle and bottom 
right). 
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Figure 31: The Things You Know but Cannot Explain. Main gallery, video projects – 
Watched (top left and middle) and Watching (top right and bottom). 
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Figure 32: The Things You Know but Cannot Explain. Main gallery, The One Pixel 
Camera. 
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Figure 33: The Things You Know but Cannot Explain. Main gallery, Locations. 
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Figure 34: The Things You Know but Cannot Explain. Front lobby and entrance.1  
                                                 
1  The documentation of the One Pixel Camera in use is included at the end of the One Pixel Camera 
 book. Both books contains an extended series of images beyond those show in the gallery. The 
 complete books can be previewed online at: http://www.blurb.com/user/davekemp. 
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Figure 35: The Things You Know but Cannot Explain. Small gallery, Watch. 
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Figure 36: The Things You Know but Cannot Explain. Small gallery, Watch (at various 
stages). 
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Figure 37: The Things You Know but Cannot Explain. Examples of labels used in the 
exhibition.
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Chapter 8  
8 Conclusion  
This dissertation has been an inquiry into the nature and significance of artistic knowledge, 
as a subset of the larger category of tacit knowledge. Art, both in its production and 
reception, encompasses many diverse forms of knowledge, so by artistic knowledge I am 
referring to the components of art that do not conform to traditional notions of codified, 
propositional or explicit knowledge. This inquiry has pursued the application of artistic 
knowledge within science (Chapter 2: “The Idea of Colour”), design (Chapter 3: “Design of 
the Absurd”), art history (Chapter 4: “An Uncertain Experience”), and my personal art 
production (Chapter 5: “A Brief Statement on Locations" and Chapter 6: “How to Watch 
Video”). Combined, the chapters represent a meandering journey through and exploration of 
the questions posed in the introduction:  
1. What exactly are tacit forms of knowing? 
2. Why are tacit ways of knowing important, and why should we care? 
3. What can be done to increase awareness, acceptance and appreciation of this type of 
knowledge within contemporary culture? 
The introduction addressed the first two questions from a theoretical perspective while the 
articles provided further elucidation and expanded upon these same questions. As mentioned 
in the introduction, there is little in the way of scholarship relating to the third question. This 
final question has been examined from a number of angles within the articles and can now be 
approached in a more direct fashion. However, before commenting on my own conclusions, I 
would like to review some rare instances where speculative solutions have been offered and 
directions of hope have been provided. 
For Bruno Latour, the solution involves moving from knowledge based in “matters of fact” 
to knowledge dealing with “matters of concern.” Matters of fact are the typical objective, 
explicit “facts” about nature and our world that are deemed to be true and without doubt. 
Latour has spent much of his academic career disputing the validity of such matters of fact, 
presenting them as socially constructed understandings (or models) of nature instead of 
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absolute fact: “I myself have spent some time in the past trying to show ‘the lack of scientific 
certainty’ inherent in the construction of facts. ... I intended to emancipate the public from 
prematurely naturalized objective facts. Was I foolishly mistaken?” (Latour “Critique” 227). 
His “mistake” stems not only from the fact that there is still a strong belief that science 
produces indisputable facts, but also that his own methods of questioning “facts” have been 
repurposed by others to discredit and “deconstruct” any form of scientific knowledge. This 
becomes particularly problematic when the deconstruction of such facts is done with ulterior 
motives, as is regularly seen in industrial and political disputes over the “factual” basis of 
global warming. For Latour, the answer is to move away from objective and explicit 
knowledge (“facts”) — which, he points out,  is never entirely objective, fixed and/or explicit 
anyway — and instead to focus on more tacit ways of knowing based in “matters of 
concern”:  
 Reality is not defined by matters of fact. Matters of fact are not all that is given in 
 experience. Matters of fact are only very partial and, I would argue, very polemical, 
 very political renderings of matters of concern. (Latour “Critique”  232).  
To better describe what a matter of concern is, he draws from Heidegger’s notion of a 
“thing”: “A thing is, in one sense, an object out there and, in another sense, an issue very 
much in there, at any rate, a gathering” (Latour, “Critique” 233).1 Unlike Heidegger, Latour 
accepts that industrial objects, such as a can of Coke, have the potential to become “things” 
too; it is not a quality reserved for handmade earthenware jugs. For Latour, even a rock (the 
philosopher’s epitome of a mere object) can become a thing when considered in a certain 
manner: “Dolomite [a type of rock] is so beautifully complex and entangled that it resists 
being treated as a matter of fact. It too can be described as a gathering; it too can be seen as 
engaging the fourfold” (Latour, “Critique” 233). With this in mind, he uses the example of 
the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster as “a metamorphosis of an object into a thing” 
(“Critique” 234). As thousands of people worked together to gather the pieces of the 
                                                 
1 Heidegger’s term relating to the gathering of the fourfold — earth, sky, gods, and mortals — which 
 come together to unconceal the mere object, allowing it to presence as a thing. 
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exploded spacecraft, writes Latour, “here, suddenly, in a stroke, an object had become a 
thing, a matter of fact was considered as a matter of great concern” (Latour, “Critique” 234). 
As a more thorough explanation of what matters of concern entail, we can look to Latour’s 
essay “What is the Style of Matters of Concern?”: 
 A matter of concern is what happens to a matter of fact when you add to it its 
 whole scenography, much like you would do by shifting your attention from the 
 stage to the whole machinery of a theatre. This is, for instance, what has happened 
 to science when seized by the recent “science studies,” what has happened to 
 Dutch landscape painting in Svetlana Alpers’ able hands, and what has happened  to 
 anatomical drawing when restaged by a contemporary artist like Jeff Wall. 
 Instead of simply being there, matters of fact begin to look different, to render a 
 different sound, they start to move in all directions, they overflow their 
 boundaries, they include a complete set of new actors, they reveal the fragile 
 envelopes in which they are housed. Instead of “being there whether you like it or 
 not” they still have to be there, yes (this is one of the huge differences), they have  to 
 be liked, appreciated, tasted, experimented upon, mounted, prepared, put to the 
 test.  (39) 
By moving away from an emphasis on – and objective belief in – matters of fact and coming 
to view them in a more holistic and tacit manner, allowing for the various mediators and 
considering the translations involved, we can start to move away from the problems 
associated with overly explicit forms of knowing. At the same time, accepting them as 
matters of concern is not to dismiss and deconstruct them as mere subjective social 
constructions and fabrications. Instead it is to combine tacit aspects with explicit aspects and 
come to form a more thorough understanding of what such matters of fact actually mean – to 
us and to our own understanding of the world.    
In a similar fashion, Michel Serres also sees a need to reconsider our approach to knowledge: 
 The question of philosophy today could therefore be formulated thus: what do we 
 think when we know? What can we think when we know as we speak, when we 
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 know science in the sense in which it is active and alive, it blends into thought, in  the 
 sense in which, having learned it, our flesh had incorporated it? 
 Not: what is there to think in science? Objective or collective science, as far as I 
 know, answers this question by its very nature. 
 Not: what is there to think outside of it? Or, if science is dismissed or reduced, 
 what is there to think? (Serres 338)   
Serres call is reminiscent of Latour’s matter of concern in that it asks us to think about how 
we know scientific knowledge, the various factors involved in its “active and alive” 
construction and how we come to tacitly indwell such knowledge – to make use of Polanyi’s 
terminology once again. For Serres, it is not a matter of focusing on explicit and tacit ways of 
knowing as being mutually exclusive, but rather looking at them as mingled and intertwined 
ways of knowing where the senses and intuition play a significant role.  
McGilchrist presents his own remedy for, what he describes as, the left-hemisphere-
dominated world that we currently occupy. For him, this remedy exists in the left 
hemisphere’s points of weakness: “the body, the soul, and art (which relies on body and soul 
coming together)” (McGilchrist, “Master” 438). In terms of the body, we must come to see 
not the body itself, but according to the body, and come to view the importance of our 
embodied existence.2 In terms of the soul (or spirit, two terms that he uses interchangeably), 
he looks back to a time when religion could provide a way out of left-hemisphere dominance. 
He argues, however, that with the decrease in religious belief in recent years, this role is now 
passed on to art. In terms of art, McGilchrist presents a very conservative and naïve 
viewpoint,3 nonetheless he views art as one way in which to reintroduce the “betweenness” 
missing from our modern world and in this regard, I would tend to agree.  
                                                 
2  A specific example of this notion is presented in Chapter 4: An Uncertain Experience where I argue that
 acknowledgement of the photographer’s embodied existence is critical to producing a personal 
 understanding, and imagining, of the experience of a performance art event through the use of 
 photographic documentation.   
3  Through expressing a strong dislike of contemporary art, such as Tracy Emin’s unmade bed—which in 
 his opinion has become overly intellectualized and based in entirely explicit, conceptual ideas—and by 
 locating the value of art in a notion of universal beauty (McGilchrist, “Master” 443).     
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Latour, Serres and McGilchrist do not provide specific directions or explicit instructions 
about how to make such changes, but they do provide a rough sense of where we must head. 
For my part, I agree with their suggestions; in particular, I subscribe to the idea that art has 
the potential to pry us away from the overly explicit, matter-of-fact-based, left-hemisphere-
centric world that we now face. In fact, the capacity for art to aid in this endeavor, through 
both forming and passing on tacit knowledge, is central to all aspects of my research. I do not 
feel it is possible to fully understand the dynamics, and value, of comingled knowing through 
explicit means alone. In this regard, I see the promotion and encouragement of arts-based 
research within the academic sphere as essential.   
Arts-based research is defined by James Haywood Rolling Jr.: 
 The multisystemic application of analytical, synthetic, critical-activist, or 
 improvisatory creative cognitive processes and artistic practices toward theory 
 building. Best at addressing questions that can neither be measured with exactitude 
 nor generalized as universally applicable or meaningful in all contexts. Stems directly 
 from a researcher’s artistic practice or creative worldview.” (8).   
This is distinct from research-based art, or art about research, because it is not research 
performed to facilitate the making of an art object, nor is it a case of theoretical references 
simply being included in the artwork. The distinction is described by Tom Barone and Elliot 
W. Eisner in their book Arts Based Research:  
 We are here to say that arts based research uses the arts as a foundation for 
 creating expressive forms that enlighten. Research based art is the use of research  in 
 any modality that will serve as a basis for creating a work of art.” (9) 
Arts-based research asks questions and unbalances opinion in order to help people see the 
world in different ways. It does this rather than providing explicit answers to questions or 
producing matters of fact, as customary with most other forms of research. It is a form of 
unfinished thinking; it makes you think rather than telling you what to think: 
 The deep strength of using arts in research may be closer to the act of problematizing 
 traditional conclusions than to providing answers in containers that are water tight. In 
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 this sense, the products of this research are closer in function to deep conversations 
 than they are to error-free conclusions. (Eisner 7) 
Olafur Eliasson’s Room for One Colour, described in Chapter 2, functions in this manner, by 
problematizing the viewer’s personal understanding of colour perception, and I would argue 
that my One Pixel Camera Project (Chapter 3) challenges the perceived neutrality of the 
designed objects surrounding us.  
Arts-based research can also function to create virtual sensory experiences that evoke the 
experience of another, or transport the viewer to a situation other than their own. This is not 
accomplished through a literal (explicit) description, but instead through the construction an 
aesthetic experience that transfers knowledge of that situation through tacit means: “Put 
another way, art is present in research when its presence enables one to participate 
vicariously in a situation.” (Eisner 6). Arts-based research, in this sense, can make the 
familiar strange and the strange familiar—it is not so much what is represented, but what is 
presented anew. This is what I attempt to do through my photographic documentation of 
performance art (Chapter 4):4 to create an experience of an experience so that the viewer may 
develop their own tacit understanding of the performance event. In my Series of Boring 
Videos (Chapter 5) I present familiar yet underappreciated phenomena in a new light so that 
the viewer may reconsider and understood them in a nonlinguistic, sensory manner. And the 
Locations project (Chapter 7) adds an element of mystery to seemingly banal landscapes 
leaving the viewer to ponder their unspoken significance. 
Many artworks function within this definition of arts-based research; however, arts-based 
research is distinct in that it exists beyond the art world and is accepted as a valid form of 
knowledge in itself—particularly within the academic realm. However, such acceptance is a 
far from common. According to Tom Barone, this is detrimental to our overall scope of 
knowledge: 
                                                 
4  My documenting of performance art events may not be part of my artistic practice proper, but I do consider 
 it  a form of arts-based research in the sense that it creates an evocative and embodied art-historical 
 record.  
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 What we do argue is that there are different ways of understanding the human 
 condition. The arts are among them, and with their virtual absence, the research 
 community pays a dear price. Indeed, their absence diminishes our capacity for 
 understanding. (171)  
Arts-based research can be a powerful pedagogical tool for transferring tacit knowledge both 
in terms of its products and through the process of performing arts-based research itself (e.g. 
when used as a class assignment or as a form of active learning).5 It is through experience, 
even if it is an experience by proxy, that one is able to indwell the very important and tacit 
aspects of knowledge in any field. This is true even in the sciences, as explained by Arthur 
Zajonc, who writes on the importance of intuitive, tacit understanding within physics: 
 Herein lies the intelligent schooling of intuition. Unlike the usual laboratory  
 experiments designed to exemplify physical laws, there would be a structured 
 series of experiments designed to lead the student to a perceptual encounter with  the 
 laws of physics!  
 Merely showing students the appropriate archetypal phenomenon by no means 
 guarantees the concomitant perception or intuition. How many people saw the 
 cathedral chandelier before Galileo and failed to make his observations concerning 
 pendulum motion? The initial necessary element is the feeling of wonder without 
 which the investigator can make little or no progress, but then, as the perceptual 
 world flows into us in a coarsely differentiated fashion, faculties or abilities gradually 
 arise which lead to a sufficiently refined perception, the result of which is cognition. 
 (Zajonc 332) 
Even though Zajonc does not explicitly state art as the means to accomplish his goal, I would 
argue that designing a perceptual experience, in order to inspire a feeling of wonder, is 
exactly what art can do. The challenge is in legitimizing art as a form of valid knowledge and 
                                                 
5
  “Active Learning” is a method of teaching promoted in various teaching seminars that involves the 
 active engagement of the student as they work on open ended tasks. It is a process that involves 
 students teaching themselves and thinking about what they are doing. For an extended explanation see 
 Bonwell, Charles C., and James A. Eison. Active Learning: Creating Excitement in the Classroom.  
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as a means by which to transfer the intangible aspects of understanding that can helps us to 
see the world in new and different ways.  
This will not be an easy task and I expect it will unfold as a very slow process. I would 
suggest the most effective and realistic way to assist with this endeavor is to produce art as a 
form of research—and to present it as such, in an attempt to prove its worth. This is what I 
have attempted to do with the artwork produced for my PhD, and my writing is designed to 
frame it as a form of research. It remains to be seen if these current projects will have an 
impact and a life outside of the sphere of art. 
An acceptance of artistic knowledge and arts-based research would no doubt involve a 
profound change within academia. It would dramatically impact the ways we think about 
knowledge and research and, in turn, would also involve a change in the very nature of art. 
This may require a less individualized approach to art, and greater emphasis on collaboration 
with researchers from other disciplines. Or it may entail a less purified status for art, where 
its function is coupled with the ambitions of other fields. In the past such things were 
common and, prior to modernism, art was largely associated with other systems of 
knowledge—most notably religion. Personally, I would advocate such a change to art 
because I feel art should be constantly evolving. In fact, I feel it needs to evolve in order to 
remain relevant and viable within our contemporary knowledge-based economy.     
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